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ABSTRACT
BECOMING VISIONARY:
READING AND WRITING IN THE EXISTENTIAL MODE
by
Michael Reardon
University of New Hampshire, September, 1994

This study identifies, defines and analyzes a sub-genre of
modern Anglo-American fiction distinguished by the presence
of "visionary" characters, who possess the ability to see
acutely into the contingency and anguish of the human
condition in this world rather than—as with the popular
conception of "visionary"—our potentialities in another.
Their experience of vision flows from an "existential
moment," a type of epiphany which discloses the essential
Nothingness that exists beneath the systems, structures,
attitudes and assumptions through which we attempt to order
our daily lives. Most importantly, the visionary's
heightened consciousness leads to an existence defined by
individual choice, responsibility for oneself and toward
others, and passionate commitment to the pursuit of Sartrean
authenticity—and as such marks an ontological evolution
from the "quotidian," a state of "bad faith" characterized
vi

by "blindness" to the unsettling truths with which the
visionary confronts us. It is my contention that visionary
characters, who are invariably themselves readers, enact
paradigmatic possibilities for being for their readers, and
in so doing, demonstrate art's most essential function: the
ability to rouse the faculties to act.
This study deals with, in order, five texts: Ivor
Winter's "The Brink of Darkness," Miss Lonelyhearts, Irwin
Shaw's "Act of Faith," The Voyage Out and Lord Jim. The
study's frame of "Brink" and Lord Jim provides a contrast
between a character who recoils from the implications of
vision and one who comes to be defined by his pursuit of
them. ML and "Act" demonstrate the coherence of visionary
narratives through the juxtaposition of a modern masterwork
and a relatively obscure short story. Finally, Voyage, in
reflecting the perspective of a woman visionary, offers
perhaps the most intense experience of vision in the study.
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CHAPTER I
THE CONSEQUENCES OF READING
"That is the question...How to be!"

(Conrad, Lord Jim)

"There is but one truly serious philosophical problem,
and that is suicide." (Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus)

The goal of this study is the identification, definition, and
analysis of what I feel to be a significant subgenre of modern
fiction which portrays characters I call "visionaries." While
the thematic and formal similarities of these disparate texts
are in themselves compelling, their true value and power, I
will argue, lie in their depiction of the problem of and
strategies for attaining authentic being within an existential
universe1.
Now, having at the outset placed equivocal terms like
"visionary" and "existentialism" on the table, I realize
definition is essential. My primary goal in this chapter,
however, is to establish a conceptual, historical, literary
and

ethical

framework

for

the

1

analysis

of

visionary

By "authentic being" I mean, first, that we are what we
choose, or to look at this from the other end, we are the sum
of our decisions. This is not to state something equivalent
to, say, the United States Army's recent recruiting slogan,
"Be all that you can be," which implies the presence of a kind
of ontological blueprint which the individual can either
choose to fulfill or not. Rather the experiences adumbrated in
visionary texts show authenticity to be contingent on freedom.
As John Macquarrie summarizes the point, authentic individuals
"become truly themselves only to the extent that they freely
choose themselves." This freedom, I will argue, results from
two prominent manifestations of visionary experience: the
question and the existential moment. Such freedom is also as
rare as it is frightening. I hope to make this point most
clearly through a consideration below of one small, dark
corner of the Holocaust.
I would also point out the cogency of the concept of
authentic being in our everyday lives. For example, the
emergence over the past decade of the Hip Hop culture and rap
music is spoken of as a desire for "authenticity" among black
inner city youths. The best example I have encountered
recently was the observation that Vice President Albert Gore
is who George Bush would be if the former President were
"authentic."
2

characters. This frame begins with two "existential" questions
which visionary texts address and which visionary heroes
answer. The first of these—"how to be?"—appears in Lord Jim
(1900) and epitomizes the profound ontological displacement
caused by the social, economic, and scientific changes of the
nineteenth century while simultaneously acting as prologue to
the existential tenor of the twentieth. It will be recalled
that in that passage the portentous Stein, in responding to
Marlow's request for guidance in relation to Jim, is offering
an imprecise paraphrase of Hamlet's meditation on suicide:
"Ja! Ja! in general, adapting the words of your great poet:
That is the question.. .How to be! Ach! How to be!" (199).
Stein's linguistic awkwardness and consequent "adaptation" is
a conscious move by Conrad to invest Jim's quest for identity
with archetypal and personal2 significance. In doing so the
second

frame

question

is

also

prefigured:

Camus's

philosophical imperative (if I, too, may adapt)—"whether to
be"—which opens The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) 3. Stein's and
2

Conrad, too, with English as his third language, was
prone to the infelicitous phrase.
3

Conrad himself attempted suicide by placing a gun
against his breast and pulling the trigger. He survived only
because the bullet missed his heart by a fraction of an inch.
See chapter five for context. The opening of Camus' work
reads:
"There is but one truly serious philosophical
problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life
is or is not worth living amounts to answering the
fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest—
whether or not the world has three dimensions,
whether the mind has nine or twelve categories—
3

Camus's questions delineate an ominous progression. Yet does
not the setting of Camus's query—the Europe of 1942—stand in
bleak

testimony

of

the

utter

seriousness,

the

very

appropriateness, of that grim question as well as of our
collective failure to adequately answer Stein's question?
Indeed, given this century's unabated appetite for genocide
and social disintegration, Camus's is perhaps the only serious
philosophical question that can be asked in our time and
completes

the

existential

"frame" which

the

visionary

characters I will analyze inhabit.
The question of "how to be" is also implicit in this
chapter's title, which is intended to suggest a complementary
thesis which will inform my discussion of visionaries. As
befits an analysis which will draw heavily upon the themes and
ideas of existentialism, this underlying thesis has a personal
cast which I want to acknowledge at the outset. My motivation
in undertaking this topic is to reflect upon the connections
between the hours of my life engaged in reading and in
teaching and writing about what I read, and the rest of my
life in the world of women and men and events; to investigate
the possible links between any consciousness engaged with a
literary work and the moral quality of an individual's
existence beyond that text; in a phrase, to examine whether
the study of literature is, can be, or even ought to be

comes afterwards. These are games; one must first
answer."
4

ethically "profitable." In a sense, I am carrying

I.A.

Richards' bold (and, many today would argue, naive) contention
that literature "is capable of saving us; it is a perfectly
possible means of overcoming chaos" a half-step further by
suggesting that our most ethically valuable critical responses
are those which apprehend the literature which confronts and
responds to the question of "how to be" in a universe devoid
of moral absolutes.
To be sure, the question of the affective nature of
literature has been addressed by others. Plato, through his
banning of poets from his Republic, ironically lent a powerful
eloquence to literature's ability to affect human conduct. In
the sixteenth century, Sidney defined the object of poetry to
be "to teach and delight (in order to) move men to take that
goodness in hand, which without delight, they would fly as
from a stranger, and teach, to make them know that goodness
whereunto they are moved" (Abrahms, 480). Indeed, he saw
knowledge's purpose as its ability "to lead and draw us to as
high a perfection as our degenerate souls...can be capable
of." And the highest form of knowledge, in Sidney's view, was
"knowledge

of

one's

self,

in

the

ethic

and

politic

consideration, with the end of well doing and not of well
knowing

only"

(Abrahms,

481,

emphasis

mine).

In

the

seventeenth century, Ben Jonson's "Epistle Prefatory" to
Volpone unabashedly claims as the "principal end of poesy" the
desire "to informe men, in the best reason for living" (Booth,
5

231-32). And in the eighteenth century, Matthew Arnold wrote,
"One must...be struck more and more the longer one lives, to
find how much in our present society a man's life each day
depends for its solidity and value upon whether he reads
during that day, and far more still on what he reads during
it" (Booth, 264).
We can cite, too, testaments from writers' personal
experience in gauging the ability of literature to offer
psychic counsel and spiritual rejuvenation. Indeed, Saint
Augustine, one of the most influential predecessors of the
modern

existentialists,

is

finally

converted

from

his

dissolute life when he hears
a voice, as of a boy or a girl, I know not,
chanting, and oft repeating, "Take up and read;
Take up and read." Instantly, my countenance
altered, I began to think most intently whether
children were wont in any kind of play to sing such
words. So checking the torrent of my tears, I
arose; interpreting it to be no other than a
command from God to open the book, and to read the
first chapter I should find....I seized, opened,
and in silence read that section on which my eyes
first fell: Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in
chambering and wantonness, not in strife and
envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and
make not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence.
No further would I read; nor needed I; for
instantly at the end of this sentence, by a light
as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all
the darkness of doubt vanished away (VIII, 131).
Through his act of textual interpretation, and particularly
through his application of his reading to the chaotic welter
of his life, Augustine's experience offers a microcosm of
visionary

experience.

During
6

the

Victorian

Age,

the

dislocating effects of the ascendancy of the city and the
factory and the disconcerting ramifications of the higher
criticism of the Bible, witnessed the emergence of the
temporal writer as spiritual guide; the artist supplementing
if not supplanting the priest. Essayists like Carlyle, Ruskin,
Cardinal Newman, and Arnold played a tangible role in helping
the reading public to confront and deal with profoundly
disturbing ontological questions. Perhaps most famously,
Tennyson

epitomized

the

subgenre

of

the

spiritual

autobiography in In Memoriam by asking and working through the
existential shock implicit in his perception of a universe
heedless of human destiny. Nature has lost the nurturing
benevolence perceived by the Romantics and has evolved into a
mechanistic indifference: "I bring to life, I bring to death;/
The spirit does but mean the breath:/ I know no more."
However, the experience of John Stuart Mill is perhaps most
pertinent to my discussion. His spiritual autobiography
recounts being trapped in a "dry heavy dejection" brought on
by his assiduous Benthamite training whose object was "to be
a reformer of the world": for "the time came when I awakened
from this as from a dream." In what he assumes to be a passing
funk, Mill asks himself what Dostoyevsky elsewhere calls "an
accursed question," those with the capacity to challenge the
very core of our lives: "Suppose that all your objects in life
were realized; that all the changes in institutions and
opinions which you are looking forward to could be completely
7

effected at this very instant; would this be a great joy and
happiness to you?" When he can only answer "no," his momentary
melancholy devolves into a consuming despair: "The fountains
of vanity and ambition seemed to have dried up within me, as
completely as those of benevolence."
For reasons which will later become apparent, it is worth
noting that during his depression, Mill was able to function
quite well in his daily life:
During this time I was not incapable of my usual
occupations. I went on with them mechanically, by
the mere force of habit. I had been so drilled in a
certain sort of mental exercise that I could still
carry it on when all the spirit had gone out of it.
As his depression endures, he contemplates Camus's question,
which evolves directly from his asking himself "How to be?":
"I frequently asked myself if I could, or if I was bound to go
on living, when life must be passed in this manner." It is
here, on the brink of the abyss, that Mill encounters "a small
ray of light": J.F. Marmontel's Memoires. Prior to this,
Mill's attempts to find solace and direction in literature had
been in vain. But now Marmontel's narrative of his family's
own desolation and his role in rescuing them sparks an
empathic response in Mill, the engaged reader4: "A vivid
conception of that scene and its feeling came over me, and I
was moved to tears." Mill is again able to feel, and slowly,
inexorably he begins to break free of the desiccating grip of
4

The idea of an "engaged" or "committed" reader will
assume increasing importance to my argument. For a working
definition, see pages 11 and 38.
8

utilitarian analysis, a process which culminates in his
rereading of Wordsworth:
"What made Wordsworth's poems a medicine for my
state of mind, was that they expressed, not mere
outward beauty, but states of feeling, and of
thought colored by feeling, under the excitement of
beauty. They seemed to be the very culture of the
feelings, which I was in quest of" (Abrahms,
pp.1066-1074).
What I wish to stress at this point is the importance of
the individual's—if I may posit Mill's experience as a
paradigm—discovering

the

medicinal

text

which

will

effectively minister to his or her psychic needs. Now I hasten
to point out that this is not to advocate a kind of
bibliotherapeutic,

text-as-magic-bullet

stance

regarding

reading and living; however, I am trying to establish through
these various citations and examples two key points: first,
the efficacy of literature, indeed, perhaps its integrality,
for

our

living

moral

lives—by

which

I

mean

lives

characterized by personal reflection, social connection, and
perseverance in the face of the omnipotence of entropy—and,
second, the special efficacy of certain texts and characters—
specifically, those I designate below as "visionary"—in
addressing specific problems endemic to human experience.
Kenneth Burke has written: "A work is the strategic naming of
a situation. It singles out a pattern of experience that is
sufficiently representative of our social structure, that
recurs sufficiently often mutatis mutantis. for people to
'need a word for it' and to adopt an attitude towards it"
9

(259). The enduring human problem depicted in visionary
literature is that of constructing a moral life in an
existential universe, and the visionary hero is that character
who offers paradigms and even strategies for confronting that
problem.
Certainly some modern and contemporary critics have
recognized the connection between reading and living. That the
primary fruits of literary study were ethical rather than
theoretical in nature had, until the past twenty years, always
carried substantial credibility. In the introduction to his
Three Philosophical Poets (1936) George Santayana writes
The sole advantage in possessing great works of
literature lies in what they can help us to become.
In themselves, as feats performed by their authors,
they would have forfeited none of their truth or
greatness if they had perished before their day. We
can neither take away nor add to their past value
or inherent dignity. It is only they, in so far as
they are appropriate food and not poison for us,
that can add to the present value and dignity of
our minds. (5)
Burke's article cited above, entitled "Literature as Equipment
for

Living,"

suggests

an

even more

pragmatic

end

for

literature, a "sociological criticism," by which he means one
which would
codify the various strategies which artists have
developed with relation to the naming of
situations....(It) would derive its relevance from
the fact that it should apply both to works of art
and to social situations outside of art....(It)
would consider works of art, I think, as strategies
for selecting enemies and allies, for socializing
losses, for warding off evil eye, for purification,
and desanctification, consolation and vengeance,
admonition and exhortation, implicit commands and
instructions of one sort or another (260-62).
10

Indeed, Louise Rosenblatt speaks of "aesthetic transactions"
between reader and text in which the reading act is motivated
by a desire in the reader for something to "carry away": moral
guidance, wisdom, direction. Paul Hunter concurs with this,
noting that while "none of us would rationally decide to turn
our personal decisions over to novelists.., the desire for
instruction (usually a little disguised) still remains one of
the most powerful motives for reading novels or autobiography
or history, or for seeing films" (269). John Gardner has
further observed: "No one seriously doubts that...ideals
expressed in art can affect behavior in the world, at least in
some people some of the time" (27). More boldly, Wayne Booth
argues that "anyone who conducts honest introspection knows
that 'real life' is lived in images derived in part from
stories" (228). And Gary Saul Morson asks where but in novels
we are to discover "situations rich enough to educate our
moral sense... .The entire impulse of novels is to provide just
such information, as 'thickly' as possible. Ethics is a matter
of prosaics, and great prose develops our ethical sense"
(526).
Most rigorously, reader response critics have traced how
such effects might be realized through the act of reading. In
its most profound form—and by that I mean a depth and
intensity of reading characterized by intellectual and psychic
engagement and immersion into the "destructive element" of the
text—I believe the reading of fiction to be a form of putting
11

one's self into question with the certainty that when we
retrace our identity, that self will only more or less
resemble that with which we entered the work. Thus readers
speak of "losing" themselves in a book. The question, then,
becomes who are we when found?
When Wolfgang Iser discusses the reading process as an
"active interweaving of anticipation and retrospection" in
which a fiction's "dynamism" is generated by the reader's
"filling in the gaps left by the text itself," he is
describing a phenomenological transaction which in effect
vivifies the text. Iser employs the analogy of constellations
in which the linguistic signs of the text are equated with the
fixed stars in a night sky. The "lines" with which the chance
patterns of heavenly bodies are transformed into recognizable
forms are equated with the "variable" and "inexhaustible"
permutations through which readers "transform" linguistic
signs into the "active and creative" experience of reading.
Iser points out that this process is "closely akin to the way
in which we gather experience in life5. And thus the *reality'
of the reading experience can illuminate basic patterns of
real experience"6.
5

An excellent example of this process is in the reader's
experience of Jim's character in Lord Jim, which will be
discussed in chapter five.
^hat also bears comment here is the existential nature
of this analogy. Constellations are but a form of cosmic
"connect the dots" upon which humankind, faced with the
impenetrable and inexhaustible darkness of the universe, seeks
to impose "significant form."
12

The most commented upon aspect of Iser's trenchant
analysis is the concept of textual "gaps," the "unwritten"
parts of a work which "stimulate the reader's creative
participation and set into motion the reading dynamic. Yet
what remains only implicit is the "abysmal" nature of gaps.
They are terra incognita, an intellectual terrain devoid of
signs, the "ground" in which the existent/reader is confronted
with a continuum of choices between self-invent ion (how to be)
and extinction (whether to be) ; that is, between sustaining or
ending the literary experience. This last option is an aspect
neglected in Iser's description. While he speaks of textual
gaps as a series of opportunities for the reader to "climb
aboard,"

even,

in

its

fullest

fruition, to

"formulate

ourselves," each gap or "blockage" also presents the reader
with the possibility of "jumping ship." Thus does the reading
act—through

the reader's continuous negotiation of and

decision making about textual gaps—constitute in fact an
existential act. The reading experience does, in this sense,
powerfully mirror reality not only mimetically through the
situations

it

creates

but

more

significantly

phenomenologically through the raw existential quality of the
experience itself. Herein lies the relevance, I trust, of my
Conradian allusion above to the "destructive element" of the
text. The act of reading can be seen as a type of ontological
training in which one either learns to swim or one sinks; one
either becomes or decays; that is, the reader—in the face of
13

all rational and pragmatic and sophisticated evidence to the
contrary—affirms his or her belief in the literary work as a
thing which, through the act of committed reading, "becomes"
rather than "is." One, for example, hasn't "had" Shakespeare
or the Romantic poets with the connotation of something
mastered or endured but rather the individual turns and
returns to these texts, as did J.S. Mill, as sources of and
for life. Our experience of visionary characters reflects a
prime example of this phenomenon.
As I hope I have outlined historically, the existence of
a correlation between the acts of reading, studying and
responding to significant literary works and the ethical and
quotidian content and conduct of our lives is an enduring
ideal, but one, to judge from the rarified matter of much
professional dialogue about literature, often forgotten,
repressed, disguised, or in some cases even disdained. In his
admirable The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction, Wayne
Booth discerns five reasons for the decline of "ethical
criticism," by which he means "any effort to show how the
virtues of narratives relate to the virtues of selves and
society..." (11) : first, that a greater emphasis on the actual
effects of literature would result in censorship; second, that
value judgements are subjective and thus incompatible with a
serious intellectual discipline, that knowledge is only

14

attainable from facts7; third, (an apparent corollary of two)
true reason evolves only from critical doubt. From this
perspective, it would be inappropriate for the reader to
surrender him or herself to the "invitation" of the text8;
fourth, the problem of variability in standards of taste and
aesthetic value: the belief that "conflicting values cancel
each other out"; fifth, the ascendancy of abstract theories of
art, which, because of narrative's emphasis upon content, has
proved particularly debilitating to ethical criticism of
fiction (26-37).
However valid any of these reasons may be, even a
cursory view of the current state of literary studies reveals
that a significant number of the most technically gifted
readers have apparently come to view the critical act as
primarily abstract and theoretical rather than ethical.
Writing about what one reads is now more often than not denied
an ethical dimension; it is, it seems to me, aimed more toward
the delineation and defense of professional turf than toward
personal discovery and decision. The concern is with "how to
be" a formalist, structuralist, or deconstructionist critic
rather than with how interaction with the literary work
affects one's being beyond the work if, in fact, the poststructuralist critic grants the existence of anything beyond
7

Cf. both Ambrose Ridley in The Voyage Out (chapter four)
and Jim's naval tribunal in Lord Jim (chapter five).
8

Cf. my remarks on Wolfgang Iser's analysis of the
reading process in this chapter.
15

the text. The argument becomes political, not ethical with the
emphasis on theory not only preceding but seemingly obviating
action. We think but, neglecting Spenser's advice, we do not
do.
In discussing reading as an ethical act, Gary Saul Morson
expresses his discomfort at recommending Tolstoy's What Is
Art? and "similar writings," recognizing that he "risk(s)
seeming naive, because all that people remember about these
essays is their narrow moral ism—the very thing that has given
moral criticism a bad name. In reacting to such narrowness, we
have mistakenly banned moral criticism altogether." But Morson
sees beyond what he terms "Tolstoy's objectionable moralism"
to the Russian's insight that what is essential to the
literary work is not whatever explicit moral one may glean
from it, but instead its ability to "infect" (Tolstoy's term)
us with "moral values that we as readers practice moment to
moment while reading it" (527) and, I would add, inculcate
into our everyday lives as well.
Near the end of his life, Hermann Hesse observed that he
had a "charge, albeit small and confined: to help other
seekers to understand and to cope with the world, if only by
assuring them that they are not alone."

Yet I suspect that

many of us are uncomfortable with art and approaches to art
that revolve around such bald questions as the "meaning of
life." We are uncomfortable, I think, not primarily because
the answers—or their absence—may prove, as with writers like
16

Conrad

and

Camus,

disconcerting,

but

because

we

are

embarrassed by their naivete or, to look at them from the
other end, because they lack the patina of sophistication and
intellectual rigor of, say, deconstruction. We are both
compelled and rendered uneasy by the "accursed" question much
as the inhabitants of fictional worlds will be seen to be
alternately, even simultaneously, compelled and embarrassed by
the visionary in their midst.
As I stated, the question of the "aesthetic" potential of
literature is the complementary thesis of my study. It is a
theme, however, integrally related to my stated topic of
visionary literature, not only because these fictions grapple
with the difficult and daunting issue of individual identity
in an existential universe but also because virtually all the
visionaries in this study are themselves readers and many are
artists or artisans, which is to say they are by nature
inclined toward reflection and creative ways of interpreting
their worlds. The cogent and provocative temper of their
critiques is why these texts are valuable and remarkable to me
for they have the power of shocking me into awareness.
Heidegger, whose life described a moral chasm between reading
and living9, speaks of the world being "lit up" for us when
its "instrumentality"—the tools and services and institutions
that constitute the fabric of everyday life—breaks down. This

9

See especially Victor Farias's Heidegger and Naziism and
Jean-Francois Lyotard's Heideggar and the "jews".
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"breakdown" and subsequent illumination is what the visionary
hero experiences and shares with the reader: the ability to
"light up" the habitual patterns and assumptions of our
everyday psychic life. The visionary offers, in John Gardner's
phrase, "the flicker of lightning that shows where we are"
(16) and in so doing evokes reflection and response and change
in us10.
Having outlined an ethical context for my discussion,
let me now turn to defining my two key terms. Since it will
serve as the background for my analysis of visionary texts, I
will

begin with

"existentialism,"

which

is most often

designated an "attitude" rather then a coherent philosophy11.
Indeed, its complexity and broadly divergent manifestations
have rendered it notoriously elusive as a concept12. Sartre,
whose "existence precedes essence" is the closest one can come

10

By "change," I am speaking again of moral growth along
the lines of my above definition of "moral." It is this type
of change that is implicit in the conclusion of Forster's
Aspects of the Novel when he envisions a time when "the phrase
'the development of the novel' might cease to be a pseudoscholarly tag or a technical triviality, and become important,
because it implied the development of humanity" (174).
11

We expect, too, I think it is safe to say, more
objectivity and detachment from our ideal of a philosopher
than most existential thinkers deliver.
12

As might well be expected of a world view which numbers
among its elite a Protestant like Soren Kierkegaard, a Jew
like Martin Bauber, a Catholic like Miguel de Unamuno, and an
atheist like Jean Paul Sartre (which is not to mention those,
like Albert Camus, who are wont to switch "affiliations" in
search of spiritual solace.) I recognize, too, that in any
event no self-respecting "existentialist" would allow her or
himself to be classified as such.
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to an actual definition, complained that "the word is now so
loosely applied to so many things that it no longer means
anything at all13" (Kaufmann, 289). However, in this study the
term will mean something, to wit: the universe as indifferent
to human needs and enterprise; human life as essentially
tragic; and the individual's role within that universe and
life as defined by individual choice, social responsibility,
and spiritual commitment in the pursuit of authentic selfhood.
This overview itself requires elucidation. Regarding my
first

two

components,

I

would

cite

William

Barrett's

observation that "the radical feeling of human finitude14,"
which he sees as the defining characteristic of the modern
human condition, is a result of "alienation and estrangement;
a sense of the basic fragility and contingency of human life;
the impotence of reason confronted with the depths of
existence; the threat of Nothingness, and the solitary and
13

There is an interesting parallel between Sartre's
observation regarding existentialism and the fortunes of
deconstruction in the public linguistic domain. Although David
Lehman makes a similar observation in his acerbic attack on
deconstruction in Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the
Fall of Paul de Man (see especially his first chapter) , he
seems to also suggest an intellectual equation between the two
concepts, labeling existentialism "that mid-century salute to
death-of-god theorizing in the Gallic manner" (19). While
Lehman is no doubt being arch here, it is ironic to note that
existentialism, which stresses individual choice, decision,
and responsibility, could not be further removed from the
tenets of deconstruction, which in Lehman's own words "puts
into question things like cause and effect, right and
wrong...(and) that individuals are agents of volition..."
(41).
14

Barrett defines "human finitude" as "the presence of the
not in the being of man" (290).
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unsheltered condition of the individual before this threat"
(36) . It is perhaps easy when confronted with phrases like
Barrett's to understand Lehman's waggishness (cited in the
footnote above) in regard to existentialism. The brooding
pessimism15 which is often unjustly attributed to existential
thought seems to frequently provoke a (defensive?) desire to
laugh and then to get on with one's life in the "real world."
I am not entirely sure that this is unsound advice. But I
know,

too,

that

in

its

individual's responsibility

unwavering

insistence

on

the

for "making" him or herself

through a lifetime of choices; in its valorization of
consciousness, by which I mean an accurate appraisal of the
human condition16; and, most significantly, in its inextricable
linking of the world of thought and the world of everyday

15

See Sartre's seminal essay "Existentialism Is a
Humanism" for a spirited defense against charges of
existentialism's pessimism.
16

Miguel De Unamuno asks: "Which would you find most
appalling—to feel such a pain as would deprive you of your
senses on being pierced through with a white-hot iron, or to
see yourself thus pierced through without feeling any pain?
Have you never felt the horrible terror of feeling yourself
incapable of suffering and tears? Suffering tells us that we
exist..." (207). If doubt exists as to the "terror" of which
De Unamuno speaks, consult the Autobiography of John Stuart
Mill cited above. While Olsen reminds us that 'Englishman' and
'Utilitarian' are still dirty words in the existentialists'
vocabulary" (15), Mill did once observe that it would be far
better to be Socrates unhappy than to be a contented pig.
Indeed for a temperament such as Mills' to be born the son of
Jeremy Bentham's chief lieutenant seems a cruel twist of fate.
As to the beneficial effects of suffering, see the comments
below of Irving Howe regarding the value of questions.
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life17, existentialism as a world view dwells more affectively
and more concretely in that "real world" than any other
perspective—however loosely defined—I have encountered.
But what are the "realities" of our world, why are they
"tragic,"

and

why

is

existentialism

a

cogent

way

of

confronting them? I suggested as part of my existential
criteria a universe whose nature is "indifferent to human
needs." In Woody Allen's18 Hannah and Her Sisters Allen's
character is desperate for a source of spiritual direction in
his life; consequently, he investigates a series of faiths,
momentarily seizing upon Catholicism, a choice which, to
understate the situation, nonpluses his Jewish parents. While
his mother wails in another room, Allen confronts his father
with Allen's need for spiritual certainty in a morally
ambiguous world, finally blurting out, "How do you explain
evil? How do you explain Nazis?" "Nazis?" the father responds.
"How do you expect me to explain Nazis? I can't even figure
out how the can opener works." Herein lies our burden—the
need to discover a moral fulcrum upon which to balance our
existence—enveloped within a dilemma: the desire and need to

17

Soren Kierkegaard, the so-called "father" of modern
existentialism, is in my view a modern archetype of this type
of integrated, holistic life: a man who "drank from his own
well."
18

Since I originally wrote this chapter, Allen's fortunes
have undergone a precipitous fall, which again serves to
delineate the distinctions between theory and practice as well
as the advisability of completing one's dissertation in a
timely manner.
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live our lives in the quotidian/material world—to both
negotiate its myriad obstacles and, we hope, reap the benefits
of our diligence and skill in doing so—while somehow also
satisfying the moral imperative of confronting humankind's
undiminished capacity for evil. This tension and clash—
indeed, this incompatibility—between the desire for comfort
and joy on the one hand and for psychic wholeness and moral
rectitude on the other will be played out repeatedly in the
visionary texts I will examine19.
Allen's character's desire to find an articulated faith
which will offer him moral direction

19

likely touches a

Hannah and Her Sisters is a romance in which the myriad
ills that gnaw at human happiness and harmony (disease,
infidelity, jealousy, despair, and lust—to name but a few
that appear in this film) are happily resolved as the various
permutations of couples and relationships align or realign
themselves. Allen's character comes to realize that being
"part of (a life)" that includes the Marx brothers and the
possibility of joy is "worth it." All ends harmoniously in and
at Thanksgiving. Never resolved, however, is Allen's awkward
question to his father about the prevalence and magnitude of
human evil. Indeed, the film is peppered with references to
Nazis almost as if Allen sought to inject his romance with the
germ of darkness, which, his character realizes, like the
cancer he feared had infected his brain, waits symbolically,
ineluctably for and in us all. A more cynical and realistic
vision of human endeavor is offered in Allen's later Crimes
and Misdemeanors, in which the protagonist, mired in an
extramarital affair gone dangerously sour, solves his
"problem" through murder, a deed which propels him into an
abyss of depression, which in turn (and herein lies true
realism) he not only survives but transcends. By film's end,
he has apparently resolved, psychically and spiritually, the
despair that had threatened to engulf him. In the film's
concluding scene, he cathartically retells his experience to
the Allen character, who produces socially relevant (and thus)
unsuccessful documentaries, in the form of a potential film
script. Interestingly, the dominant image motif in Crimes and
Misdemeanors is that of vision.
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responsive chord in us all. It is, nonetheless, a futile
desire. Sartre defines the human condition as "one of free
choice (but) without excuse and without help" (307). Without
excuse because we are the sum of our free choices; there
exists neither a human essence/nature to explain or excuse
those choices; nor a supernatural power to help us make them:
The
existentialist...finds
it
extremely
embarrassing that God does not exist, for there
disappears with Him all possibility of finding
values in an intelligible heaven....Everything is
indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is
in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything
to depend upon either within or outside himself.
(294-95, Kaufmann)
With this in mind, the implications of Sartre's phrase
"condemned to freedom" begins to crystalize as does also,
perhaps, what is meant by the "tragic condition of humankind."
We will see characters confront such condemnation in, for
example, Bartleby's brick wall reveries; in Terence Hewet's
realization of Rachel's Vinrace's death; and in Jim's loss of
his code of conduct.
In the film, Allen's character, fearing an apparently
imminent death, confronts and answers Camus's question,
escaping death only because he is sweating so profusely that
the

rifle

reclamation

barrel
of

slips

life

as he pulls

its

occurs, significantly,

trigger. His
alone

in a

moviehouse watching the Marx Brothers. There, like Plato's
prisoners in the cave20, he is literally and symbolically in
Z0

Plato's allegory will emerge as a prominent visionary
motif in my discussion of "Act of Faith" and The Voyage Out.
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the dark watching images flicker on a screen while surrounded
by others in the same condition. It is in those circumstances
that he must make his choice. His desire for an explanation of
nazism is, of course, never granted. I think existentialism
may provide one.
Surely one must ask whether it is necessary to conjure
the grim implications of Auschwitz, possibly the nadir of
human experience, as representative of the "real world"21.
Unquestionably the rhythms of the daily lives of most women
and men are characterized by decency and decorum; without
that, anarchy would be at every door. But is this perhaps too
facile of an assumption in that it implies the Holocaust as
aberration, as "an interruption in the normal flow of history,
a cancerous growth on the body of civilized society, a
momentary madness among sanity" to be commemorated by annual
Holocaust observances and the like

(Bauman, viii)? The

suggestion is that while the Holocaust should be remembered,
that that memory be sufficiently circumscribed so that it not
encumber the solid and comfortable furniture of our everyday
psychic life. Robert Nozick places the wages of confronting
the truths of the Holocaust into stark perspective. Given the
reality of the Holocaust, he writes, the termination of the
human race is not unthinkable. Not desirable perhaps, but it
"would now be no special loss above and beyond the losses to
21

Auschwitz was referred to as "the asshole of the world"
by condemned and executioners alike. For a graphic depiction
of the phrase, see Lina Wertmuller's film Seven Beauties.
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the individuals involved. Humanity has lost its claim to
continue" (238). Nozick images the Holocaust as "a massive
cataclysm that distorts everything around it" (242) . I would
suggest that it is this distortion—the abyss of human perfidy
underlying the structures of everyday life—that the visionary
ahistorically perceives.
But such reasons for emphasizing the centrality of the
Holocaust are perhaps insufficient. Let me cite others: first,
as I hope my discussion below of Ordinary Men: Reserve Police
Battalion

101

demonstrate,

and
the

the
gap

Final
between

Solution
quotidian

in

Poland

and

will

visionary

experience is no gap at all but rather a distinction in moral
acuity and, consequently, of how to be; second, the Holocaust
was perhaps the ultimate "limit situation," which is a key to
visionary experience22; third, the Holocaust was fueled by and
the culmination of the triumph of the literature of antiSemitic myth; fourth, many of the most influential thinkers in
the Western intellectual tradition fed into and off those
myths23; fifth, the Holocaust may be seen as the inevitable
outgrowth of modernity itself24; sixth, and most importantly,
the career of anti-Semitism is integrally bound to the concept
22

This idea from Karl Jaspers will be discussed in chapter

two.
23

And in this context it should be noted again that the
Holocaust was perpetrated by perhaps "the most civilized
nation on the face of the earth."
24

Bauman's Modernity and the Holocaust offers a cogent
defense of this thesis and is indeed the source of this idea.
25

of identity. From the time of the Babylonian Captivity when
Jews evolved many of their religious rituals as a defense
against cultural assimilation, through the various attempts by
European "liberals" to reform the "depraved Jewish character"25
by ostensibly incorporating them into the body politic, and
culminating with the Holocaust as the Final Solution to this
age old "problem," the persecution of the Jews has always been
to

a

significant

degree

the

product

of

Jews'

very

authenticity—their refusal to relinquish their identity as
Jews. The significance of this for each of us as we seek our
own authenticity, sometimes utilizing visionary texts as
possible models, would seem clear.
It is interesting within this context, then, to note
David Hirsch's observation that "the quintessence of Nazism
was precisely an assault on the concept of the existence of
the self carried to its logical extreme" (95) . The Jews,
historically the archetypal Other26, were exterminated by the
Nazis because they were perceived by their persecutors as
subhuman, a process which was but the culmination of a mythic
apparatus centuries in the making: the Jew as killer of

"See Rose, especially chapter 6.
26

I have been asked why women wouldn't be a more logical
historical choice for this dubious distinction. Two reasons:
first, a grouping by race rather than gender offers a better
microcosm of humanity; second, as mentioned above, the idea of
Jewishness seems inextricably bound to the idea of identity.
The larger point, however, is not which group has been more
oppressed but rather humanity's indefatigable appetite for
oppression.
26

Christ; as killer of Christian children; as drinker of their
shed blood and slaughtered flesh

(or, in a variant, as

desecrater of the sacramental host); as poisoner of Christian
wells; as usurer. These myths are the lifeblood of antiSemitism, and they have been perpetrated by some of the most
influential thinkers in the Western intellectual tradition—
Christian, Jew and atheist alike. In a pamphlet entitled "The
Jews and Their Lies," Martin Luther condemned the Jews for all
the above "crimes":
So we are even at fault in not avenging all this
innocent blood of our Lord and of the Christians
which (the Jews) shed for three hundred years after
the destruction of Jerusalem, and the blood of the
children they have shed since then (which still
shines forth from their eyes and their skin). We
are at fault in not slaying them.
Paul Rose observes, "Through the influence of Luther's
language and tracts, a hysterical and demonizing mentality
entered the mainstream of German thought and discourse; Luther
in fact legitimated hysteria and paranoia in a major European
culture" (163). In 1935 the Nazis reissued Luther's pamphlet
in a popular edition.
What evolves most tellingly and most frighteningly from
the analysis by historians like Rose and Gavin Langmuir27 of
the enduring career of anti-Semitism is, in the words of
Robert Alter, "the awesome power over human events of word,
image, and narrative." Alter argues that without the invention

27

See Langmuir's History. Religion, and Antisemitism and
Toward a Definition of Antisemitism.
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and propagation of anti-Semitic myths, the Nazi's holocaust
would never have occurred: "Words are the first weapons of
mass destruction."
Words, however, are coined and manipulated by men and
women. Alter notes the German language's wealth of "verbal and
substantive terms for extirpation," and suggests that the
"lethal ambiguity" of these terms as they were used in
relation to the "Jewish Problem" afforded a "cover that made
it possible for men of good conscience to speak about the
unspeakable." These thinkers, among whom are listed Kant,
Marx, and Voltaire "would have considered themselves men of
humane values, certainly idealists..." (40). That is, they
were men who would have conducted themselves with decency and
decorum.
In "Portrait of the Antisemite" Sartre seizes upon this
discrepancy between appearance and reality in relating the
story of a fishmonger in 1942 who, angered at competition of
two Jewish competitors who had disguised their race, denounced
them to the authorities. "I was assured," says Sartre, "that
in other respects (the Christian fishmonger) was kind and
jovial, the best son in the world. But," concludes Sartre, "I
don't believe it:
A man who finds it natural to denounce men cannot
have our concept of the humane; he does not even
see those whom he aids in the same light as we do;
his generosity, his kindness are not like our
kindness, our generosity; one cannot localize
passion (276).
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So we are reminded again of the difficulty of apprehending the
real, of acknowledging the implications of truth, of attaining
disillusionment.
My concern, however, is not with "great thinkers," but
as I stated, with myself and the connection between my life in
literature and my life in the world. In this respect another
recent study on a small corner of the Holocaust (which Rose
calls "...the ultimate practical achievement of a century and
a half of the mythogenic development of German revolutionary
antisemitism," (58) may be more revealing. In Ordinary Men:
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland
Christopher Browning examines the sixteen month career of an
approximately 500 man German unit of what were euphemistically
and paradoxically termed "order police"28 composed of ordinary
Germans, men in their 30's and 40's, who, because of their age
...went through their formative periods in the preNazi era. These were men who had known political
standards and moral norms other than those of the
Nazis. Most came from Hamburg, by reputation one of
the least nazified cities in Germany, and the
majority came from a social class that had been
anti-Nazi in its political culture. These men would
not seem to have been a very promising group from
which to recruit mass murderers on behalf of the
Nazi vision of a racial Utopia free of Jews. (48)
Their job, which fell to them because of personnel shortages
in other units, was nonetheless "executed" with skill and even
zeal:

they

participated—through

Z8

direct

shootings

and

These units were essentially occupying forces in areas
conquered by the German army.
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transportation to Nazi death camps—in the slaughter of 80,000
Polish Jews. Browning's thesis, of course, is an investigation
of the motivations of these "ordinary men": what induced them
to become mass murderers of, mostly, women, children and
elderly men?
Not

surprisingly,

Browning's

conclusions

cite

the

influence of a virulent anti-Semitism and, more shockingly,
the post-war ambitions of the killers. But he places most of
the weight of his analysis upon simple peer pressure: "the
social psychological conditions, the objective and keenly felt
pressures of the group, the fear of being held in contempt by
one's comrades: these were what turned these men into
killers.. .and

kept

them

at

it"

(Goldhagen,

50). The

existentialists would label such a condition a "flight from
freedom" or "bad faith" or simply inauthenticity. Moreover,
Browning

concludes

his

study

with

another

example

of

Dostoyevsky's "accursed questions": "If the men of Reserve
Police

Battalion

101

could

become

killers

under

such

circumstances, what group of men cannot?"
It is important to remember that this unit did not
experience the "crucible of combat." A Nazi commander observed
that "the shooting of the Jews was not a matter of destroying
elements that represented a threat either to the fighting
troops or to the pacification of the field of operations
behind the lines; it was simply a matter of destroying Jews
for the sake of destroying Jews" (52). Virtually none of the
30

men of this unit were fired upon by or fired at a traditional
enemy during the duration of the war. But what is truly
revelatory in this book is that the participation in genocide
by these ordinary men was voluntary; they were mass murderers
by choice. As Daniel Goldhagen points out, previous Holocaust
scholarship has assumed that German troops who participated in
the actual killing of Jews fell into two groups: the Waffen
SS, the "true" (authentic?) and rabid Nazis who manifested the
"culture of death," and rank and file German troops who acted
under coercion.
What Browning shows, however, is far more chilling. On
July 11, 1941, Reserve Police Battalion 101 had the task of
rounding up the 1800 Jews of the Polish village of Jozefow.
Unlike their previous actions which had involved relocating
the Jewish population, the Germans were to summarily execute
all women, children and elderly, with working age males being
sent to work camps. The battalion commander, Major Wilhelm
Trapp, with tears streaming down his face, gathered his men
together, and, "after explaining the battalion's murderous
assignment, made an extraordinary offer: any of the older men
who did not feel up to the task that lay before them could
step out" (57) . Previously, if the all too familiar cry of
having "only followed orders" raised nothing other than
revulsion when cited by death camp commandants and members of
the Nazi hierarchy, there existed a tacit assumption that the
common German soldier acted under some degree of compulsion:
31

The authoritarian political culture of the Nazi
dictatorship, savagely intolerant of overt dissent,
along with the standard military necessity of
obedience to orders and ruthless enforcement of
discipline, created
a
situation
in which
individuals had no choice...Disobedience surely
meant the concentration camp if not immediate
execution, possibly for their families as well.
There is a problem with this explanation,
however. Quite simply, in the past forty-five years
no defense attorney or defendant in any of the
hundreds of postwar trials has been able to
document a single case in which refusal to obey an
order to kill unarmed civilians resulted in the
allegedly
inevitable
dire
punishment.
The
punishment or censure that occasionally did result
from such disobedience was never commensurate with
the gravity of29 the crimes the men had been asked to
commit. (170)
The participation in the slaughter by the "ordinary men" of
Police Battalion 101 was a matter of personal choice and
commitment to ideas that had been inculcated in them through
oral

and

written

literature,

specifically

through

the

mythology of anti-Semitism that in fact fueled the Holocaust.
Each of these men made an autonomous, cognitive, existential
choice to become a killer of Jews—what Goldhagen calls
"voluntary barbarism"—based upon "a profoundly anti-Semitic,
hallucinatory image of them" (52)30.
29

Browning also addresses the reasonable argument of
"putative duress," that these men had no way of knowing that
they, in fact, would not face dire consequences for not
participating in the slaughter. While some of the unit's
officers and non-commissioned
officers did pressure
recalcitrant soldiers, there existed, because of the
unambiguous sympathy and indeed protection extended by Major
Trapp, a set of unwritten assumptions that any man could
refuse participation with virtual impunity.
30
It is important here, I think, to understand that the
choice these men made was existential. Of the approximately
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The brute fact of the reality of the Holocaust stands as
five hundred men in the battalion, about twelve took up
Trapp's offer. Others, once the shooting had begun, found
means of avoiding participation. Nonetheless, it is clear that
between 80 and 90 percent of the battalion took part in the
extermination, which lasted for seventeen hours. The manner of
execution is revealing. The condemned Jews were trucked from
a reception center to the edge of a nearby woods where they
were met by squads of Reserve Police Battalion 101. Each squad
member would, face to face, take charge of a prisoner, and the
condemned were escorted to various clearings where they were
ordered to lay face down. The executioners would then place
their rifles at the base of the victim's skull and fire.
Again, the massacre at Jozefow lasted for seventeen hours with
the execution squads working in relays. There were regular
"breaks" for food and even alcohol. Furthermore, the men who
requested and received release from participation in the
slaughter did so not from moral compunction but rather from
physical revulsion at the visceral nature of the killings. One
of the killers recalled:
I especially asked to be relieved because the man
next to me shot so impossibly. Apparently he always
aimed his gun too high, producing terrible wounds
in his victims. In many cases the entire backs of
victims' heads were torn off, so that the brains
sprayed all over. I simply couldn't watch it any
longer (68).
It seems to stretch credulity that the aesthetic sensibilities
of these men could be acute while their moral sense remained
dormant. Yet the numbing shock this unit felt almost to a man
over their experience at Jozefow was soon replaced by
workmanlike competence and even zeal (recall the experience of
J.S. Mill). As the mass executions and transportations
progressed, these "ordinary" men participated in what they
called "Jew hunts," patrols whose goal was to search out and
destroy any Jews who had eluded the general slaughter.
Browning points out that this phase of the Holocaust was not
incidental but rather "a tenacious, remorseless, ongoing
campaign in which the 'hunters' tracked down and killed their
'prey' in direct and personal confrontation. It was not a
passing phase but an existential condition of constant
readiness and intention to kill every last Jew who could be
found" (132). Indeed, this activity, which again brought the
Germans face to face with their victims and where again they
could exercise a considerable amount of choice, became so
prominent an aspect of these men's identities and duties that
they began to refer to it as their "daily bread."
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an objective correlative of the psychic implications of an
existential universe: a world with a capacity for a voracious,
irrational and, subsequent events would suggest, undiminished
predatoriness framed by an indifferent and silent cosmos.
Faced with the Holocaust's historicity, we are faced, too,
with Browning's

"accursed" question of our own innate

capacity for complicity as ordinary men and women with the
killers of Reserve Police Battalion 101. Existentialism, of
course, would deny that connection for there exists no human
essence that would dictate for any of us the choices made by
those men. But the conditions within which those choices were
made—racial myth, authoritarian rule, alienation, personal
greed, the loss of empathy and the failure of responsibility—
remain undiminished. In our own country one need only tap into
the Zeitgeist concerning, say, AIDS or military escapades
against the Other of the moment to be reminded of the
alienating and isolating choices of ways to be that are made
daily31.
I suggested earlier that existentialist thought offers a
reply to our puzzlement over the existence of nazism/evil. It
is provided by Sartre in "Portrait of an Antisemite." I will
quote his conclusion:
We can now understand him. He is a man who is
afraid. Not of the Jews of course, but of himself,
of his conscience, his freedom, of his instincts,
of his responsibilities, of solitude, of change, of
31

And consequently, of course, a de facto decision of the
Other's right to be.
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society and the world; of everything except the
Jews. He is a coward who does not want to admit his
cowardice to himself; a murderer who represses and
censures his penchant for murder without being able
to restrain it and who nevertheless does not dare
to kill except in effigy or in the anonymity of the
mob; a malcontent who dares not revolt for fear of
the consequences of his rebellion. By adhering to
antisemitism, he is not only adopting an opinion,
he is choosing himself as a person. He is choosing
the permanence and the impenetrability of rock, the
total irresponsibility of the warrior who obeys his
leaders—and he has no leader. He chooses to
acquire nothing, to deserve nothing but that
everything be given him as his birthright—and he
is not noble. He chooses finally, that good be
readymade, not in question, out of reach; he dare
not look at it for fear of being forced to contest
it and seek another form of it. The Jew is only a
pretext; elsewhere it will be the Negro, the yellow
race; the Jew's existence merely allows the
antisemite to nip his anxieties in the bud by
persuading himself that his place has always been
cut out in the world, that it was waiting for him
and that by virtue of tradition he has the right to
occupy it. Antisemitism, in a word, is fear of
man's fate. The antisemite is a man who wants to be
pitiless stone, furious torrent, devastating
lightning: in short, everything but a man (286-87).
In touching upon the themes of the anti-Semite's fear before
that which is in question or doubt; of his desire for a place
in the world that is ready-made, not earned; of, in sum, his
terror before his human condition, Sartre names some of the
core issues of visionary fiction. In this vein, I wish to
suggest that the fulcrum of this study, the visionary
character, through his or her status as outsider, as alien to
the quotidian world, as authentic individual, and ultimately
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as reflector of that which is best or worst in all of us, to
be a form of Jew.32
Admittedly, "visionary," my second key term, is an
exceptionally elusive, even vague, designation. It has been
applied to historical and public figures from Attila to Saint
Joan; from Martin Luther King to Leona Helmsley. In spite of
the term's ubiquity, definitions within literary studies are
few, and those that exist accent the term's connections with
the unreal, imaginary, and speculative. Northrop Frye, in his
seminal study of Blake, defines the visionary as one who
"creates, or dwells in, a higher spiritual world in which the
objects of perception in this one have become transfigured and
charged with a new intensity of symbolism" (8). That is, the
visionary is able to see deeper and further into the stuff of
the physical realm, into its true nature/identity, in a manner
that would suggest Hopkins' conception of inscape. While my
sense of the visionary is integrally tied to the idea of
insight. Frye's use of the phrase "higher spiritual world,"
both in its implication of a realm removed from the physical
plane in which men and women exist and in its emphasis upon
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I suggest this idea within the (continuing) historical
framework
of
the
wholeness
of
Jewish
life—the
interconnectedness of religion, state, and family—rather than
in positing Jews as potentially or inherently any more
authentic than members of any other ethnic or religious group.
Nonetheless, as one recent commentator remarked, "Jews are now
liable to be envied for their persistent sense of identity.
They seem to be exempt from the blurred individualism of the
lonely crowd of a society increasingly denied cohesion"
(Raphael).
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spiritual

rather

than

existential

values,

treats

the

"visionary" antithetically to my sense of the term.
However, Colin Wilson's conception of the "Outsider"
shares important attributes with mine of the visionary. He
emphasizes, most significantly, the idea of the Outsider as
Truth-teller, one who sees "Too deep and too much" into the
human condition and is compelled to act upon that vision:
For the bourgeois, the world is fundamentally an
orderly place, with a disturbing element of the
irrational, the terrifying, which his preoccupation
with the present usually permits him to ignore. For
the Outsider, the world is not rational, not
orderly. When he asserts his sense of anarchy in
the face of the bourgeois' complacent acceptance,
it is not simply the need to cock a snook at
respectability that provokes him; it is a
distressing sense that truth must be told at all
costs, otherwise there can be no hope for an
ultimate restoration of order....The Outsider is a
man who has awakened to chaos." (15)
In a chapter entitled "The Outsider as Visionary," Wilson
deals with George Fox, the founder of the Society of Friends,
and, almost de

riqeur. William

Blake, emphasizing the

visionary as one who "starts from a point that everybody can
understand,

and

very

soon

soars

beyond

the

general

understanding" (203). While Wilson speaks of the "actual"
visions experienced by Fox and Blake, he argues, correctly
(although perhaps in contradiction to his image of a recondite
visionary knowledge in full flight) that the value of their
writing "does not lie in the 'visions' their words can conjure
up for us, but in the instructions they left for anyone who
should want to see the same things that they saw" (204). That
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is, Wilson places the ultimate value of visionary experience
in its ability to guide our being in this world.
Wilson's argument is compelling, in part admittedly
because it is the only study I have encountered which strikes
substantial harmony with my own ideas. However, besides
distinctions in terminology and texts, there are important
differences that should be noted. First, Wilson's Outsiders
experience their otherness in medias res; the key element in
my treatment of visionary experience is the existential
moment, the evolution from blindness to insight, from being in
the quotidian/bourgeois to being in the visionary realms.
Second,

Wilson

speaks

of

"rid(ding)

ourselves

of

the

temptation to identify the Outsider with the artist" (14) .
However, this identification is central to my argument, which
extends and focuses this connection to the act of engaged
reading by which I mean the reader's ability to see and
perhaps enact the paradigmatic possibilities

for living

presented by the visionary text. Third, Wilson ignores female
visionary

experience

when,

given

the

lack

of

choices

historically imposed upon women by a patriarchal culture, they
are much better candidates for revolt than most men.
Specifically, I will utilize "visionary" in the sense of
the

ancient

Greek

word

for

"truth,"

which

meant

"unhiddenness." That is, the visionary will be primarily
defined by his or her ability to see what is in this world but
hidden rather than the quality of being able to envision what
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will be in this or another world but does not yet exist. The
visionary's "sight" is an acting out of the biblical phrase
"the evidence of things unseen." In this sense, Plato's
"Allegory of the Cave" will serve throughout this study as a
classical paradigm for modern visionary experience33. The
visionary is the individual who, in William Barrett's phrase,
"can no longer hide his nakedness by the old disguises." He or
she has lost the ability to be pragmatic in responding to the
world, rejected conventional morality, and embraced instead a
personal ethic based upon his or her most profound selfconsciousness. In an existential sense, visionaries' actions
in response to what they see might be labeled an "act of
conscience";

always, having

achieved

vision,

they

are

motivated by a quest for authenticity and thus an ability to
not only see acutely and profoundly into the human condition
but also to act upon that vision. That is, as in Shaw's
conception of the genius/saint34, the visionary hero must
33

In its emphasis upon essences, Plato's thought is, of
course, antithetical to existentialism. His allegory, however,
loses none of its power even if one were to redefine the
nature of the truth the freed prisoner discovers. It is also
worth noting that Plato and existentialist thinkers from
Kierkegaard onward all pursued essentially the same goal:
human salvation. Plato sought his in the ideal forms that
would transcend the mortal realm; the existentialist seeks
only within that realm.
34

In Saint Joan, Shaw defines a genius as "a person who,
seeing farther and probing deeper than other people, has a
different set of ethical values from theirs, and has energy
enough to give effect to this extra vision and its valuations
in whatever manner best suits his or her specific talents"
(10). While I certainly do not wish to embroil my discussion
of visionary experience with the term "genius," Shaw's
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reconcile and give effect to what he or she "sees" on a
psychic plane within the everyday world of getting and
spending,

living

and

dying.

Visionary

heroes

cogently

illustrate art's ability to "rouse the faculties to act."
In light of these criteria, I have chosen to work with,
in order, "The Brink of Darkness," Miss Lonelyheartst "Act of
Faith," The Voyage Out and Lord Jim. I hope these selections
will accomplish several ends: first, the study's frame of
"Brink" and Lord Jim provides a contrast between a character
who recoils from the implications of vision and one who
doggedly pursues them; second, ML and "Act" demonstrate the
coherence of visionary fictions through the juxtaposition of
a modern classic and a relatively obscure short story; third,
Voyage. in addition to being the prototype for my conception
of visionary fictions, simply offers one of the most powerful
evocations of their function. Most significantly, of course,
I hope to offer original insights for each of these works.
Undoubtedly, the visionary fictions listed above are far
from comprehensive nor are such effects limited to fiction. I
have focused on narrative not only for the pragmatic reason of
limiting a potentially amorphous topic but more significantly

definition is nonetheless helpful. The distinction he makes
between "seeing" and "probing" also foreshadows, respectively,
what I will define below as the visionary's initial
"existential moment" and his or her subsequent and persistent
questioning of the accepted norms of a given milieu. The
reference to differing "ethical values" succinctly captures
the inherent tension between the visionary and the quotidian
world.
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because of fiction's mimetic properties. "Fiction," John
Gardner has written, "goes after understanding by capturing,
through imitation, 'the ineluctable modality of the world'—
that is, characters who subtly embody values and who test
them, with clear but inexpressible results, in action" (92).
Moreover, the preponderance of "visionary" short stories and
novellas reflects Langbaum's observation of the profound
influence the related concept of "epiphany" has exerted on
modern fiction and the short story in particular (336). But
while the list in its present form is based upon the
peculiarities and exigencies of my own reading, it more
rigorously reflects my observation of a complex of traits I
noticed repeated throughout these works, and although I again
make no claim that each of the following characteristics
appears in each of the listed works, enough do appear in each
work to signal us of their probable significance:
1. the existential moment (a special form of epiphany)
2. absence or loss of visionary's correct name or any name
at all
3. encounters with primal settings
4. "truth-telling" (and frequently subsequent
obnoxiousness)
5. the visionary's isolation/outsider status
6. collapsing of topographical and psychic margins
7. the visionary as reader and/or artist
8. primacy of the interrogative mode
9. existential motifs, themes, and imagery
10. the strategic inclusion of reader in choice-making: the
"one of us," "shock of recognition," "you, hypocrite
lecteur" motif
11. conflict between visionary and quotidian worlds
12. the visionary's immersion in the "destructive element"
13. the visionary's distrust of language
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While these characteristics will be elucidated in my
analysis of the individual texts, I would like to outline some
here to demonstrate the coherence of the characters I have
designated. Each visionary has, at some point, experienced a
profound

and irrevocable psychic shock—what

I term an

"existential moment"—that denies the sanctuary of blindness
and places him or her in direct and often tragic opposition to
the everyday world. By the "everyday world" I mean the mode of
being in which most of us spend most of our lives: the
cyclical core of actions and tasks which are largely performed
without reflection. To be sure, this is not a value judgement,
for, as Macquarrie points out, this mode of being is
"concerned with the satisfaction of ordinary human needs (and
is therefore) the most fundamental mode of existence..." (83) .
This is the realm in which we certainly do not always find,
but in which we seek, comfort and joy. Yet existential
thinkers point to a real danger of individual identity being
lost to the everyday world (Kierkegaard denigrates the "crowd"
and Nietzsche the "herd"); of the self's being controlled by
the very instruments through which comfort and joy were
sought:
Normally man's mind is composed only of a
consciousness of his immediate needs, which is to
say that his consciousness at any moment can be
defined as his awareness of his own power to
satisfy his needs. He thinks in terms of what he
intends to do in half an hour's time, a day's time,
a month's time, and no more. He never asks himself:
What are the limits of my powers? (Wilson, 188)
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The existence of the visionary's critique threatens the
illusory structures and systems of order which constitute this
everyday world and, in so doing, the very identity of those
who inhabit it. The stakes of this confrontation are evident
when we parallel it with the situation of the Jew in
eighteenth century Germany:
The urgent search for German authenticity...helps
to explain the strange intensity of the debate on
the Jewish Question....The Jews were a living
reproach to them, a reminder of German weakness and
sinfulness, a challenge to German self-esteem.
Above all, the Jews seemed to possess an almost
natural ability to remain a "people" endowed with
its own natural culture and consciousness, an
ability envied as well as hated by the less-thansecure Germans.... Perhaps what more than anything
was bound to rack up German insecurity and
resentment to fever pitch was the outrageous fact
that Jews had escaped from the ghetto, becoming
"German" in appearance but still remaining Jews
either in religious, or, more insidiously, in a
social or psychological sense....When primal
existential categories become blurred like this,
the whole order of the world is thrown into doubt,
assurance fails, and the hysterical temperament
runs free (Rose, 41-2).
Because the everyday world is empowered through sheer
weight of numbers to name and define right and wrong, truth
and falsehood, good and evil, it possesses the power and will
to ostracize vision. One of its most potent weapons is the
power of naming. (One might consider, for example, the cogent
reinterpretation of the Cain story offered by the visionary
Demian in Hesse's novel). This power of naming is evident,
too,

in Charles Marlow's recognition of the ability of

language to eviscerate what vision reveals:
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For a moment I had a view of a world that seemed to
wear a vast and dismal aspect of disorder....But
still—it was only a moment: I went back into my
shell directly. One must—don't you know?—though I
seemed to have lost all my words in the chaos of
dark thoughts I had contemplated for a second or
two beyond the pale. These came back, too, very
soon, for words also belong to the sheltering
conception of light and order which is our refuge.
The truth of Marlow's observations is borne out by the
awareness of other visionary characters of both the impotence
and insidiousness of language. It is evident in Bartleby's
laconic disavowal of his Sisyphean copying of words to
perpetuate a sterile social order; it is present, too, in
Frederick Henry's recognition of the hollowness inherent in
terms of honor and glory; in the realization of the writer,
Miss Lonelyhearts, of the emptiness and ineffectuality of his
words; in the futility of Krebs' attempts in "Soldier's Home"
to communicate his enveloping alienation to his parents; in
the reversion to a prelinguistic state by the narrator of
Surfacing; in the cloaking invisibility of Ellison's antihero
who, in his quotidian incarnation, had been "honored" for his
verbal

powers;

in

the

ultimate

impotence

of

Kurtz's

magnificent voice against the primal darkness; in the mute
endurance of Kafka's Hunger Artist, who is devoid of "normal"
appetites. And this disaffection for language is emblematized
most cogently, perhaps, in the fact that so few of these
figures bear full names, or their own names, or any name at
all. It will be the task of the remainder of this study to
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name these characters and to understand the ways in which they
name and enlighten our own condition.

CHAPTER II
THE BRINK OF VISION:
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM OF BECOMING OURSELVES
"I wanted only to try to live in accord with the promptings
which came from my true self. Why was that so very difficult?"
(Demian)
"How many live in such a way as to have renounced or gained
everything, how many are simply honest enough to know what
they are and what they can and cannot be?" (Kierkegaard)
"Who is it that can tell me who I am?" (King Lear)

Ivor Winter's short story "The Brink of Darkness" (1932) is
unusual in at least three important ways: first, it is the
only work of fiction the eminent critic and poet produced,
thereby imbuing it with a special curiosity, perhaps even with
a human immediacy as if it were written from need or
compulsion; second, primarily because it pretty much disdains
exposition, the story is especially opaque, engulfing its
reader in a universe that is simultaneously alienating,
disorienting, and compelling. Such opacity is not in itself
unusual in the modern short story, which Robert Langbaum has
cited as being "plotless and apparently pointless in order
that it may be epiphanic" (345, emphases mine), and Allan
Swallow cites the "psychological story" as being "frequently
experimental." To be sure, a precis of the story's plot is
difficult. As Terry Comito points out, its incidents do not
present a "cumulative weaving of a causal chain, but rather
"isolated moments of perception" which are indicative of what
Winters termed his "scattered method" (13)1. Those moments of
Winters' conception of the four different ways of
structuring a poem was expressed in "The Mechanics of the
Mood" section of his essay "The Extension and Reintegration of
the Human Spirit" (1929). As outlined by Davis they are the
scattered method, the logical method, the narrative method,
and the psychological method. Davis glosses the scattered
method as a "list of details—images or statements—that
'converge upon a common center' or serve as illustrations of
the poem's theme." His claim that "from the amount of space
allotted and from the tone of the discussion (in the above
essay) that Winters was mainly interested.. .in the logical and
psychological" (62), while a logical deduction, doesn't
address two salient facts: first, the lone facticity of "The
Brink of Darkness": why it had to be written and written,
clearly, in the "scattered method; second, Winters' lifelong
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perception, however, are of a cogency and nature which, along
with the interrelated existential themes of the struggle for
identity, the facticity of death2, and the omnipresence of
chaos mark "The Brink of Darkness" as an example of visionary
literature. As such, its third unusual characteristic is its
visionary narrator's disavowal of his existential insight and
subsequent withdrawal into the quotidian "limits of (his) old
identity." This chapter will address the implications of that
renunciation

and

conclude

with

a

consideration

of

the

pedagogical functions of visionary fictions.
At the outset of the story, the nameless narrator
describes and traverses an elemental landscape—bitterly cold
in the winter months; in the summer, an "unbearable blaze of

fascination with and dread of the demonic element in human
existence.
2

Death is an especially powerful presence in Winters'
story. The gruesome death of one of the narrator's students
mirrors the passing of Mrs. Stone and in so doing performs the
same function as the Gloucester subplot of Lear; it reminds us
of the unexceptional nature of the dark events we are
witnessing. These deaths are in turn reflected in the animal
kingdom by the death of a mouse at the opening of the story
and the pen of soon to be slaughtered coyotes encountered by
the narrator. Finally death is present, too, in the plant
kingdom; the flowers decorating the church at the student's
funeral are described as "innocent and pathetic...curling
imperceptibly inward, as if they were the sluggish dead
incarnate, dying slowly again in pity..." 239). Death in
visionary literature is not, it is important to note, a
convention in the manner cited by Richards, that is, a
strategy for completing a fiction; rather it is a palpable
entity whose omnipresence and facticity renders the primary
existential truth of death's ineluctability. We must remember,
too, that on both a literal and symbolic level death remains
a choice, e.g. Edna Pontellier, Mrs. Moore, Jim, and the
narrators of Invisible Man and Surfacing to name but a few.
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heat"—that in its extremity

foreshadows the ontological

crucible he is about to experience. He refers to his being a
teacher although we do not see him in the classroom. His
living arrangements—the setting of his daily life—are barely
sketched. He rents (apparently) an apartment—perhaps no more
than a room—from the Stones, an elderly couple (we infer).
Throughout the story human presence is minimal; people are
disconnected shadows isolated both from others and seemingly
from any integral connection to the story itself, and, when
encountered, are disquieting, even grotesque: A woman engaged
to do housework is "almost featureless," sweaty, panting and
covered with dust; her brother Eli is "a man of great power
and agility, but without forearms....His abnormality had made
an

exile

from

human

society";

the

features

of

the

grandchildren of the narrator's now deceased landlady are
"obscured with sorrow"; her son is "a man who...seemed to know
little of peace, whether of body or of spirit"; and the
landlady herself, Mrs. Stone, who succumbs to a "frailness"
she had concealed until "concealment was impossible," is
perhaps the story's most profound presence as she lies in
state beneath the narrator's austere room: "Upstairs were the
dogs and the stove; below was the echoing desolation" (235).
Augmenting the sparseness of exposition and the isolation
and angst of the story's characters is a motif of spatial
disorientation

which

is

also

emblematic

of

visionary

literature: An enveloping snowstorm causes "confusion." The
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winter months are characterized by "a sky (that) had no
identity—there was merely the soft air. The snow merged into
the air from below with no visible dividing line. Often I
should not have known whether I was going uphill or down..."
(228)3. This loss of elemental and spatial distinctions, what
MacQuarrie calls the perception of "things in the depth of
their interrelatedness," (244) signals the narrator's growing
awareness of and potential immersion into the existential
"ground"—the Nothingness—which, omnipresent yet heretofore
repressed, has
"figures"

of

surrounded
everyday

and

given

definition

life—institutions,

to the

rituals, and

assumptions—which, I would suggest, have until now been the
focus of his life4.
Winters' narrator is experiencing, I feel, what Karl
Jaspers

calls

a

"limit

or

boundary

situation"

(Grenzsituationen) wherein the individual/visionary confronts
the impenetrable boundaries or limits of existence. As such,
no "traditional" plot of cause and effect actions will
3

Cf. Lord Jim, for example: "You couldn't distinguish the
sea from the sky; there was nothing to see and nothing to
hear. Not a glimmer, not a shape, not a sound" (114) .
4

This is admittedly making a bit of a leap. We, of
course, are not privy to what constituted the center of the
narrator's life prior to the experiences related in the story.
It is nonetheless reasonable to extrapolate from his
profession as teacher, his excursions (and consequent
interaction) with the Stones, and his keeping of pet dogs that
both his everyday and psychic life were of a more mundane
nature than that recounted in the narrative; that is, his
experience of an existential moment is a profound departure
for the narrator. Always the crux of visionary fictions is
this ontological evolution.
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suffice. Rather the story is composed of an unrelenting and
disorienting (to both reader and character) interiority, a
chaotic psychic landscape that functions as both theme and
setting. The catalyst for these experiences will differ for
each visionary. It may be death as in "The Brink of Darkness";
guilt as in Miss Lonelvhearts and "Act of Faith"; a sense of
the precariousness of identity as in Surfacing and A Passage
to India; or alienation as in Invisible Man. "Bartleby the
Scrivener" and "A Hunger Artist"; often it is a combination of
these realities. But what is clear in all visionary narratives
is that the visionary is in a situation of extremity, which is
the occasion for the beginning of his project toward authentic
being—the

choosing/creating

of

a

self

unimpeded

by

considerations of personal circumstances or the strictures and
norms of

state, church, or society5. Furthermore, this

condition of authenticity, once attained, is capable of
confronting and psychically surmounting these barriers; the
5

This is not meant to suggest an "all is permitted"
nihilism. Authentic being also includes "conscience"—in the
sense of a moral commitment that compels the individual to act
against the normative standards and assumptions of quotidian
society—as a prime component. American anti-war protesters
during the Vietnam War (that is those who protested before
protesting attained fashionability) would be an example. A
much better one, though, is offered by Vietnamese Buddhist
monks who publicly immolated themselves during the war years
in protest against the killing. They, in effect, answered both
of this study's frame questions simultaneously. The type of
choice involved in these situations is integral to what is
meant by "the anguish of freedom." The imperative to choose,
as Camus pointed out, is fraught with fear. Thus those
Americans or Vietnamese who declined military service as an
act of conscience were decidedly more courageous than those
who served because their respective governments demanded it.
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acknowledgement of death (Jim at the conclusion of Lord Jim
would be perhaps the best example), to name the most potent of
these limits, endows the existent with courage and integrity
in that he or she now perceives the structure of reality in
its totality, both figure and ground, and is able to formulate
his or being upon that perception. When, for example, another
nameless visionary narrator surfaces from her limit situation,
an encounter with her primal self, she is authentic and selfmade, but it is an identity which rests on her precarious
understanding of a world which asks and gives "nothing"
(Atwood, 231) .
A limit situation, then, implies a prohibition, and it is
the

overcoming

of

prohibitions

which

is Kierkegaard's6

catapult to human freedom. He utilizes the story of Adam and
Eve to illustrate the point:
6

In this study I will rely more on the work of
Kierkegaard than on that of any other philosopher generally
recognized as an "existentialist," not only because of the
cogency of his insights but also because Kierkegaard is one of
the great examples in the western intellectual tradition of an
individual who lived his ideas, which is one of the chief
values I embrace in chapter one. Nor do I feel any
contradiction between Kierkegaard's Christian existentialism
and my positing of a Godless universe. My contention in this
chapter particularly is that acknowledgement of the void is a
key to authentic being and, as I develop the point in
subsequent chapters, literary and philosophical texts afford
us various strategies for coping with that emptiness and
achieving wholeness. Kierkegaard's so-called "leap of faith"
is but one way of dealing with that void, a strategy adopted
by Miss Lonelyhearts. Moreover, Kierkegaard's affinity with
the visionary ethic is reflected by the general disdain in
which he was held during his lifetime by the citizens of
Copenhagen who saw his ideas and his way of being as a
distinct "threat to the order they loved as final" (Hubben,
11).
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The prohibition (to not eat the forbidden fruit)
induces in (Adam) anxiety, for the prohibition
awakens in him freedom's possibility. What passes
by innocence as the nothing of anxiety has now
entered into Adam, and here again it is nothing—
the anxious possibility of being able. He has no
conception of what he is able to do...only the
possibility of being able is present as a higher
form of ignorance, as a higher expression of
anxiety, because in a higher sense it both is and
is not, because in a higher sense he both loves it
and flees from it (CD, 44-5).
Kierkegaard's illustration reminds us that limit situations
both destroy (Jaspers speaks of existence "foundering" and
"shattering" in these situations) and transcend; Adam and Eve,
in choosing a way of being distinct from that ready-made for
them and therein exposing their nakedness to the destructive
element of God's wrath, transcend the boundaries of their
given

existence,

embracing

in

their

felix

culpa

the

possibility of both the suffering and the joy of existing in
full existential awareness of and responsibility for their
being in the world7. "Man's freedom," writes Jaspers, "is
inseparable from his consciousness of his finite nature" (64).
"The

coming-to-be

of

the

individual

begins

where

the

acceptance of the ready-made ends..." (Heller, 20)8. Herein
perhaps we begin to understand, too, the nature of Stein's

7

Implicit in this situation is the same question which
any reading of King Lear, another patriarch who confronts a
limit situation, must evoke: whether the endurance of
suffering to obtain self-knowledge is preferable to sailing
safely through existence.
8

Cf. Sartre's disdain for those who would accept "readymade" values and ways of being in "Portrait of an anti-Semite"
quoted in chapter one.
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enigmatic advice to Marlow about the importance of submitting
to the "destructive element" and making "the deep, deep sea
keep you up" (214).
These limit situations, however, do not themselves signal
the attainment of freedom and authenticity; they only create
the awareness of freedom's possibility. As such, they preface
the

visionary's

existential

moment,

the

defining

characteristic of visionary experience. A "crossing over" or
threshold

experience,

the

existential

moment

implies

alternative ways of being. It is the vehicle through which
Winters'

narrator

and

all

visionaries

experience

the

ontological insight that reveals their total situation:
During the three nights that Mrs. Stone had lain
below me in the hall, my sensitivity to death, to
the obscure and the irrelevant, had been augmented.
I felt that I saw farther and farther into the
events about me, that I perceived a new region of
significance, even of sensation, extending a short
distance behind that of which I had always been
aware, suggesting the existence of far more than
was even now perceptible. This might have unnerved
me had it not been for the firmness of the woman in
the coffin. In her were united the familiar and the
inchoate. The certainty of her expression gave me
pause. She was like a friend bidding me be quiet
with a raised hand, a friend whose bidding I could
trust to be authoritative. But with her departure
there remained only the demonic silence which she
had introduced, and to which for three nights she
had given coherence and meaning (235).
This experience of a sudden and profound awareness of
one's condition in the world is significant as both sign and
process. It is most immediately a verbal designation of
vision; indeed, it was repeated encounters with characters who
"saw further and deeper" that first suggested to me the
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potential harmony of this body of disparate texts. More
importantly, however, the existential moment posits through
the character's seeing of that which had been heretofore
hidden—"I perceived a new region of significance, even of
sensation, extending a short distance behind that of which I
had always been aware"—the experience of disillusionment: an
awakening to the purpose of the ordering structures and
systems of human society which, in the observation of William
James "divert our attention from disease and death..., and the
slaughterhouses and indecencies without end upon which our
life is founded are huddled out of sight and never mentioned
so that the world we recognize officially in literature and in
society is a poetic fiction far handsomer and cleaner and
better than the world that really is" (90)9.
The process of the visionary's "crossing over" from the
quotidian to the visionary mode of being may be more readily
apprehended by employing the already alluded to idea of
figure-ground dichotomies10, of which Winters' narrator's
perception of the unity of "the familiar and the inchoate" in
the corpse of Mrs. Stone is an example. He is confronting here
9

0ne of the most powerful manifestations of this
dichotomy between the realms of order and chaos occurs in
Hermann Hesse's Demian (1919) and Steppenwolf (1927). The
human tendency to repress the realities of disease and death
is emblematized in "The Brink of Darkness" by the coffin of
the narrator's student, which was "kept closed, from respect
for the disease" (238-39).
10

For a discussion of one of the most salient examples of
this metaphor in twentieth century fiction see the discussion
of "The Blue Hotel" in Appendix "A".
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the facticity of death, an awakening to which his landlady's
once

familiar body acts as mute guide: "The skin was

preternaturally and evenly white, and in the wrinkles there
seemed a trace as of an underlying darkness, even and
impenetrable" (234)11. Once her body is removed he must choose
how to be in relation to the "demonic silence" her death has
revealed.
This

trope

is

augmented—and

lent

a

certain

universality—by the presence of the complementary ancient
Chinese concept of the Yin-Yang, a concept that has affected
virtually every aspect of Chinese thought. Of particular
relevance here is its suggestion of a connection between the
natural world and human events. At the story's opening, the
narrator mentions that mice that would venture out upon the
stark winter landscape would be pounced upon and killed by his
dogs, "leaving a small spot of blood suspended in grayness"
(228) ; later, in what is essentially the story's climax, the
narrator works in the grayness afforded by poor lighting on
one of those dogs whose head and mouth are lacerated with
porcupine quills. The removal of each quill is followed "by
a gush of blood" (239). The encroaching "demonic silence"
evoked by the figure-ground image and the inchoate grayness
and blood of the Yin-Yang delineate the existential frame for
Winters' tale. As Comito observes: "Brightness and shadow,

"Cf. the black storm cloud which almost surreptitiously
envelopes the Patna in Lord Jim.
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hardness and softness, are continually juxtaposed. They define
not so much stages of a cycle as complementary aspects of a
single intuition" (18, my emphasis). That intuition is of a
universe whose essential nature is violent and dark. Indeed,
a character in Beckett's Murphy observes that "All life is
figure and ground(4)"; that is, existence is perceived
(incorrectly, I will argue) as an unacknowledged dichotomy
between those elements a person chooses to acknowledge as real
or important or valuable and everything else, which often is
designated the "other" or simply the concern of alienists12.
It is helpful, then, to understand the visionary's power as
dialectical or a "single intuition." He or she is able to
synthesize the nature and interdependence of both the chaotic,
12

Philosophically, the figure-ground metaphor suggests the
distinction between the two most predominant western ways of
thinking about the human condition in the twentieth century:
positivism, which takes science as the arbiter of human life
and "dwells in the tiny island of light composed of what
(positivist man) finds scientifically 'meaningful,'" (Barrett,
21) and existentialism, which seeks to address the human
condition in its totality, emphasizing if anything the
encompassing Nothingness of our spiritual and physical
condition.
Modern art in general and visionary literature in
particular reflect this awareness of the existential void
through their flattening out of traditional conceptions of
time, space, and subject, and their emphasis upon limit
situations. It is when confronted with situations which are
"on the far side of what is normal, routine, accepted,
traditional, or safeguarded"—when through death, disease or
despair we truly see and feel how contingent and fragile our
existence is—that the abstract concept of the existential
void assumes a numbing concreteness: "Our being reveals itself
as much more porous, much less substantial than we had thought
it" (Barrett, 62) . Moreover, the facile phrase the "tragic
condition of humankind" assumes
palpability when it is
understood that we can only claim our selfhood, our identity
and freedom through immersion in these realities.
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existential "ground," (which, in his visionary incarnation,
can now be "seen"), and that which it surrounds and defines:
the "figures" of "norms, requirements, and conventions"
(Heller, 26) , which constitute our everyday life and whose
function is, in fact, the suppression of that very ground13.
This "synthesis" is essential to understanding the nature
and power of visionaries. In Everyday Life Agnes Heller
distinguishes between two modes of being: "particularity" and
"individuality."

"Particularity" is characterized as the

process of accommodating the self to the requirements of "the
ready-made world," a world in which the "order of priorities,
the scale of values...is largely taken over ready-made" (15);
such

a way

of being

emphasizes

"self-preservation

and

subordinates everything else to this self-preservation;" that
is, it is a way of being which perceives only the figures
which will facilitate the person's preservation (20, emphasis
mine). As Heller notes (and experience reminds us) we are all

13

Even a cursory survey of the stuff of everyday life
reveals the validity of this assertion. That civilization is
a record of humankind's battle/holding action against the
entropy of nature is revealed in everything from cryogenics to
the lane markers on highways. Possibly the apotheosis of this
struggle, though, is to be seen in the rise of bureaucracy,
whose effects were most potently dramatized in art by Kafka,
and in the real world by the Nazis for whom bureaucracy,
perhaps not all that ironically, was the sine qua non of the
Holocaust: "The light shed by the Holocaust on our knowledge
of bureaucratic rationality is at its most dazzling once we
realize the extent to which the very idea of the Endlosung
(Final Solution) was an outcome of the bureaucratic culture"
(Bauman, 15).
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subject to the claims of particularity14; yet the fruits of
particularity as a sole or even primary way of being are
illustrated graphically and darkly by the choices based upon
preservation of self made by the men of Reserve Police
Battalion 101, choices based primarily, it will be recalled,
upon the maintenance of their standing in their unit and their
future place in the perceived "society" to which they planned
to return. Choices, that is, which regarded only the "figures"
of a ready-made mode of being while assiduously ignoring and
thus perpetrating the existential darkness and chaos that
enshrouded and permeated those figures.
Opposed to this, "individuality," according to Heller,
is "a development; it is the coming-to-be of an individual,"
a state in which "the individual does not necessarily wish to
preserve himself 'in all circumstances' and 'in any way

u

Heller also notes that "in history up to the present,
particularity has been the subject of everyday life in the
great majority of social orders and social relations. All the
material wealth of the world has arisen from the activity of
those who 'took things as they come'" (27). In light of the
discussion of the Holocaust in chapter one, it is revealing to
note the contrast between the United States' massive reaction
to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in which Saddam Hussein was
characterized as being "worse than Hitler" and its passivity
toward the Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia.
This would seem, given the economic stakes of each case, a
particularly cogent example of Heller's contention. It might
finally be noted that neither of these tragedies approaches
the on-going human suffering occurring today on the African
continent, a situation which seem to befuddle attempts at
meaningful action by the rest of the world. Indeed, Somalia's
devastating famine is the direct result of the withdrawal of
American economic support following the demise of Russian
communism. Herein lies an incarnation of the existential
concept of "absurdity."
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possible'"

(20). In other words, faced with a morally

unacceptable way of being, the individual will may choose not
to be, as in the cases of Bartleby, the Hunger Artist, Edna
Pontellier,

Mrs.

"individuality"

Moore,
is

a

and

Septimus

cognate

of

Smith.

Heller's

existentialism's

"authenticity," of a self constructed from the individual's
personal and conscious choice15. Clearly the myriad choices we
make "every day" constitute a perpetual morality play that
leads us toward or away from our selves.
In visionary literature the blurring of figure-ground
distinctions

functions

as

a

sign

of

movement

toward

authenticity and individuality and as a prelude to vision:
boundaries are dissolving; barriers disappearing. In "The
Brink of Darkness," it is almost as if the narrator were
undergoing a form of ontological ripening, a movement from the
phenomenal to the noumenal world, which will allow him to see
things as they are, not as he had assumed them to be. Each
season he mentions includes a reference to a blurring of

15

We may better understand what is at stake here by noting
a "universal" example: the glaring incongruity between the
persona of Elvis Presley as rock and roll/rhythm and blues
icon, and the "plastic" Elvis seen in his movies, where the
very rawness and danger of his identity and—inseparably—his
talent have been eviscerated and buried beneath inane, "safe"
lyrics; a vapid, inauthentic persona; and insipid production
values. The question of "What really happened to Elvis" is in
this light quite obvious: having relinquished his identity—
his way of being—to economically-minded handlers (what Heller
would label "particularity"), he realized implicitly that he
no longer wanted to be and committed what was tantamount to
suicide in the process of obliterating his consciousness to
his renunciation of that identity.
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figure and ground contours: the fall sees his pet dogs
described as "dark vortices, blurred and shapeless"; the
summer reveals trees as "black voids growing shadowy and
visible at the edges" while two white goats are "trembling
watery blotches, barely discernable." A young woman, briefly
encountered,

is

"almost

featureless";

a

sky

appears

"unvaulted.. .without distance or dimension"; mice which emerge
from behind his bedroom walls are "shadowy little creatures."
The darker it grows, the more he sees the animate and
inanimate, the human and nonhuman, figure and ground, in their
interrelatedness.
The significance of this dissolution is adumbrated in
the narrator's encounter with a pen of yearling coyotes, "the
only sign of life amid four hours of snow." The animals,
captured to be slaughtered for their fur, "were about ready
for killing." They seem, however, wholly oblivious to their
fate or condition:
It was strange that they never broke through so
slight a fence, yet there they were; young dogs
would have torn through it with scarcely a pause,
scarcely a sense of an obstacle. But these
creatures were innocent and delicate, spirits
impeded by a spell, puffs of smoke precise at the
tips.
The timid, caged coyotes (by nature an intelligent, radically
independent and free breed) form the keystone to a complex of
animal-human relationships in the story16. Their "innocence"
16

In addition to the coyotes, dogs, mice, goats, horses,
and a porcupine are mentioned. Perhaps more significantly, the
character of Eli, born without forearms and consequently "an
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recalls Kierkegaard's equation of that state with "ignorance"
in speaking of the Garden of Eden. As with our mythical
parents, these creatures are in a dreamstate, a "spell"; they
are inauthentic, not themselves (mere "puffs of smoke") for,
as Kierkegaard says of Adam and Eve, they have nothing to
strive against save Nothingness itself17, yet this they disdain
or ignore.
Comito's analysis, which describes this incident as one
of the story's "most evocatively mysterious episodes," places
the coyotes in a favorable ontological light:
What the narrator finds appealing about them is the
freshness and insubstantiality of their suddenly
flaring identities....They are "innocent" not in
any sentimentalist primitive sense but in their
vulnerability and fleetingness, without past or
future. (21)
exile from human society," develops in compensation "an
unusual sympathy for horses and mules, with whom he could
accomplish extraordinary things, and that part of his nature
which was not satisfied by this companionship had turned to
religion" (233). The alienation that Eli experiences is
paralleled by the narrator whose anguish is also mitigated by
his observation of housemice and his ministrations to his
dogs. However, aside from the solace animals offer in this
tale, their plenitude also suggests the ontological proximity
of their complementary world, which almost literally is
gnawing at the edges of human identity.
17

"Nothingness" was a (non)state which filled Miguel de
Unamuno with a particular dread: "For myself, I can say as a
youth and even as a child, I remained unmoved when shown the
most moving pictures of hell, for even then nothing seemed to
me quite so horrible as nothingness itself"
(9) .
Existentialist writers, ironically I suppose, write a great
deal on the subject of Nothingness, but essentially what they
are responding to is the anguish or contingency of being; the
anguish that results "whenever the thought comes to us that
Nothingness was and still is just as possible as being,
whenever we ask ourselves how it is that there is something
rather than nothing" (Olson, 31).
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While I agree the incident is a key to understanding the
story, its significance seems to me quite different from that
suggested by Comito18. Indeed I would argue the coyotes'
condition to be one of despair and intended to foreshadow the
narrator's own failure of authenticity; like the coyotes, he
will choose to deny his freedom and not become himself by
retreating

into the

safety

of the

"limits

of my

old

identity"19. The self, Kierkegaard teaches us, the individual
18

0ne might be curious, first of all, how an "identity"
can be simultaneously "insubstantial" and "flaring." Moreover,
to be "without past or future" is to be the ontological
equivalent of the prelapsarian Adam and Eve, which is to say
to lack will, freedom, identity itself, none of which can be
attained without the breaking of prohibitive psycho-social
barriers.
19

This type of boundary-drawing, cited by Bauman as a
"universal cultural activity," is one of the chief strategies
individuals and societies have of maintaining an ersatz sense
of order. Surely the prime historical example of its almost
metaphysical power is found in the endurance of anti-Semitism,
a timeless tragedy made up on the one hand of the Jews' fierce
refusal to relinquish their identity as Jews and the diaspora
which forced Jews across countless geographical boundaries,
and on the other of those native to those boundaries,
primarily Christians, whose "self-identity was, in fact,
estrangement from the Jews." Their identity, then, was
dependent on the other, not on their own choices and actions:
It was born of the rejection by the Jews. It drew
its continuous vitality from the rejection of the
Jews. Christianity could theorize its own existence
only by an on-going opposition to the Jews.
Continuing Jewish stubbornness bore evidence that
the Christian mission remained as yet unfinished.
Moreover, what Bauman terms the "conceptual Jew" of Christian
imagination became the visualization of the
...horrifying
consequences
of
boundarytransgression, of not remaining fully in the fold,
of any conduct short of unconditional loyalty and
unambiguous choice; he was the prototype and arch63

whom through our actions and decisions we create, is freedom.
To renounce that freedom, to refuse to become ourselves, is
the kind of despair that
allows itself to be, so to speak, cheated of its
self by the "others." By seeing the multitude of
people around it, by being busied with all sorts of
worldly affairs, by being wise to the ways of the
world, such a person forgets himself, in a divine
sense forgets his own name; dares not believe in
himself, finds being himself too risky, finds it
much easier and safer being like the others, to
become a copy, a number, along with the crowd,
(emphasis mine)
This situation, Kierkegaard wryly observes, "goes practically
unnoticed in the world. Precisely by losing himself in this
way, such a person gains all that is required for a flawless
performance in everyday life:
Far from anyone thinking him to be in despair, he
is just what a human being ought to be. Naturally
the world has no understanding of what is truly
horrifying. The despair that not only does not
cause any inconvenience in life, but makes life
convenient and comfortable, is naturally enough in
no way regarded as despair. (SD, 63-4)
In Kierkekaard's view, such individuals "lack primitiveness."
It is a suggestive phrase, for a key element in "The Brink of

pattern of all nonconformity, heterodoxy, anomaly
and aberration....The conceptual Jew carried a
message: alternative to this order here and now is
not another order, but chaos and devastation.
(Bauman, 38-9)
The irony of this, as I hope to make clear, is that chaos is
the result of the erasure of artificial and irrational
boundaries, but it is only through immersion in that chaos
that true salvation—by which I mean the achievement of
authenticity—can be realized. The danger of both Jew and
visionary to quotidian reality lies in their ability to expose
the inauthenticity of identities which rely on the
artificiality of boundaries.
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Darkness," as with most other visionary texts20, is just such
a rediscovery of the primitive, an immersion into Stein's
"destructive element." In the same way that The Sickness Unto
Death is an anatomy of despair, the caged coyotes are to be
seen as an evolutionarily distinct breed from the narrator's
dogs21 ("young dogs would have torn through [that fence] with
scarcely a pause") who, later in the story, bolt into the
wilderness
encounter

for several days only to return
with

the

destructive

element

from their

"emaciated

and

limping," their heads and throats covered in porcupine quills.
The narrator's ministrations to the dogs are graphic and
horrible; in effect a blood rite whose very concreteness (Cf.
the coyotes being likened to "puffs of smoke") reconnects him
to something visceral and (Kierkegaard's term) "primitive" to
his humanness. The scene emblematizes the palpable danger of
the destructive element, and acts as a paradigm for the
possibility of the narrator's own achievement of authenticity.
"I was prepared for this kind of return," the narrator
says of his dogs' reappearance, and an essential part of that
preparation is a second existential moment, which reveals not
the world but himself. The world for the narrator—as it was
20

Cf. "Act of Faith"'s emphasis on an almost primordial
sea of mud that engulfs the army camp or the equally ancient
Marabar Caves in A Passage to India; Miss Lonelyheart's trip
to the country; the jungle settings of The Voyage Out. Lord
Jim, and Lord of the Flies or the return to the wilderness in
Surfacing.
21

Genetically, of course, domestic dogs and coyotes share
the same genus; indeed, the coyote is the ancestor of the dog.
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for Emil Sinclair—has been circumscribed into two realms:
upstairs, in his actual living quarters where he reads and
eats and sleeps, are life and comfort, "the dogs and the
stove," the figures of everyday life; below, where the body of
his deceased landlady has lain, is "echoing desolation," the
ground of the existential void. One night he ventures into
this "demonic" zone for a glass of water. His footsteps
resound with "great volume...as if I were walking (in my
room)." In the kitchen he stands before a window, "bright
emptiness behind (him)":
I stared at the smooth surface of the snow thus
suddenly revealed to me, like a new meaning not
divisible into any terms I knew. Again I had the
illusion of seeing myself in the empty room, in the
same light, frozen to my last footprints, cold and
unmeaning. A slight motion caught my eye, and I
glanced up at the darkened corner of the window, to
be fixed with horror. There, standing on the
outside of the window, translucent, a few lines
merely, and scarcely visible, was a face, my face,
the eyes fixed upon my own. I moved on quickly to
the kitchen; the reflection started and vanished.
(238)
The sudden depth of vision ("suddenly revealed to me like a
new meaning not divisible into any terms I knew") which
signals the existential moment

is again present as he

perceives the formless ground in the undifferentiated winter
landscape; the passage's diction—"empty," "frozen," "cold and
unmeaning"—suggests the emotional and metaphysical despair
vision encompasses; and the face he encounters—a "figure" of
"a few lines merely"—recalls that of Mr. Stone, which, upon
his wife's death, is described
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as

"pale and lifeless,

f(a)ll(ing) away in heavy lines" (231). But most indicative of
this visionary is his characterization of the experience as an
"illusion" and his retreat to another room, foreshadowing his
subsequent retreat to Colorado, another "state," a different
set of "boundaries" within which he can attempt to elude the
consequences of what he sees.
Clearly, Winters has carefully qualified the scene; the
face the narrator perceives is but "a few lines, and scarcely
visible," and, after all, we must ask, whose face would one
expect to see reflected in a window but one's own? The
temptation is thus strong to read this text—largely devoid as
it is in narrative logic and linear development—as a
psychological curiosity22, or perhaps one man's exorcism of his
personal demons. Comito points out that Winters himself was
"annoyed by naturalistic explanations (17)" of the story.
Indeed, such a reading is reductive for the themes Winters
addresses have a resonance not only for other visionary texts
but much more importantly for our lives beyond the text. "The
real themes of (the story)," argues Comito, "are moral and
metaphysical: the precariousness of identity and the ambiguity
of the universe by which it is threatened" (4). That is, the
story prompts the reader's confrontation with Augustine's
question "Who am I," and takes it one step further: how do I

Z2

I first encountered this story in a graduate course on
"Madness in Literature."
67

survive, much less thrive, in a universe at best indifferent,
at worst inimical to that identity23?
It is not surprising then that as a result of his
experience of vision, the narrator literally asks himself
Augustine's question: "I sometimes wondered who I was" (235),
but he falters and finally withdraws before the implications
of the answer:
I thought back over the past months, of the manner
in which I had been disturbed, uncentered, and
finally obsessed as by an insidious power. I
remembered that I had read somewhere of a kind of
Eastern demon who gains power over one only in
proportion24 as one recognizes and fears him. I felt
that I had been the victim of a deliberate and
malevolent invasion, an invasion utilizing and
augmenting to appalling and shadowy proportions all
of the most elusive accidents of my life, my new
penumbra of perception thus rendering to what would
otherwise have appeared the contingent the effect
of coherent and cumulative meaning. Finally through
some miscalculations on the part of the invader, or
through some other accident, I had begun to recover
the limits of my old identity. I had begun this
recovery at the time of the immersion in the brute
blood of the bitch. The invading power I could not
identify, I felt it near me still, but slowly
receding. (244, emphasis mine).
The narrator's "reading" of his experience seems a patent
example of what Sartre terms "bad faith" or "self-deception";

23

In an author's footnote to an edition of this story,
Winters wrote "that this story is a study of the hypothetical
possibility of a hostile supernatural world, and of the effect
on the perceptions of a consideration of this possibility"
(Powell, 45).
24

Cf. the refrain of "proportion" and "reasonableness,"
which is urged upon Rachel Vinrace in The Voyage Out. In the
quotidian view, to maintain one's sense of proportion is to
effectively obviate the possibility of confronting one's
"demons."
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it is a choice of how to be which represses if not outright
denies

the

narrator's

knowledge

of

his

fragility

and

contingency within the gray indifference of his universe; in
making that choice, he denies his freedom and becomes
inauthentic. His retreat into the "limits" of his former self
is an ontological circling of the wagons, an action similar in
kind analogically to the coyotes and intertextually to Charlie
Marlow's in Heart of Darkness in that, confronted by the
implications of the darkness, both men lie25. The narrator
stands before the brink of the abyss as his students had stood
before their deceased classmate, "looking curiously young and
helpless" and in so doing he betrays his psychic immaturity.
The objectifying of the narrator's "problem" by the reference
to an "insidious force" and the tenuous attribution of his
"recovery" to the demon's "miscalculations...or through some
other accident..." is a species of dissembling, a repression
which Kierkegaard sees as ultimately damning: "...learning to
know dread is an adventure which every man has to confront if
he would not go to perdition either by not having known dread
or by sinking under it. He therefore who has learned rightly
to be in dread has learned the most important thing" ("Dread,"
252) .
25

Clearly there is a considerable difference in degree
between Marlow's (who travels to the very heart of darkness)
and the narrator's experience of vision. Marlow receives "just
a glimpse" while Winters' narrator is, as it were, fully
immersed in the destructive element of existential awareness.
Nonetheless their respective reactions to the darkness are
essentially similar.
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To read the conclusion of "Brink of Darkness" in this way
is to subvert what seems to be occurring. The narrator, after
all, does recover the "figure" of his old self, a recovery
whose inception lies in his care of his badly hurt animals, an
action palpably human and humane. But the vocabulary of
visionary literature is singular: when he notes, in speaking
of the disorder of his room, "I was busy and very tired and
slowly lost the habit of noticing" (240) , one might recall
Marlow's

observation that he, too, did not go ashore for "a

howl and a dance" because, with the myriad tasks of his boat,
"(He) had no time....neither that fireman nor I had any time
to peer into our creepy thoughts" (HD, 106-07). The work of
the quotidian world becomes a means of deflecting vision and
alienating us from understanding our condition and ourselves.
Indeed, Winter's concluding image of a plow—"a tiny iron
thing crawling rapidly in straight lines across the hills"—
resonates with

Marlow's

image

of his

"little begrimed

steamboat, like a sluggish beetle crawling on the floor of a
lofty portico" toward an impenetrable darkness (104) . The plow
is driven by Eli, and Terry Comito sees in the deformed man's
" 'strange movements' the agency of a resourcefulness (the
narrator) will himself need in the continuing struggle he
foresees. For a moment at least he feels the sunshine" (16).
But the illusory nature of both the narrator's claim to
"recovery" and of even Comito's guarded optimism is made
unequivocal earlier in the story's final paragraph where the
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figure-ground dichotomy is again manifested: "I could not
blink my eyes without being conscious of the darkness....It
was as if there was darkness underlying the brightness of the
air, underlying everything, as if I might slip into it at any
instant, and as if I held myself where I was by an act of will
from moment to moment" (242). The narrator's removal to
Colorado from which he "would never return" is an act of
"particularity," of self-preservation. Unlike Yeats' visionary
in "The Second Coming," Winters' narrator emerges from his
vision

willfully

empty-handed;

unlike

Leda,

who

also

experienced the "brute blood," he has put on no knowledge.
I would suggest, however, that we have been prepared for
the narrator's act of bad faith by his uses of reading, always
a key component of visionary texts. The narrator mentions, in
a most offhanded way, that he is a teacher, which is to say
that by definition he is a reader. There is, moreover, a
single reference to the narrator's actually reading: "While
the dogs were gone, I spent as much of my nights as I could in
reading" (237) . Because Winter's tale is cut not from the
"figures" of everyday life but instead from the enveloping
existential "ground," these are two of the few facts of an
expository or mundane nature offered in the story and as such
accrue to themselves a special significance. The narrator
wishes to remain awake because of his concern over his dogs'
venture into the countryside, and reading, rather than
inculcating a moral consciousness, becomes merely a means of
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maintaining a physiological state much in the manner of the
initial voice in The Wasteland, who "read(s) much of the
night, and go(es) south in the winter"; that is, reading is a
way

of

denying

the

darkness

rather

than

a

means

of

apprehending it.
What is particularly interesting in this regard is the
narrator's reference to the "insidious power's" use "of all
the most elusive accidents of (his) life...thus rendering to
what would otherwise have appeared the contingent the effect
of coherent and cumulative meaning." I believe that what seems
to be a reference to the protagonist's life (of which we know
next to nothing) is, in fact, a commentary on the reader's
experience of the story itself. As suggested earlier, "The
Brink of Darkness" is essentially a series of impressionistic
details ("elusive accidents") held together, I would argue, by
the reader's own "penumbra of perception"; that is, the
ability of a virtually structureless story to achieve not only
coherence and meaning but indeed power is "contingent" only on
my now awakened sense of a narrative logic which transcends
traditional "limits." When I am aware of this story as an
example of visionary
relationship

among

literature, I perceive the causal

the protagonist's

formerly

disparate

impressions. "The Brink of Darkness" "uncenters" my sense of
what a fiction should be and do and in the process teaches me
to see a narrative and myself in a new and possibly truer way.
To use E.M. Forster's distinction, what had been a story, a
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mere amalgamation of events, becomes a plot, a group of
interrelated occurrences. I maintain that the reader-oriented
structures and existential themes of visionary fictions are in
fact moral exercises which prompt us to reexamine the
narrative logic of our own lives, to discover their "plots,"
to construct meaning from what may only seem to be "elusive
accidents."
Through their insistence upon the kind of engaged reading
I mentioned in chapter one, visionary fictions and their first
cousins, epiphanic

fictions, foster this kind of moral

exercising. Indeed, the epiphanic fictions of Dubliners are
some of the great examples in modern literature of art's
ability to enhance our moral vision. Mirroring the experience
of visionary awakening, Dubliners7 stories, which frequently
end

in

medias

res.

consistently

subvert

the

reader's

accustomed and comfortable expectations, even insistence, of
discovering meaning in all the old familiar places. In
cumulative effect, Joyce's willful non-endings teach the
reader to transform the grammar of meaning from the arena of
the "figure," (the actual black-charactered words upon the
white page) where complication leads to climax and reassuring
resolution, to that of the decidedly more unstable "ground,"
(the whiteness of the page: the gaps between words extending
to the very margins of the page and beyond, perhaps, to our
daily lives) where "meaning" as such becomes a much more
problematical (and personal) entity.
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The moral thrust of Dubliner's stories extends, of
course, far beyond the provincialism of Dublin society. In
"Counterparts," Joyce

relates

the

ontological

death of

Farrington, a law copyist paralyzed between his unarticulated
dreams and his submergence into alcoholic stupor, which, along
with his wife's reliance upon religion, form Joyce's Scylla
and Charbydis of Irish paralysis. But the numerous references
to Farrington as the generic "man" alert us to the universal
implications of this story, extending its connections beyond
father and son to text and reader until the full and main
intent of its title hits the reader with the delayed epiphanic
impact of Eliot's (via Baudelaire) "You hypocrite lectuer!" We
as readers are surely part of the "race" whose conscience
Stephen/Joyce seeks to create, in part, through circumventing
ways of being like Farrington's.
Robert Scholes suggests as much in noting that in our
encounters with "Counterparts," "we develop and refine our
consciences" (emphasis mine) and compares the experience of
reading Dubliners as a whole with reading Saint Ignatius's
Spiritual Exercises:
The evaluation of motive and responsibility in
these stories...must inevitably lead the reader
beyond any easy orthodoxy. These case histories
encourage us to exercise our spirits, develop our
consciences: to accept the view that morality is a
matter of individual responses to particular
situations rather than an automatic invocation of
religious or ethical rules of thumb. (382, emphasis
mine)
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In "Counterparts" meaning evolves from meaninglessness;
in effect—like Scholes' valorization of individual choice and
responsibility over unreflecting "ethical rules of thumb26"—an
existential exercise. Farrington is identified both by others
and himself as knowing nothing:
— I know nothing about any two letters, (Farrington) said
stupidly.
—You—know—nothing. Of course you know nothing, said
Mr. Alleyne. Tell me, he added...do you take me for a
fool? Do you take me for an utter fool?
The twin questions of "how/whether to be" are made
central here through the story's implicit connections with two
works which are visionary archetypes: first, the above
passage's repetitions of "Nothing" and "fool" echo King Lear27
as Farrington's relinquishing of moral authority to alcohol
and

(through his wife) the

church

recalls

Lear's own

abrogation of moral responsibility. All this is prelude to
Farrington's Lear-like descent into the maelstrom of wrath,
personal oblivion, fear and loathing. But as is characteristic
of much of the literature of the high modernist era and in

26

Cf. "ready-made" ways of being.

27

See note 6. Lear's existential moments occur, I would
suggest, on the heath in his vision of human suffering and in
his shocks of recognition regarding the true natures of both
Goneril and Regan, who possess the "figures" of women but are
"beneath...all the fiend's" (IV, vi, 128). Again, the key is
that these awakenings reveal an existential universe along the
lines I defined in chapter one. Of course, Lear, like Winters'
narrator and Bartleby, is more often than not labeled as mad.
I am reminded, however, of Nietzsche's saying "all worthwhile
thought risks madness" and also of McCall's citing Melville's
frequent observation that "seeing the world for the monstrous
place it is, is what drives one mad" (51).
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particular that of Joyce himself, the heroic and tragic have
been

eviscerated

spiritual

renewal

and
nor

enervated:

There will

self-knowledge

be neither

for the

likes of

Farrington who remains benighted, his eyes perpetually "heavy"
and

"dirty," virtually an anti-visionary

state; indeed,

Farrington is even denied the physical conquest granted the
eighty year old Lear over Cordelia's slayer: in his abiding
rage he only

"gauges the fragility" of his employer's

"polished skull"; he does not act. Rather his physical prowess
is reduced to a child's test of arm-wrestling with a drinking
companion, a match he loses ignominiously.
"Counterparts" concludes with one of the stark images of
circularity which conjure Irish paralysis in Dubliners:
Farrington's son kneels before him proffering a "Hail Mary" if
his father will refrain from beating him. Like several of
Dubliners's stories, this seems a non-ending, devoid of the
moral symmetry and catharsis of a Lear. However, the epiphany
(perhaps deferred until the collection's final story or even
until the completion of multiple readings) is the reader's:
the elements which—in Joyce's view—constitute Ireland's
moral paralysis—alcohol and religion—are revealed here as
incipient and insidious in the next generation. There is, we
sense, no other way to be in the prisonhouse of Dublin.
However, the most powerful visionary connection offered
in "Counterparts" is precipitated by Farrington's absorption—
indeed, his revery—with a line he is copying, an "incomplete
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phrase: in no case shall the said Bernard Bodley be..."(90).
Farrington's position as a law office copyist and Joyce's
penchant for wordplay might suggest "Bernard Bodley" as an
anagram

for

Bartleby,

Melville's

nineteenth

century

scrivener28, whose own name suggests a hindrance to being,
whose drama plays out in a setting—Wall

Street—which

connotes a prison, and whose death occurs in a literal prison.
As Farrington is defined by "nothingness" and foolishness,
Bartleby is defined by phrases which name his prescience: "I
know you" (i.e. the tale's narrator and, by extension, the
reader) and "I know where I am." Moreover, Bartleby knows that
which he needs for spiritual survival: a pattern or way—a
copy—of being: upon his hiring, Bartleby falls to his task as
if "long famished for something to copy." But such spiritual
food as his milieu provides him proves, as it does for a
visionary like Kafka's hunger artist, thin gruel indeed. Thus
do both Bartleby29 and Kafka's fantastic artist starve to death
amidst an abundance of food.
Both Melville's and Joyce's short stories may also be
read as fables about learning to read and as cautionary tales

"Although the resuscitation of Moby Dick's reputation did
not begin until 1917, knowledge and admiration of the book
were evident among members of Joyce's Parisian circle during
the time the author was completing Dubliners. Whether Joyce
had actually read "Bartleby," however, I have been unable to
ascertain.
29

Several commentators on the story have noted its
preponderance of eating imagery. See McCall (pages 40-4) for
a good summary.
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about the inherent pitfalls in the gaps any reader will
encounter within and between words. It is within those gaps—
the blank spaces that surround the words' characters—that the
ground of literary and, by extension, ontological inquiry
resides30. Farrington simply never cracks the code. His first
encounter with the "incomplete phrase: In no case shall the
said Bernard Bodley be..." inaugurates his day's drinking, a
patent form of ontological retreat (his way of going to
"Colorado"); his

second

attempt

leads

to

a rhetorical

analysis—" (he) thought how strange it was that the last three
words began with the same letter"—but he is never able to
apprehend or willing to confront the significance of the
phrase's content. Farrington, in the simplest terms, is a poor
reader, in effect disappearing among the phrase's gaps, never
to resurface unless in the form of a son tragically intent on
copying the patterns his parents present him. Within those
gaps is the "nothingness" which Farrington claims to know. And
he does, on a quotidian level of humiliation and insult, know
the searing scourge of nothingness. But on the visionary level
of actually seeing into, embracing and surmounting that
nothingness, Farrington is profoundly blind and impotent,
incapable of articulating or interpreting what he reads.
Bartleby, however, embodies the "postal principle"; the
dead letters he at onetime processed deliver their grim

30

I will incorporate Iser's theory of reading into my
later chapters.
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message; he knows where he is and his dead wall reveries—his
limit situation—only serve as objective correlatives to his
spiritual desolation. The story's frequent references to
Bartleby's deteriorating eyesight—his "eyestrain"—attest to
the diligence of his "reading" of his world31. Bartleby, too,
disappears into the gaps of his "text," albeit his plunge into
the destructive element, as has been suggested, is taken in
full and tragic consciousness of a desire (a "preference") to
no longer be.
Bartleby7s character may be distinguished

by three

qualities: his isolation ("...he seemed alone, absolutely
alone in the universe") , his silence, and his dignity. His
silence—as both cause and effect of the unnamed "incurable
disorder" from which he suffers—is one of literature's most
eloquent and darkest pronouncements. As McCall puts it, "the
repeated answer to our question

(of what is wrong with

Bartleby), and the profoundest, is silence" (58). But most
significant, I would argue, is Bartleby's unyielding dignity
in the face of his knowledge of that silence and aloneness32.
In his refusal to compromise himself through immersion, like
31

What Bartleby literally reads, of course, are legal
documents, a bulwark, if you will, of the quotidian life in
general and of boundary-drawing in particular. The fragility
of such structures is amply demonstrated by the havoc
engendered by one recalcitrant scrivener.
32

McCall quotes John Haig, an actor who played Bartleby
in a movie version of the story, that listing "the most
important qualities of the character as I came to him...I
think I would commence with Dignity. Bartleby's personal
dignity never falters before the world" (57) .
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Farrington, in a life of dissolution and wrath or through
accepting the lawyer's offer of material succor or through
retreating—like Winters' narrator—from the implications of
his vision, Bartleby emerges as an existential archetype of
Camus' question—one who knows himself, his condition and, in
his authenticity, shows us one response to the universe's
silence. The remaining chapters will explore the dynamics—the
ways

of being—of

four visionary

heroes who

choose a

"condemnation to freedom" and a pursuit of authenticity over
suicide and bad faith.
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CHAPTER III
FIGURING THE GROUNDS OF EXISTENTIAL BEING:
FAITH IN TWO VISIONARY FICTIONS
The lustre of the present hour is always borrowed from
the background of possibilities it goes with. Let our
common experiences be enveloped in an eternal moral
order; let our suffering have an immortal significance;
let heaven smile upon the earth, and deities pay their
visits; let faith and hope be the atmosphere which man
breathes in;—and his days pass by with zest; they stir
with prospects, they thrill with remoter values. Place
round them on the contrary the curdling cold and gloom
and absence of all permanent meaning which for pure
naturalism and the popular science evolutionism of our
time are all that is visible ultimately, and the thrill
stops short, or turns rather to an anxious trembling.
(William James)
All life is figure and ground. (Samuel Beckett)
Art is a way out. (Miss Lonelyhearts)

The "dead letters" which Melville's narrator speculates as the
cause of Bartleby's fatal melancholia are made flesh in both
Nathanael Wests's Miss Lonelyhearts and Irwin Shaw's "Act of
Faith." Both of the latter works turn on their visionary
protagonists' reading of letters, which are simultaneously
narratives of despair—raw, authentic pleas for spiritual help
and ontological direction—and

revelatory documents which

inspire faith in both their fictional and ideal readers. For
Miss Lonelyhearts and Seeger, the visionary hero of "Act of
Faith," letters mark an immersion into the destructive element
of existential awareness and the subsequent struggle toward
selfhood and identity, which define visionary experience;
their reading mirrors our own reading of visionary fictions in
which

we

see

the

visionary

grow

toward

selfhood,

and

experience the enhancement of our own vision, of our own
possibilities for being.
While Miss Lonelyhearts is one of the masterworks of
twentieth century American fiction1, Shaw's "Act of Faith"
enjoys—justifiably—a much more modest reputation. Yet I hope
to show that when viewed within the framework of visionary
fiction, it, too, acquires a narrative dynamism. The complex
1
Stanley Edgar Hyman calls the book "one of the three
finest American novels of our century" (27). Harold Bloom
contends that except for the greatest Faulkner, no other
American fiction writer in this century "can be said to have
surpassed Miss Lonelyhearts" (1) . It is noteworthy that West's
critical reputation parallels Melville's, both having suffered
years of critical neglect (West's reputation wasn't revived
until the mid fifties). For an intriguing Westian allusion to
"Bartleby," see p.98.
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of characteristics which define visionary works is manifest
throughout both works. As is characteristic of the interiority
and subjectiveness of visionary fictions, the plots of these
works are sparse2; Victor Comerchero observes that "within two
pages after the novel begins...Miss Lonelyhearts' problem is
quite clear: how does he answer the letters (he receives as an
advice columnist) when the letters are "no longer funny'?"
(74) . This is indeed the quotidian manifestation of Miss
Lonelyhearts' conflict3—with a slight but I think significant
visionary alteration: as I will demonstrate below, Miss
Lonelyhearts7 problem is clear in the book's first paragraph:
how does he respond to the letters when he perceives them to
be authentic manifestations of the human condition, of his own
condition? To no longer be amused by the letters does not
necessarily imply action, but to see them as reflections of
one's condition

in the world demands a response. Miss

Lonelyhearts turns on the anxiety inherent in that response.
Similarly, in "Act of Faith," Shaw utilizes a faux plot of
American soldiers at the end of World War II trying to gather
funds

for

a

weekend

in

Paris

to

prepare

the

reader

psychologically to experience Seeger's existential moment upon
2

A distinction should be made here between fictions which
contain visionary characters like Mrs. Moore in A Passage to
India and those (the majority) whose protagonists are
visionaries.
3

A truer sense of the book's conflict would be to say
that it is the problem of becoming a Kierkegaardian Knight of
Faith; that is, of making the absurdity of faith keep one
afloat in the existential void.
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receipt of his father's letter. With that moment the story
moves from the objective world of events to the subjective
experience of Seeger's vision and again turns on his profound
anxiety before the necessity of choosing how to be. Each story
offers a leap of faith as answer to the existential drama of
discovering meaning in meaninglessness. As exemplars of that
chaos each setting is a holocaust: that of the Nazis in Europe
and that of the human spirit in West's nihilistic vision of
America. Again, the letters reflect and resonate with those
tragedies. Finally each story employs a motif to illustrate
the process of vision: in Miss Lonelvhearts. figure-ground
dichotomies; in "Act of Faith," Plato's "Allegory of the
Cave."
By far the greatest depth of darkness revealed in these
stories is of the human heart itself. Augustine has written,
"If by 'abyss' we understand a great depth, is not man's heart
an abyss? For what is there more profound than that abyss? Men
may speak, may be seen by the operation of their members, may
be heard speaking; but whose thought is penetrated, whose
heart is seen into?...Do not you believe that there is in man
a deep so profound as to be hidden even from him in who it
is?" (Przywara, 421). Augustine describes here a condition of
despair, in which, manifestly, all visionaries share. But
Kierkegaard teaches us that all people are in despair and that
we are differentiated only by our consciousness of and
response to that despair. It is this consciousness or
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awareness or vision and the choices for one's being contingent
upon

it that

constitute

the

significance

of visionary

experience for us as readers.
It is, then, against and within this profound depth of
darkness that each visionary must struggle to fathom his or
her own heart; to establish an identity; to become oneself;
which, Kierkegaard argues, is the fundamental responsibility
of each individual. That self, as I indicated earlier, is not
encoded in a genetic blueprint nor is it anything as universal
as "human nature"; rather, it is a moral choice—an act of
will—made by the individual to transcend one's merely natural
self; to choose a self capable of attaining wholeness and
coherence and to live up to the fulfillment of that choice.
The ways in which that end may be realized through either
divine grace or human autonomy is the object of the two
visionary stories I have chosen to examine in this chapter.
For the visionaries in "Bartleby, " Miss Lonelyhearts and
"Act of Faith," the process of becoming oneself begins with
the reading of letters. Whereas in Melville's treatment, the
"stillborn errands of life" had been abstractions borne of the
narrator's need to find meaning in Bartleby's fate, Miss
Lonelyhearts' letters are rendered in lurid detail:
Dear Miss Lonelyhearts—
I am sixteen years old now and I dont
know what to do and would appreciate it
if you could tell me what to do. When I
was a little girl it was not so bad
because I got used to the kids on the
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block making fun of me, but now I would
like to have boy friends like the other
girls and go out on Saturday nites, but
no boy will take me because I was born
without a nose—although I am a good
dancer and have a nice shape and my
father buys me pretty clothes.
I sit and look at myself all day and
cry. I have a big hole in the middle of
my face that scares people even myself so
I cant blame the boys for not wanting to
take me out. My mother loves me, but she
crys terrible when she looks at me.
What did I do to deserve such a
terrible bad fate? Even if I did do some
bad things I didnt do any before I was a
year old and I was born this way. I asked
Papa and he says he doesnt know, but that
maybe I did something in the other world
before I was born or that maybe I was
punished for his sins. I dont believe
that because he is a very nice man. Ought
I commit suicide?
Sincerely Yours,
Desperate
The reader will immediately recognize Camus' "one truly
serious philosophical problem" which "Desperate" instinctively
understands to be a possible response to her original question
of "how to be" and to her pervading, insistent, unfulfilled
desire to attach some pattern of meaning to her condition4.
These questions form a refrain throughout the letters,
becoming an almost formulaic plea for guidance: "I don't know
what to do...Tell me what to do...What would you do?"5 It is
the cumulative effect of their repetition that triggers Miss
Lonelyhearts' existential moment and subsequent conversion
A

This is the same ontological need that drove Melville's
narrator to speculate on Bartleby's career in the dead letter
office.
5

Precisely this refrain will reappear in Lord Jim.
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from living in the quotidian plane to the visionary, an
evolution he tries to explain to his fiance, Betty:
A man is hired to give advice to the readers of a
newspaper. The job is a circulation stunt and the
whole staff considers it a joke. He welcomes the
job, for it might lead to a gossip column, and
anyway he's tired of being a leg man. He too
considers the job a joke, but after several months
at it, the joke begins to escape him. He sees that
the majority of the letters are profoundly humble
pleas for moral and spiritual advice, that they are
inarticulate expressions of genuine suffering. He
also discovers that his correspondents take him
seriously. For the first time in his life, he is
forced to examine the values by which he lives.
This examination shows him that he is the victim of
the joke and not its perpetrator. (32)
Miss Lonelyhearts' "examined life"6 signifies his conversion
from an existence confined to and sheltered by the concerns
and rhythms of everyday life to one defined by an awareness of
existence as enveloped by existential darkness. The profundity
of this conversion cannot be overstated. It is perhaps
tempting to dismiss one's proclamation of an "examination of
life" as trite or facile, but I would point out that, first,
by this point in the work nothing approaches ease for West's
bewildered protagonist; second, as a visionary work, West's
book is structured upon the very principle of "seeing"—and an
'implicit here, of course, is Socrates' dictum that the
unexamined life is not worth living. Perhaps the obviousness
of this allusion explains its absence from critical commentary
on the book, yet the centrality of this idea to Miss
Lonelyhearts and visionary fictions in general cannot be
overstated. While West's acknowledged debt to James' The
Varieties of Religious Experience has attracted considerable
and warranted commentary, the real genealogy here is
Kiergegaard by way of Socrates. Kierkegaard's dictum "become
oneself" is, in essence, his translation of Socrates' "know
thyself."
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examination is, of course, a way of seeing; and third, and
most significantly, a merely ironic if not cynical response to
Miss Lonelyhearts' spiritual quest7 repeats the cycle of
sterility represented by Shrike, a cycle from which the
visionary paradigm is capable of freeing us.
Moreover, Miss Lonelyhearts carries a significant history
of having in the past denied the implications of his visions:
As a boy in his father's church, he discovered
that something stirred in him when he shouted the
name of Christ, something secret and enormously
powerful. He had played with this thing, but had
never allowed it to come alive.
He names this force "hysteria" and images it as "a snake whose
scales are tiny mirrors in which the dead world takes on a
semblance of life." Staring at his crucifix, he again begins
to chant Christ's name, "but the moment the snake started to
uncoil in his brain, he became frightened and closed his eyes"
(8-9) . This is an instance of what Kierkegaard would label the
awakening of "possibility," which is the force capable of
taking the individual beyond "necessity" (the force opposite
possibility, and located in the world8) and beyond himself and
out of despair. For Kierkegaard possibility is incarnated in
God: "The decisive thing is: for God everything is possible."

7

Comerchero explores the influence of Jessie Weston's
work on the Grail Legend on Miss Lonelyhearts; see pp. 86-92.
At one point a character asks Miss Lonelyhearts for "the
nature of (his) quest" (17).
8,1

Becoming oneself is a movement one makes just where one
is. Becoming is a movement from some place, but becoming
oneself is a movement at that place" (SUP, 66).
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The question for the individual "is whether he will believe
that for God everything is possible, that is, whether he will
have faith" (SUP.68). It is faith that we come to understand
through Kierkegaard to be the sine quo non that keeps the
individual afloat in Stein's destructive element:
Whether the person who thus contends goes under
depends entirely on whether he gets hold of a
possibility, that is to say, on whether he will
have faith....This is what is dialectical in having
faith. In general all a person knows is that this
and that, as he hopes and expects, etc., is not
going to happen to him. If it does, he goes under.
The foolhardy person throws himself deliberately
into danger, where the possibility may also be this
and that; and if it happens, he despairs and goes
under. The believer sees and understands his
undoing (in what has befallen him and what he
risks) in human terms, but he has faith. Therefore
he does not go under. The manner in which he is
able to be helped he leaves wholly to God, but he
believes for God everything is possible. To believe
in his own undoing is impossible. To grasp that
humanly it is his undoing and yet believe in
possibility is to have faith. (SUP, 69)
It

is

particularly

important

to

understand

that

for

Kierkegaard as well as for the visionaries in this study
"personhood is a synthesis of possibility and necessity"; that
is, the ways of being the individual can imagine are only
valuable in so far as he can bring them to fruition in the
world (necessity) . One must live one's possibilities. This
raises an important point as well

in understanding what I

have termed the "quotidian". The quotidian mode of being is
not defined by actions but by attitude. It is to live, as
Kierkegaard says of those who lack possibility, "devoid of
imagination...within a certain orbit of trivial experience as
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to how things come about, what is possible, what usually
happens, no matter whether (one) is a tapster or a prime
minister" (SUP, 71). It is, in contradistinction to vision, a
way of blindness. The goal of realizing personhood, then, in
my own terms, is to live one's daily life in vision (of a
violent but indifferent universe) kept afloat through the
infusion of a secular or divine grace. The visionary and
everyday worlds must be made one.
The terrifying vision Miss Lonelyhearts closes his eyes
to above is an instance of the denial of possibility, a flight
from freedom, which is to be in despair. But without question
this instance of vision has strong affinities with madness.
Kierkegaard defines faith as "the formula for losing one's
mind; to have faith is precisely to lose one's mind so as to
win God" (68) . Indeed, the leap of faith is based upon an
absurd assumption and is therefore especially susceptible to
denial. The snake with which West images Miss Lonelyhearts'
incipient

vision

is

a

powerful

and

ambiguous

symbol

suggesting, perhaps, madness or sexual energy but, most
potently, evil. Now clearly evil seems an incongruous result
to his invocation of Christ9. However, it is precisely Miss
'Carroll Schoenewolf argues that West sees the religious
experience itself as "at best meaningless...at worst, evil."
In addition to the snake image, he cites Miss Lonelyhearts'
characterization of his experience as "hysteria" and its being
"an accomplice to homicide." Certainly meaninglessness and
evil are a cogent presence in this work; however, they are a
part of the existential fabric of West's vision of the human
condition, not an outgrowth of his protagonist's religious
experience. The snake image is a manifestation of Miss
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Lonelyhearts' acute perception of evil that is the genesis of
his troubles; that is, his sense of Christ as "the answer" is
inseparable from his vision of the universe as predatory in
the same way that one's faith is contingent upon the
maintenance of doubt. Regardless of his lineage as the "son of
a

Baptist minister," the

relentlessness

of

his

Christ

obsession is directly proportional to his deepening vision of
and impotence before his existential situation10.
What is equally clear is that his vision is revivified
through his correspondents' suffering as manifested in their
letters, the reading of which again accentuates his own
spiritual

longing; repeatedly he

is seen seeking on a

Lonelyhearts' consciousness of evil; it is not a conflation of
evil with Christ. While Miss Lonelyhearts' belief that "Christ
is the answer" may, indeed, prove ineffectual in effecting
happiness for him or his correspondents, it remains an act of
authenticity, a becoming of Miss Lonelyhearts true self, which
he had heretofore repressed.
10

The visionary's courage in facing the abyss is
characteristic of his ontological status. Conversely, James
argues that "if a creed makes a man feel happy, he almost
inevitably adopts it. Such a belief ought to be true;
therefore it is true—such, rightly or wrongly, is one of the
immediate 'inferences' of the religious logic used by ordinary
men" (78-9). The question of Miss Lonelyhearts' Christ
obsession as a case of "bad faith" also needs attention; that
is, is his conjuring of Christ imagery in response to his
vision of the human condition as tragic and permeated by
suffering merely a defence against the void, a positing of the
inauthentic? I think not for two reasons: first, the text
makes it clear that the idea of Christ has been a palpable and
personal presence for Miss Lonelyhearts since his boyhood;
indeed, his denial of his spiritual impulses strikes me as the
true instance of the inauthentic. Second, as Camus points out,
one must answer, which is to say each of us must discover an
authentic stance with which to face the void. For Miss
Lonelyhearts, as for Kierkegaard, that stance is Christian.
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quotidian level the answer to "what to do?"11 Miss Lonelyhearts
can not only see but also can empathize with the chaos that
laps at the borders of everyday life. Alienated by his vision,
he is no longer at home in the world, which cannot supply him
with the spiritual sustenance he so desperately needs. Thus
his "examination of values" marks an existential threshold
that once crossed, denies him the sanctuary of blindness. Both
Betty, Miss Lonelyhearts' fiance, and Shrike, his diabolical
editor, name avenues of escape from his enveloping despair.
Betty even suggests a career in advertising, an industry whose
raison d'etre is the warping of truth through the manufacture
of an ersatz and sanitized reality. But there is no escape or
return to a habitual way of being: "I can't quit," Miss
Lonelyhearts replies. "And even if I were able to quit, it
wouldn't make any difference. I wouldn't be able to forget the
letters no matter what I did" (31-2).
But what is the power that these letters harbor?
Consider the psychological, emotional, and moral consequences
of a committed reading of and response to the epistolary
narratives Miss Lonelyhearts receives, a reading, that is,
which views these stories and the lives they recount as
11

"Unable to think of anything else to do, he now repeated
the gesture" (12). "In the street, Miss Lonelyhearts wondered
what to do next" (13). "Made sad by the pause between playing
and eating, he had gone to the piano and had begun a piece by
Mozart" (15). "Although he had tried hot water, whisky,
coffee, exercise, he had completely forgotten sex" (19) .
"...out of desperation, (he) went to the telephone to call
Mary" (20).
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authentic reflections of the human condition. In "Bartleby"
the narrator speculates on the effect of "continually handling
those dead letters (which arrive) by the cartload." One is
struck by the emphasis on time and mass, by the spiritual
consequences he intuits of exposure to the timeless repetition
of these symbols of human futility. How long would anyone
faced with such evidence maintain a faith in a teleological
universe? Moreover, this weight is carried by "a man by nature
and misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness" (41). William
James has categorized such individuals as "sick souls," those
who are "persua(ded) that the evil aspects of our life are of
its very essence, and that the world's meaning most comes home
to us when we lay them most to heart" (131)12. And, indeed,
what would one expect of those whose life in the world was the
"unpleasant task of hearing what the sick souls...have to say
of the secrets of their prison-house, their own peculiar form
of consciousness"? (James, 135) This vision or consciousness
of chaos and disorder, and consequent recognition of the
vulnerability of life lies at the core of the visionary's
nature. But how is one to be in the face of such a vision? How
does one respond to having been condemned to such freedom?
12

In "Some Notes on Miss L" set down shortly after the
publication of the book, West noted his indebtedness to James'
book: "Miss Lonelyhearts became a portrait of a priest of our
time who has a religious experience. His case is classical and
is built on all the cases in James' Varieties of Religious
Experience and Starbuck's Psychology of Religion. The
psychology is theirs, not mine. The imagery is mine" (Wisker,
158) . For discussions of James' influence on West, see
Schoenewolf and Lorch.
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Not surprisingly, the desire for escape from the anxiety
and despair inherent in ontological choice is tenacious; the
illusion of comfort and assurance offered by the rhythms of
quotidian life, narcotic. Miss Lonelyhearts develops "an
almost insane sensitiveness to order. Everything had to form
a pattern: the shoes under the bed, the ties in the holder,
the pencils on the table. When he looked out of a window, he
composed the skyline by balancing one building against
another. If a bird flew across this arrangement, he closed his
eyes angrily until it was gone" (10) . In the throes of a
fever, he envisions himself in a pawnshop where he forms
figures from the "paraphernalia of suffering": phalluses,
hearts, diamonds, circles, triangles, squares, swastikas. "But
nothing proved definitive and he began to make a gigantic
cross" (30-1). He recalls a transcendent moment from his
childhood when, as he played a Mozart piece, his sister
spontaneously danced. As he reflects on the memory, he
envisions all children, everywhere, dancing: "square replacing
oblong and being replaced by circle" (15) in a formal ritual
of innocence

and order. When his

frenzied

attempts to

establish a geometrical order inevitably break down, he seeks
out

Betty,

who,

in

straightening

his

tie, gave

Miss

Lonelyhearts the sense that "she straightened much more. And
he had once thought that if her world were larger, were the
world, she might order it as finely as the objects on her
dressing table."
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The deep spiritual wounds Miss Lonelyhearts suffers
through his column are diagnosed by Betty as "city troubles,"
to be ministered to by removal to the country. Betty is West's
personification of James' conception of the healthy-minded
individual, those who "take good as the essential and
universal aspect of being (and) deliberately exclude evil from
(the)

field

of

vision"

(88) .

But

Betty's

(and

Miss

Lonelyhearts') character is considerably more complex than an
element in a Manichean abstraction between the forces of light
and darkness. Her goal is to be happy, but it is a happiness
compounded of bringing happiness to others (specifically Miss
Lonelyhearts' febrile existence) and maintaining a sense of
order in everyday life13.
James notes that we should all ideally know someone
"whose affinities are rather with flowers and birds and all
enchanting innocencies than with dark human passions" (80).
This is realized in Miss Lonelyhearts and Betty's return to a
pastoral and more primitive setting, a motif seen repeatedly
in visionary literature. Predictably, Betty's ministrations
are to Miss Lonelyhearts' body, not his spirit. He realizes
that the physical manifestations of his illness were "merely

13

The distinction between Miss Lonelyhearts' and Betty's
ways of being may be understood in the book's climactic scene.
He rushes to embrace Doyle; she arrives to nurse Miss
Lonelyhearts. The boundaries of Betty's existence—of her
consciousness—simply do not include the Peter Doyles of the
world. Of course, the most telling aspect of the scene is the
abject, darkly ironic failure of both their efforts to effect
happiness.
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a trick by his body to relieve one more profound." Betty's
course of treatment is one of perpetual denial: "Whenever he
mentioned the letters or Christ, she changed the subject to
tell long stories about life on the farm. She seemed to think
that if he never talked about these things, his body would get
well" (36).
But facing Betty, he comes to "self-consciousness"; that
is, he realizes the futility of escaping from despair through
something as facile as changing one's environment14, that his
condition requires something decidedly more radical, interior
and encompassing. Indeed his despair has become precious to
him, a sign of his emerging selfhood. As they return to the
city, and he realizes Betty's "cure" hasn't altered his
vision, "he felt better.. .because he had begun to think
himself a faker and a fool" (38). His reaction is an object
lesson in existential authenticity, a lesson the narrator of
"The Brink of Darkness" fails to learn in his removal to
Colorado, but one Bartleby implicitly masters in his final
words: "I know where I am."
The opposition between the visionary and the mundane
mind—between the sick soul and the healthy-minded—is one
defined by borders. "(Betty's) world was not the world and

u
One is inevitably reminded of Satan's "Myself am Hell."
William James terms such remedies as Betty's and Miss
Lonelyhearts' pastoral idyll "reliefs, momentary escapes from
evil" and distinguishes them from true religious happiness,
which is contingent upon the individual's very immersion in
the destructive element he had so desperately sought to avoid.
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could never include the readers of his column. Her sureness
was based on the power to limit experience arbitrarily.
Moreover, his confusion was significant, while her order was
not" (11).

Miss Lonelyhearts' perspective encompasses the

most ragged edges of his world while Betty possesses the
"power" (suggesting, perhaps, a kind of trick or learned
response, like "keeping one's balance") to exclude that which
is disconcerting to or challenging of her "sureness." As James
points out, "happiness, like every other emotional state, has
blindness and insensibility to opposing facts given it as its
instinctive weapon for self-protection against disturbance"
(88) . Not surprisingly, visionaries—with the ethical friction
they generate through their disenchantment with

everyday

life—are labeled as at best unreasonable, at worst perverse,
if not downright mad.
Miss Lonelyhearts and Shrike, by using their education
and glibness to satirize the correspondents' pleas for help
and guidance, utilize language as an escape, intellectualizing
their responses and maintaining an aesthetic distance from—a
blindness

to—the

surrounds

and

human

suffering

inhabits them.

that

simultaneously

Shrike, Miss

Lonelyhearts

recalls, had taught him "to handle his one escape, Christ,
with a thick glove of words" (33) ; that is, he taught him to
use the infinite play of language to deconstruct the reality
Miss Lonelyhearts perceived and live in bad faith: "Shrike
had...made a sane view of this Christ business impossible"
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(8). Thus does his "Christ dream" become perverted into its
antithesis—a source of mockery and contempt for those who
seek succor. But as with Bartleby, Miss Lonelyhearts' daily
practice of reading ("He could not go on finding the same joke
funny thirty times a day for months on end. And on most days
he received more than thirty letters, all of them alike....")
teaches him to read/see in a new way; the psychic torque
produced by the sheer weight of the emotional pain he
confronts through the letters ultimately lays waste to every
intellectual defense he can muster to distance himself from
that pain.
Ironically, then, where Shrike cynically labels art as "a
way out," an escape from despair, art functions in the form of
the letters as an immersion into despair, which, to double the
irony, is a way, perhaps the only way, out of despair. An
explanation is in order. First, in what sense are the letters
Miss Lonelyhearts receives "art"? Setting aside for the moment
the obvious points that they are narrative in form as well as
components of an artistic object, let us consider the
implications of Shrike's "theory" of art. Shrike, who plays
tempter to Miss Lonelyhearts' Christ-figure, catalogues for
his antagonist the possible avenues of escape from a life
which has become, Shrike correctly analyzes, "a desert empty
of comfort." Shrike is a brilliant polemicist and a consummate
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nihilist15. He cites—indeed, explores, in many cases—nature,
primitivism, hedonism, drugs, and suicide as "escapes" from
the existential dread that is devouring Miss Lonelyhearts'
soul. He groups art among these which, with his acerbic wit,
he outlines for his nemesis:
Tell them that you know your shoes are broken and
that there are pimples on your face, yes, and that
you have buck teeth and a club foot, but that you
don't care, for to-morrow they are playing
Beethoven's last quartets in Carnegie Hall and at
home you have Shakespeare's plays in one volume.
(34-5)
Shrike is mocking aesthetics here ("When you are cold, warm
yourself before the flaming tints of Titian....") and the idea
that the object of beauty can somehow sustain the individual—
physically or spiritually—allowing one to escape quotidian
necessity

on

the

one

hand,

while

supplying

spiritual

sustenance on the other. But Shrike's conception of art is a
conventionally narrow one both in his citation of examples
and, more importantly, in his implicit assumption that art
can, should or aims to allow the individual to transcend the
quotidian rather than to live meaningfully within it.
"Harold Bloom connects Shrike's character to Jewish
Gnosticism, particularly the work of Gershom Scholem, whose
essay, "Redemption Through Sin" in The Messianic Idea in
Judaism Bloom considers to be "the best commentary I know on
Miss Lonelvhearts." According to Scholem, the nihilistic
philosophy means "to free oneself of all laws, conventions,
and religions, to adapt every conceivable attitude and reject
it, and to follow one's leader step for step into the abyss"
(Bloom, 7). This distinctly defines what Shrike is about in
his systematic rejection of escapes or "ways of being." Just
as clearly, Shrike acts as a moral counterpoint to Miss
Lonelyhearts'idealization of Christ; thus Shrike's implicit
"leader" may be said to inhabit the most abysmal of abysses.
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An existentialist thinker like Kierkegaard offers a much
more encompassing idea in Fear and Trembling, a mediatation on
faith, which is discussed through the lens of the narrative of
Abraham's consenting to sacrifice his son Isaac. Now Miss
Lonelyhearts has a problem with faith: "If he could only
believe in Christ, then adultery would be a sin, then
everything would be simple and the letters extremely easy to
answer" (26) . Moreover, his reading of Dostoyevsky16 has taught
him the corollary to his doubt—"All is permitted,"—and it is
precisely this vision of chaos that gnaws incessantly at his
soul. Yet it is with a contradiction worthy of Kierkegaard
that Miss Lonelyhearts' faith is created.

In Fear and

Trembling Kierkegaard seeks to have his reader empathize with
Abraham as the "father of faith" confronts the horror of God's
command. This empathy is essential in Kierkegaard's view lest
we trivialize the quotidian, chronological, and existential
element of Abraham's experience through conveniently labeling
it a "test" or "trial":
One mounts a winged horse, that very instant one is
on the mountain in Moriah, the same instant one
sees the ram. One forgets that Abraham rode on an
ass, which can keep up no more than a leisurely
pace, that he had a three day journey, that he
needed time to chop the firewood, bind Isaac, and
sharpen the knife. (80)
The situation Kierkegaard outlines here is analogous to
Miss Lonelyhearts' originally thinking of the letters as
"jokes." The more letters he reads and the more he immerses
16

See page 118.
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himself in their details, the more profound is his anguish
before his realization that they represent an instance of
significant form having been given to the quotidian and
existential reality of his correspondents' lives; the letters
possess—demonstrably in Miss Lonelyhearts' case—the power to
change one's perception, to make visible what had been
repressed or lost to the habitual. In this these narratives
surely attain the status of art. But most remarkably, it is
these letters themselves which create Miss Lonelyhearts'
faith. Shrike asks:
"Come tell us, brother, how it was that you first
came to believe. Was it music in a church, or the
death of a loved one, or, mayhap, some wise old
priest....Ah, how stupid of me," Shrike continued.
"It was the letters, of course. Did I myself not
say that the Miss Lonelyhearts are the priests of
twentieth-century America?" (44)
In the same manner, the suffering of the visionary is
capable of creating faith in others. It is the narrator who,
under the influence of Bartleby's despair, perceives the
possibility and implications of that despair. In other words,
Bartleby, in the course of the events of the story, has taught
him (and perhaps the reader) to see in this new way, to shift
the weight of his world view from the camp of the "healthyminded" to that of the "sick souls"17. Thus the narrator's
"Exactly the same point is made at the conclusion of
Conrad's "The Secret Sharer" and "Heart of Darkness." In "SS"
Leggatt fosters the nameless captain's realization of his
selfhood and then, in true existential fashion, embarks "a
free man" on a "new destiny;" that is, he strikes out to go
beyond his own self, to exist in a continual state of
becoming. In "HD" Marlow conducts the nameless frame
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concluding,

seemingly

melodramatic

"Ah,

Bartleby!

Ah

humanity!" when viewed through the visionary lens is seen to
in fact signal his perception of Bartleby's experience as
emblematic of the condition of humanity—the figure (Bartleby)
is understood to be organically connected to and intrinsically
part of the ground (humanity) from which he so eloquently
projects.
It is not surprising, then, that when Miss Lonelyhearts
describes the city as a wasteland that can only be resurrected
through the tears of his correspondents, he concludes "Ah,
humanity..."

thereby

implicitly

connecting

himself

to

"Bartleby1" s narrator's perception of Bartleby as an archetype
of modern visionary experience. This expression, as was the
conceit of the revivifying effects of the correspondents'
tears,

is offered

ironically

if not cynically by Miss

Lonelyhearts, but as a visionary well into the experience of
conversion, his "joke went into a dying fall (because) he was
heavy with shadow" (5). The "weight" of those shadows is part
of the cluster of figure-ground imagery that informs West's
novella.
Because it is a technique West strategically employs in
Miss Lonelyhearts and because it stands as a cogent emblem of

narrator's initiation. The story concludes with the narrator's
observation that "the tranquil waterway... seemed to lead into
the heart of an immense darkness." He has been taught to see
the existential darkness which envelopes human endeavor. This
type of pedagogical strategy is inherent in visionary fictions
and signals their prime value to us as readers.
102

visionary and existential experience18, I would like to briefly
consider some of the implications of the concept of figure and
ground. Etymologically, "figure" is derived from the Latin
"figura" meaning "plastic form," something which is shaped or
molded. Moreover, Ellman Crasnow19 points out that "figura"
comes from the same stem as "fingere," from whose participle
"fictus" we form "fictitious" and "fiction." This clearly
complicates the relationship between the concept's parts if we
assume—as in Gestalt psychology—the "figure" to be the more
privileged of the pair or that upon which we focus our
attention as, for example, in focusing upon the words on a
printed page rather than the page itself. Simply stated, if
the figure-ground concept may be posited as an emblem of human
experience with its "figure" the life the individual shapes in
the world among others and its "ground" his or her underlying
and often unexamined values, ideology, and world view, what
are the existential implications of the figure's no longer
being privileged? Moreover, if meaning is taken as immanent in
the figure, how are we to consider the ground? With the
18

The aptness of figure-ground images lies in the
relationship of their components; that is, that part which is
designated the "figure" in effect cancels out the being of the
part designated the "ground." If the designation of the
components is reversed then what had been the "figure" becomes
"extinguished." Thus we have an emblem for the anguish of
being, which, one could argue, is the result of the anxiety of
nothingness, that nothing is just as possible as being—and
just as contingent on the inscrutable vagaries of the
universe.
19

I am indebted here to Crasnow's research on this subject
as is he to Erich Auerbach's.
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validity, truth or centrality of the figure called into
question—and this type of questioning is central to visionary
experience (hence its danger) —one must then turn to the
neglected element of "ground,"

a source of stability or

orientation, as the privileged component. "Ground" in this
sense suggests a fundamental principle, that which creates the
conditions upon which the figure can declare itself. Ellman
offers the example of "grounds of an argument," which suggests
a set of conditions which is accepted but—as with the
"ground" in any figure-ground pairing—perhaps not directly or
openly acknowledged. The Oxford English Dictionary further
defines ground in the sense of "that on which a system, work,
institution, art, or condition of things is founded" (emphasis
mine). Thus when Miss Lonelyhearts speaks of "examin(ing) the
values by which he lives," he is reflecting upon the "grounds"
of his life—the essential tenets of his existence. The
ontological implications of such an examination are profound
in that one is calling into question the philosophical
foundation and assumptions which support one's existence in
the everyday world. What seems clear is that while the figure
is dependent upon the ground for its very existence (ideally
being shaped or formed upon the principles of its ground),
this dependency is not mutual: the ground is the essential,
primary, ur component; I would further suggest that the
ground's very amorphous, opaque and enveloping nature suggests
its affinity with the silence of the universe against which
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human beings must seek to define themselves; that is, the
grounds of visionary being lie in the visionary's knowledge of
the abyss, and in the discovery that no ground exists to
support or give meaning to his or her being in the universe.20
West illustrates this by having Miss Lonelyhearts'
immersion into this existential consciousness imaged through
three figure-ground pairings which open the novella and
represent in turn the mind in relation to the text, the spirit
in relation to the self, and the body in relation to the
world. Each image is embedded in a text: Shrike's prayer, Miss
Lonelyhearts' abortive reply to a correspondent, and the
letters themselves. Indeed, the first action in which we see
Miss Lonelyhearts engaged is reading: "...(he) stared at a
piece of white cardboard. On it a prayer had been printed by
Shrike...." The prayer is a satire of "Soul of Christ" from
Saint Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises21. and the particular
problem for Miss Lonelyhearts (and the reader) is to decide
whether to read this text ironically or naively, whether its
essential message is salvageable and still capable of saving

20

The OED's first (of six pages) definition of "ground"
is "the bottom; the lowest part or downward limit of
anything," which is to say that the linguistic nature of
"ground" harbors the idea of the abyss.
21

The reader will recall my citation in chapter two of
Robert Scholes' comparison of Dubliners to Spiritual Exercises
in the ability of Joyce's stories to develop the reader's
"conscience, to accept the view that morality is a matter of
individual responses... rather than an invocation of religious
or ethical rules of thumb." Roquentin in Nausea also mentions
reading Loyola's work.
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or whether verbal irony is to be the last bastion of the
damned. The implications of his textual analysis are therefore
profound in that his mind is "searching for some clue to a
sincere answer" to the panoply of human suffering which
permeates his existence as the white cardboard permeates the
text of Shrike's prayer. I am suggesting here that Miss
Lonelyhearts

"reads," perceives, becomes

aware

of

the

existential implications of "ground"—the white cardboard
which surrounds the "figure" of the prayer—and understands
how it reflects his condition. The cardboard is the named
object of his "staring," and its valorization is further
evident in the subordination of the "figure" through the
prayer's placement in the passive voice. His deepening vision
of the omnipresence of the abyss is, like the "unescapable"
Shrike, a reality he can no longer ignore.
The second figure-ground dichotomy—of a white flame
against an enveloping dark altar—suggests a reverse image of
the white ground and dark figure of the first, a kind of YangYin:
Although the deadline was less than a quarter of an
hour away, he was still working on his leader. He
had gone as far as: "Life is worth while, for it is
full of dreams and peace, gentleness and ecstasy,
and faith that burns like a clear white flame on a
grim dark altar."
While the intended tone of this aborted response to one of his
correspondents is ironic, it is nonetheless a statement of
ideology, of the spiritual "grounds" Miss Lonelyhearts' has
chosen for his existence: namely, that life is innately
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meaningful and good. Yet as figure-ground dichotomies, both of
these messages may be read as their antitheses; that is,
Shrike's prayer is clearly relevant to a world emptied of its
symbols and sources of spiritual refuge. Miss Lonelyhearts is,
as

Shrike notes, the modern

Similarly,

Miss

guide

Lonelyhearts'

for the perplexed.

answer

simultaneously

articulates the grounds of his being but belies the reality of
his experience of being in the world, which would then have
his answer read: "Life is meaningless, for it is full of
nightmares and violence, sadism22 and despair, and disbelief
that envelopes all."
The final figure-ground pairing focuses on the physical
reality of the suffering that is manifested in the letters,
which are imaged as "stamped from the dough of suffering with
a heart-shaped cookie knife" (1) . The image intriguingly
anticipates Sartre's idea of the "being-in-itself" (or simply
the "in-itself"), his term for the noumenal world or that upon
which the human mind has not imposed its systems of artificial
order. In Nausea he images the in-itself as a shapeless,
doughy mass, a malignant presence capable of engulfing us at
any moment. What I have termed the "existential moment" is a
prime instance of the breakdown of the phenomenal world (or
what Sartre called simply "the world") of imposed order (even
22

Miss Lonelyhearts commits numerous instances of sadism
in the book involving people, animals and himself: "Turning
back to his desk, he picked up a bulky letter in a dirty
envelope. He read it for the same reason that an animal tears
at a wounded foot: to hurt the pain" (39).
107

time and space would fit into this category) and the breaking
through of the in-itself. This offers an interesting gloss on
West's returning us to the idea of text in the final figureground image. The letters may be seen as "figura," things
which are shaped into (significant) form from the encompassing
mass of the in-itself to stand as mute testimony to human
experience in a ruthless universe.
These introductory images are complemented by a series of
four other figure-ground images which, in effect, adumbrate
Miss Lonelyhearts' visionary progression. First, his room is
described as "full of shadows." It is an ascetic's room,
containing a bed, table and two chairs23. The walls, too, are
bare save for "an ivory Christ that hung opposite the foot of
the bed. He had removed the figure from the cross to which it
had been fastened and had nailed it to the wall with large
spikes"

(8) . Miss Lonelyhearts' deliberate, idiosyncratic

nailing of the Christ figure to his blank wall, a wall which
encompasses an area of shadow, emblematizes his response to
his existential dilemma of discovering meaning and goodness
amid desolation and despair. He knows, too, that the price of
that

answer

is

a

sickness, which

I

take

to

be

the

metamorphosis of vision: "Christ was the answer, but, if he
did not want to get sick, he had to stay away from the Christ
business" (3).

"Cf. Marlow's room in Lord Jim where Jim commits to a
pursuit of authentic being.
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The third image of this series is couched within the
alternative answer to a crucified, suffering Christ—the
philosophy of healthy-mindedness—in the form of Betty's
retreat to nature. The couple occupy an abandoned house owned
by Betty's aunt. Working, cleaning, scouring, they bring a
semblance of order to the ramshackle dwelling. However, the
futility of their idyll, presented within an Edenic motif
replete with apple and guilt over Betty's sexuality, is
revealed as they essentially walk into the heart of darkness,
the ground against which they had sought to define their
spiritual well-being: "...after eating, they went for a walk
in the woods. It was very sad under the trees. Although spring
was well advanced, in the deep shade there was nothing but
death—rotten

leaves, gray

and

white

fungi,

and

over

everything a funereal hush" (38) . This is the image of the
macrocosm of nature, which Miss Lonelyhearts has earlier
envisioned: "Man has a tropism for order. Keys in one pocket,
change in another. Mandolins are tuned G D A E. The physical
world has a tropism for disorder, entropy. Man against
Nature...the battle of the centuries. Keys yearn to mix with
change. Mandolins strive to get out of tune. Every order has
within it the germ of its own destruction. All order is
doomed, yet the battle is worthwhile" (30-1) . This is an
existential

vision

which

sees

beyond

the

observable

regularities of nature into its essential chaos. But even this
understanding or knowledge per se is without value to the
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visionary, who chooses to live, to make his ontological stand,
in the everyday world. It is a battle he chooses to see—in
light of his understanding of its ultimate futility—as
"worthwhile."24
The final figure-ground images occur in the novella's
climax, again set in Miss Lonelyhearts' room where he is
consumed with fever:
He fastened his eyes on the Christ that hung on the
wall opposite his bed. As he stared at it, it
became a bright fly, spinning with quick grace on a
background of blood velvet sprinkled with tiny
nerve stars.
Everything else in the room was dead—chairs,
table, pencils, clothes, books. He thought of this
black world of things as a fish. And he was right,
for it suddenly rose to the bright bait on the
wall. It rose with a splash of music and he saw its
shining silver belly. (56-7)
These concluding figure-ground images join the quotidian and
visionary worlds. Christ, whose teachings were traditionally
symbolized by a fish, here emerges from a dynamic background
as a lure, which in turn attracts the objects of the "black
world of things," which themselves metamorphose into the fish,
rising to the divine bait. The "shining silver belly" of the
fish recalls the snake's scales being imaged as "tiny mirrors"
in his earlier "hysterical" vision. But where that reflection
had generated only "a semblance of life (in) the dead world,"
this vision produces music, light, grace, and life: "(Miss

"Camus's treatment of the Sisyphus myth offers the best
gloss on this situation.
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Lonelyhearts') heart was a rose and in his skull another rose
bloomed. The room was full of grace:
He was conscious of two rhythms that were slowly
becoming
one. When they became one, his
identification with God was complete. His heart was
the one heart, the heart of God. And his brain was
likewise God's.
God said, "Will you accept it, now?"
And he replied, "I accept, I accept." (57)
The

antecedent

of

"it" in God's

question

contains an

intriguing and revealing ambiguity. Textually, it could refer
to either God himself as symbolized by the lure or it could
suggest the everyday world as symbolized by the fish. It seems
clear to me that West intended this confusion25; that, indeed,
the confusion over the antecedent's being divine or secular is
the point. That one can only live meaningfully in the world in
a condition of faith which is an outgrowth of vision. James
speaks of religion's role in helping us to face the universe:
"At bottom the whole concern of both morality and religion is
with the manner of our acceptance of the universe. Shall our
protests

against

certain

things

in

it be

radical and

unforgiving, or shall we think that, even with evil, there are
ways of living that must lead to good?" (41) . Discovering
those "ways of living" is the essence of visionary fictions.
James is careful to differentiate between "the more
commonplace happinesses" or "reliefs" which are "occasioned by

"Comerchero points out that "apparently casual responses
are far from casual. The richness of the novel resides in
symbolic or archetypal dimension residing in almost every
detail" (94).
Ill

our momentary escapes from evils either experienced or
threatened" and true religious experience, which "cares no
longer for escape (but) consents to the evil outwardly as a
form of sacrifice—inwardly it knows it to be permanently
overcome." Clearly the former are in the nature of the
"escapes" catalogued by Shrike; as Shrike concludes, "God
alone is our escape."
But what does this Christ-like demeanor mean in terms of
one's everyday life? Again James lays down the philosophy,
which West illustrates through his art. James seeks to define
the

pathology

characteristic

of

suffering

element

of

through

religious

isolating

the

experience.

His

methodology is to examine religious experience in extremis in
that its essence "will be most prominent and easy to notice in
(those cases) which are most one-sided, exaggerated, and
intense" (45)26. We experience the same strategy, of course,
in

the

unrelieved

suffering

of

Miss

Lonelyhearts'

correspondents. James further focuses on religious essence
through comparing and contrasting "the mind of an abstractly
conceived

Christian with

that

of

a moralist

similarly

conceived." The moralist, James argues, may live a life
"manly, stoical, moral or philosophical...in proportion as it
is less swayed by paltry personal considerations and more by
objective ends that call for energy, even though that energy
bring personal loss and pain." Such a man is a "high-hearted
z6

Cf. Jasper's concept of the "limit situation."
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freeman and no pining slave. And yet he lacks something which
the Christian par excellence, the mystic and ascetic saint,
for example, has in abundant measure, and which makes of him
a human being of an altogether different denomination"
(emphasis mine). Agreeing that both the moralist and the
Christian "spurn the pinched and mumping sick-room attitude,"
(that is, that they maintain a militant stance in facing the
silence of the universe), James sees this differentia of
religion as constituted of two ineffable factors: first, the
replacement of the moralist's "volition" with a "higher kind
of emotion" by the Christian; and second, a "state of mind,
known to religious men, but to no others, in which the will to
assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a
willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the
floods and waterspouts of God. In this state of mind, what we
most dreaded has become the habitation of our safety, and the
hour of our moral death has turned
birthday"

into our spiritual

(45-47, emphases mine). This correlates almost

exactly with Kierkegaard's belief that despair can only be
surmounted through experiencing despair.
West illustrates this distinction in two scenes between
Miss Lonelyhearts and the abject cripple, Peter Doyle27. The
first is their initial meeting. Mrs. Doyle, with whom Miss

27

Harold Bloom has pointed out that West took the name
Peter Doyle from Whitman's pathetic Civil War friend. Whitman,
of course,stands at the opposite end of the psychological
spectrum from West's dark nihilism.
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Lonelyhearts has committed adultery, has sent her husband to
invite the columnist to dinner. They meet in a bar and are at
first joined by Shrike. Doyle's entering hobble is accompanied
by "many waste motions, like those of a partially destroyed
insect." As Shrike spots Doyle, he winks at Miss Lonelyhearts
and raises a toast to "humanity." Again, when Doyle attempts
a bawdy innuendo about his job as a meter reader, Shrike
replies, " You can know nothing about humanity; you are
humanity," and leaves the two alone. Seated at a table, Miss
Lonelyhearts studies Doyle's "strange face," which fails to
balance, looking "like one of those composite photographs used
by screen magazines in guessing contests." West is clearly
utilizing the rhetoric of exaggeration here: Everyman as
insect, cuckold, cripple. The two stare wordlessly at each
other, a process "that began to excite them both." Finally
Doyle labors into speech, but his words are unintelligible to
Miss

Lonelyhearts;

in

fact, they

are

pure

poetry, a

spontaneous overflow of powerful emotion in which he "giv(es)
birth to groups of words that lived inside of him as things,
a jumble of the retorts he had meant to make when insulted and
the private curses against fate that experience had taught him
to

swallow."

Doyle's

language

is

accompanied

by

the

"pictorial" play of his hands, which, like a primordial
dumbshow, desperately attempt to interpret the ecstasy of his
emotion.
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Before this outpouring, Miss Lonelyhearts is described
"like a priest, (who) turned his face slightly away." This is
only one of numerous "confessions" which Miss Lonelyhearts
hears. In addition to his correspondents, virtually every
character, including Shrike, confesses him or herself to him.
One of the most significant instances is the confession of
Shrike's wife, Mary, with whom Miss Lonelyhearts also carries
on an adulterous affair. Over drinks, she relates her mother's
death from cancer and her father's cruelty to his wife. "He
was," she recalls, "a portrait painter, a man of genius...."
This triggers in Miss Lonelyhearts' mind an understanding of
the human need for transcendence through narrative:
Parents are also part of the business of
dreams. My father was a Russian prince,
my father was a Piute Indian chief, my
father was an Australian sheep baron, my
father lost all his money in Wall Street,
my father was a portrait painter. People
like Mary were unable to do without such
tales. They told them because they wanted
to talk about something besides clothing
or business or the movies, because they
wanted to talk about something poetic.
(23)
Such confessions are the oral counterparts of the letters Miss
Lonelyhearts receives and as such demonstrate the narrative
nature of those letters, of the human need to first, tell
one's story—to articulate one's presence against the silence
of the universe—and, second, of the power of narratives to
effect transcendence, to allow an individual to go beyond her
or himself, to create alternative and, ultimately, authentic
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lives28. Significantly, when Doyle grows more (conventionally)
articulate in his first meeting with Miss Lonelyhearts, he
does not tell his story but rather produces a narrative, a
letter, which he "forces" upon him. Doyle's letter is, in
essence, a philosophical document, an examination of his life
prompted by an existential crisis: "I have never let myself
get blue until lately when I have been feeling lousy all the
time on account of not getting anywhere and asking myself what
is it all for." Doyle's "blueness," his crisis of despair,
corresponds to Miss Lonelyhearts' condition characterized
above by Shrike as "feeling like hell." Seven times in the
course of his letter, Doyle redefines and reiterates his
primal question, as if its very starkness was insufficient to
bear its gravity.
Doyle's faith in Miss Lonelyhearts as a spiritual
confessor cum guide is based on two factors: first, the
latter's reply to "Disillusioned," whose pseudonym might stand
as an eponymous antecedent to the entire process of vision;
second, Miss Lonelyhearts' experience as a reader: "I figured
maybe you no something about it because you have read a lot of
books...." Again, the antecedent of "it" in Doyle's sentence
is the question, "What is it (life) all for?" As I suggested

Z8

In Survival in Auschwitz Primo Levi speaks of how the
need for survivors "to tell our story to 'the rest,' to make
'the rest' participate in it, had taken on for us, before our
liberation and after, the character of an immediate and
violent impulse, to the point of competing with our other
elementary needs" (5-6).
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in my first chapter, such questions leave all of us, for a
variety of reasons, uncomfortable. Radically subjective,
darkly opaque and eternally elusive, they lie like beached
whales threatening to befoul our happy outings to the seashore
because, once posed, they are impossible to ignore. Indeed,
West took a tremendous artistic risk in placing such a stark
question explicitly at the thematic center of his work, but he
adroitly implies the kernel of an answer in the question
itself

through

Doyle's

persistent

conflation

of

the

existential "no" with "knowing"29. Doyle has implicit faith in
reading as the vehicle which can teach one to reply to the
"Everlasting No" which dogs his days.
Miss Lonelyhearts' evolution as reader of both literary
and social texts describes a curious antithesis to the
increasing levels of sophistication and intellectualization
that might be assumed of a trained literary critic. One could
even argue the professional critic becomes increasingly
removed from the text as a living document—which is to say as
a

document

which

can

help

us

to

live

on

a

visionary/existential level—the more she becomes immersed in
the professional concerns of that text, concerns which will,
presumably, facilitate living on a quotidian plane30. Initially
29

0ne might well recall the encyclopedic knowledge of the
whale displayed in Melville's cytology chapters in Moby Dick.
That great existential symbol, when rendered, was reduced to
nothing.
30

Implicit here is that the intellectual journey of
professional readers begins in the joy of the discovery of
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these are Miss Lonelyhearts' stated concerns, too: job and
advancement. He begins, it might be said, in sophistication,
originally seeing the letters (and their implications) as
"jokes"

to

be

criticized/responded

to

in

a

tone

of

condescension. But through the very naivete of their reading
of Miss Lonelyhearts7 facile replies, his correspondents teach
him to appreciate the latent possibilities for being inherent
in his own satire; their credulity and commitment as readers—
they "take (his responses) seriously"—infuse him with the
courage to live what he writes, to, as the aphorism to this
study suggests, drink from his own well.
It is instructive, then, that the reading of Miss
Lonelyhearts we are made privy to beyond his correspondents'
letters is The Brothers Karamazov; indeed, one of the
characters refers to him as "Dostoyevski," and mockingly urges
him to stop "pulling the Russian by recommending suicide" (256). Dostoyevski's major works are, of course, "riddled" with
the themes and questions of visionary literature, and both
Dostoyevski and Tolstoy were major influences on West. But no
single work more fully captures the existential dilemma of
facing

the

universe's

silence

than

does

The

Brothers

Karamazov. Specifically, West quotes from the lectures of
Father Zossima, a Christlike monk who mentors Alyosha, the
novel's spiritual center. Zossima speaks of the power of an
meaning in texts. As a graduate school colleague once observed
to me, "I stop (work) every once in a while to remind myself
that I used to like this stuff."
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all-encompassing love which will reveal "the divine mystery in
things. Once you perceive it, you will begin to comprehend it
better every day." For him, seeing is understanding, but that
vision is contingent upon universal, non-judgmental love, even
of man "in his sin" (8) or of man in his decrepitude. Thus as
the redemption of Coleridge's Mariner is contingent on his
learning to love (learning to see in a new way) the water
snakes he loathed, so too, does Miss Lonelyhearts first jerk
his hand away when he feels Doyle's "damp hand accidently
touch his under the table....but he "drove his hand back and
forced it to clasp the cripple's. After finishing (Doyle's)
letter, he did not let go, but pressed it firmly with all the
love he could manage." Clearly this is the "volitional" love
of James' moralist, that in which the individual must "hold
his breath and keep his muscles tense...before the diseased
conditions of the body" (46).
But Miss Lonelyhearts' final encounter with Doyle is
infused with "the excitement of a higher kind of emotion,"
which for James denotes the authentic religious experience31.
Miss Lonelyhearts awakens from a fever during which he has a
Christ vision to hear his door bell. It is Doyle, ascending
the stairs with a gun wrapped symbolically in newspaper, bent
on avenging his cuckolding. James speaks of the religious
feeling imbuing one with "a new sphere of power. When the

31

West entitles the chapter of this encounter "Miss
Lonelyhearts Has a Religious Experience."
119

outward battle is lost, and the outer world disowns him, it
redeems and vivifies an interior world which otherwise would
be an empty waste" (48). Thus does Miss Lonelyhearts, with his
quotidian world in shambles, interpret Doyle's presence as a
"sign. He would embrace the cripple and the cripple would be
made whole again, even as he, a spiritual cripple, had been
made whole" (57) . He rushes toward Doyle "with his arms spread
for the miracle." This is a state of authentic "religious
happiness" in which escape is neither an option nor a desire:
In its most characteristic embodiments, religious
happiness is no mere feeling of escape. It cares no
longer for escape. It consents to the evil
outwardly as a form of sacrifice—inwardly it knows
it to be permanently overcome. (49)
Ironically, in the rapture of his religious ecstasy, Miss
Lonelyhearts again does not understand Doyle when the latter
shouts out a warning. Doyle fires and the two, entwined,
tumble down the stairs in a slapstick burlesque of sacrifice,
love, and redemption.
Given the ludicrousness of the novella's ending, West's
attitude toward religious experience as a means of personal
salvation would seem problematical. Thomas Lorch argues,
correctly I feel, that both James and West accepted the death
of God. Indeed, James, quoting Professor Leuba, contends that
gods have always been a construct of the (subconscious) human
mind, conceived to fill a human need:
God is not known, he is not understood; he is used-sometimes as a meat-purveyor, sometimes as a moral
support, sometimes as friend, sometimes as an
object of love. If he proves useful, the religious
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consciousness asks for no more than that. Does God
really exist? How does he exist? What is he? are so
many irrelevant questions.
It is with this utility of the conception of God that I
believe West is concerned. As a visionary, Miss Lonelyhearts
requires a framework within which he can give meaning to what
he has seen. Religion, specifically the idea of Christ, is a
receptacle for his expression of faith, and faith, as is
existentialism itself, is an attitude, a way of facing the
universe. What is essential in visionary terms about this
story is not that Miss Lonelyhearts7 end can be viewed as an
instance of psychosis or that his small corner of the world is
decidedly more miserable at his death than when he first
stared at Shrike's satiric prayer. Rather it is that Miss
Lonelyhearts

confronts

his

dark

vision

of

existence,

constructs an attitude of faith in relation to it, and lives
up to that vision, which is to say that he becomes himself.
Where his eyes had been closed in his boyhood reveries of
Christ, both they and his arms are now open in his death. He
lives what he knows to be true.
There is a striking irony in the theme of authenticity's
presence in Miss Lonelyhearts. West was born a Jew; his given
name, Nathan Weinstein. But his Jewishness was an aspect of
himself that he abhorred, and he, in effect, became a Jewish
anti-Semite throughout his life32. There is but a single
32

Bloom notes West's propensity for referring to Jewish
women as "bagels"; he apparently assiduously avoided dating
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reference to Judaism in Miss Lonelyhearts. During his country
retreat with Betty, Miss Lonelyhearts goes to a store for
supplies and mentions to the clerk that he and Betty have
observed a deer: "The man said that there was still plenty of
deer at the pond because no yids ever went there. He said it
wasn't the hunters who drove out the deer, but the yids" (38) .
It is a curious reference. Certainly its racism may be viewed
as part of the panorama of human degradation that informs the
work,33 and it fits, too, as the human counterpart of the
natural corruption Miss Lonelyhearts sees as inherent even in
the seemingly pristine countryside. But most potently it
suggests to me the idea posited in chapter one of the
visionary as Jew, the archetypal outsider who, in naming our
condition and maintaining fidelity to the self, defines his or
her status as outsider.
In

Irwin

Shaw's

"Act

of

Faith,"

Seeger

(read

"Seer/Seeker"), the story's visionary protagonist, must also
grapple with his Jewish heritage, which is to say his
identity, a struggle which is presented in terms of visionary
awakening34. As veterans of some of the fiercest fighting
Jewish women.
33

In one of the most offensive passages in the novella,
a group of Miss Lonelyhearts' colleagues discuss the gang
rapes of women reporters in retaliation for their going
"literary" and attempting to further their careers. One of the
incidents concludes, "On the last day they sold tickets to
niggers..." (14).
34

Shaw's fiction, while certainly competent, doesn't
approach the complexity or depth of West's although his
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following the Normandy invasion, Seeger and his two comrades,
Welch and Olson, are "like brothers," and now face the problem
of entertaining themselves as they await rotation home
following the Allied victory. They have passes for Paris but,
due to logistical problems, no money. Their one option is for
Seeger to sell a German luger he seized after killing its
owner, an SS major.
This external conflict takes up nearly half the story and
is part of Shaw's narrative strategy to prepare the reader,
through creating certain narrative expectations, to share
vicariously

in Seeger's existential moment and interior

literary output far surpasses West's. Shaw has written 12
novels, 10 plays, three works of non-fiction and countless
short stories. Readers may well be familiar with dramatized
versions of his novels Beggarman. Thief and Rich Man. Poor
Man, which attained considerable popularity when televised.
Shaw's reputation lies firmly, I believe, in his achievement
in the short story. "The Girls in Their Summer Dresses," "The
Eighty Yard Run," and "Main Currents of American Thought,"
among others, are frequently anthologized. Critical reaction
to Shaw's work has tended toward charges of its being
superficial. Leslie Fiedler termed it a "half-art," a view
which Giles contends became widely accepted in academic
circles. Perhaps the most telling comment on Shaw's critical
reputation is to be gleaned from the dust jacket of the Modern
Library edition of his selected stories. The quote is from
Lionel Trilling:
He always does observe and always does feel, and
even when he is facile in observation and sentiment
he is not insincere.... He has established himself
in a position which guarantees at least the
sociological or cultural interests of whatever he
writes.
While Giles cites this same passage as proof of Shaw's being
taken seriously by serious critics, it seems to me faint
praise indeed. I have been able to find no exegesis at all on
"Act of Faith."
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conflict, which are presented through the agency of his
father's chilling letter. This strategy of misdirection is
also extended to Shaw's limited treatment of his secondary
characters, each of whom is seen in terms of appearance and
reality. Olson, for example, is "just the type who is killed
off early and predictably and sadly in motion pictures about
the war, but he had gone through four campaigns and six major
battles without a scratch" (195) ; the captain from whom Seeger
attempts to borrow money had been

"a natural soldier,

tireless, fanatic about detail, aggressive, severely anxious
to kill Germans. But in the past few months Seeger had seen
him relapsing gradually and pleasantly into a small-town
wholesale hardware merchant, which he had been before the
war..."

(196);

similarly,

Welch

is

described

with

a

"belligerent stance, (and a) harsh stare through the steelrimmed GI glasses, which had nothing to do with the way Welch
really was" (199).
Seeger, however, who had been wounded and returned to his
unit

"unchanged,"

lacks this

surface

ambiguity.

He is

described as "cheerful and dependable." His professionalism as
a soldier is emphasized: "(He) had broken in five or six
second lieutenants who had been killed or wounded..." (195).
Nothing, one might gather from these few details, can alter
Seeger's comfortable sense of self. But that identity is
projected against a topographical and historical background
that further suggests the Satrean "in-itself," the destructive
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element which is always capable of poking through the thin
veneer of meaning and order human beings impose. In "Act of
Faith" the setting of the camp is a "bleak, wasted land"
engulfed

in

a

sea

of

primordial

mud.

Fittingly,

the

primitiveness of this setting is placed within the historical
context of the Nazi holocaust.
The implications of Seeger's Jewishness in general and of
the holocaust

in particular

are

issues, prior

to his

existential moment, remote from Seeger's consciousness and
sense of self. He was not like the Jews "whose every waking
moment is ridden by the knowledge of Jewishness, who see signs
against the Jews in every smile on a streetcar....People of
all kinds had seemed to like him all his life, in the army and
out." Even the horror of the Holocaust seemed psychologically
and ontologically distant:
In America, especially, what was going on in Europe
had seemed remote, unreal, unrelated to him. The
chanting, bearded old men burning in the Nazi
furnaces, and the dark-eyed women screaming prayers
in Polish and Russian and German as they were
pushed naked into the gas chambers had seemed as
shadows and almost as unrelated to him as he
trotted out onto the Stadium field for a football
game, as they must have been to the men named
O'Dwyer and Wickersham and Poole who played in the
line beside him.
The remote "shadows" of the Nazi's victims are part of an
image motif based upon Plato's "Allegory of the Cave," which
traces Seeger's visionary awakening35. The story opens with

35

This motif will be seen again in chapter four's
discussion of The Voyage Out.
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Olson's plea to "present (their request for money) in a
pitiful light" and the bulk of its actions occur in tents,
simulcra of Plato's cave36. When Seeger returns to his own
tent, Welch

is waiting, prisoner-like, peering "short-

sightedly" out at the rain. It is here that the story and
Seeger's existence turns. Olson has picked up a letter for
Seeger, who "goes toward the tent opening to read the letter
in the light." Like Plato's freed prisoner, he is about to
experience a second type of knowledge, one which transcends
the boundaries of an everyday sense of the order of things.
The letter from Seeger's father is a remarkable document.
Like those received by Miss Lonelyhearts, it is a plea for
help and guidance, based, as was Peter Doyle's letter, upon
the writer's perception of his correspondent's wider realm of
experience. Seeger senses something wrong merely from the
envelope's ragged handwriting, "so different from his father's
usual steady, handsome, professorial script"37. "Blink(ing) his
eyes," Seeger moves toward the entrance of the tent, "in the
wan rainy light." The letter tells Seeger of the plight of his
brother Jacob, who ostensibly had been discharged from the
service due to a leg wound. The father now realizes something
much more profound is amiss, that Jacob is suffering from
36

The captain's tent is illuminated by a single "gloomy
light" (198).
37

The fact that Seeger's father is a university professor
serves with the largely semi-literate letters seen in Miss
Lonelyhearts to create a certain comprehensiveness of human
need for the direction visionary experience can offer.
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combat fatigue and "is subject to fits of depression and
hallucinations." Socrates taught that the experience of
reality is only possible through escaping the cave, that if
the prisoner approached the fire (or even more radically, the
sun), he would perceive things in a different way, experience
a brand of knowledge distinct from that revealed through the
senses. What the father labels "hallucinations" are, in fact,
a vision of reality in the same way as is Seeger's reference
to the holocaust victims as "shadowy." Jacob has approached
the fire. The father tells of coming upon Jacob crouched in
their Ohio living room, peering watchfully through a window
for the mobs who will be "coming for the Jews" and of his
propensity for devour(ing) all the concentration camp reports,
an activity which frequently leaves him in tears.
The effect of Jacob's behavior on his father reflects the
effects of the father's letter on Seeger:
The terrible thing is, Norman, that I find myself
coming to believe that it is not neurotic for a Jew
to behave like this today. Perhaps Jacob is the
normal one, and I, going about my business,
teaching economics in a quiet classroom, pretending
to understand that the world is comprehensible and
orderly, am really the mad one....But it is
crowding me, too. I do not see rockets and bombs,
but I see other things. (204)
What Seeger's father "sees" is the universality of antiSemitism, memories of outrageous anti-Semitic incidents, and
his chilling ostracism by men he had thought his friends. His
observation as to whether he or Jacob is "normal" is, in light
of the fact of the holocaust, understatement. Robert Nozick
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speaks of the holocaust as "a massive cataclysm that distorts
everything around it:
Physicists sometimes speak of gravitational masses
as twistings and distortions of the even geometry
of the surrounding physical space; the greater the
mass, the larger the distortion. The holocaust is a
massive and continuing distortion of the human
space...its vortices and gnarled twistings will
extend very far. (242)
Jacob's "hallucinations" and Seeger's "shadows" are the result
of that massive displacement. While Seeger's father can see
these forces, he lacks the visionary's will to act upon them.
He reveals his reluctance to espouse liberal writers or
actions in his classes and his dis-ease over seeing Jewish
names signed in protest of abuses: "Somehow, even in a country
where my family has lived a hundred years, the enemy has won
this subtle victory over me—he has made me disenfranchise
myself from honest causes...." His solace is to discover
Jewish names in the casualty lists, a list which once listed
the death of a third son. This is a matter of authenticity.
The father lacks it in that he allows his actions to be
defined by the external pressures of what he perceives to be
public sentiment. It is a flight from freedom. Thus in the
conclusion of his letter does he turn to his visionary son: "I
need some help... .Maybe you understand things that I don't
understand. Maybe you see some hope somewhere. Help me."
The

course of

Seeger's

reading

of

the

letter is

punctuated by his blinking his eyes and now, at its end, he
cannot see because "his eyes (were) full and dark." It is his
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existential moment; he looks out over a "bleak, wasted land."
His reaction parallels the anger Miss Lonelyhearts had
exhibited toward the weak and suffering as well as West's
protagonist's examination of values:
Now, he thought, now I have to think about it. He
felt a slight, unreasonable twinge of anger at his
father for presenting him with the necessity of
thinking about it. The army was good about serious
problems. While you were fighting, you were too
busy and frightened and weary to think about
anything, and at other times you were relaxing,
putting your brain on a shelf, postponing
everything to that impossible time of clarity and
beauty after the war. Well, now, here was the
impossible, clear, beautiful time, and here
was his
father, demanding that he think. (206-07)38
In his reflections Seeger recalls numerous instances of
his being stopped by the civilians in towns liberated by the
Allies and asked, "Are you a Jew?" The repeated question
confuses him since "they never demanded anything from him."
When it is asked again by a "little bent old man and a small,
shapeless

women,"

they

are

transformed,

smiling

"like

children," at his reply.
"Look," the old man had said to his wife. "A young
American soldier. A Jew. And so large and strong."
He touched Seeger's arm reverently with the tips of
his fingers, then had touched the Garand he was
carrying. "And such a beautiful r i f l e — " (207-08).
Seeger, who was "not particularly sensitive," here receives
"an inkling" of the significance of the inquiry. He was "a
symbol of continuing life...blood of their blood, but not in

38

Marlow voices the same sentiment regarding the
relationship between work and reflection in "Heart of
Darkness."
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hiding, not quivering in fear and helplessness, but striding
secure and victorious down the street, armed and capable of
inflicting terrible destruction on his enemies."
But the elderly couple's vision of Seeger as an agent of
messianic vengeance fails to perceive his deep desire to deny
that role and to instead live easily in the quotidian mode.
His memories of personal affronts suffered and of the myriad
stories of the indignities suffered by other Jews had been
truths

he

had

"made

an

almost

conscious

effort

to

forget....Now, holding his father's letter in his hand, he
remembered them all" (210) . That text serves to illuminate the
darkness

that

has,

unacknowledged,

enveloped

Seeger's

existence; he "stares unseeingly," as might be expected of one
so recently emerged from the cave, contemplating Camus'
philosophical imperative: "Maybe it would've been better to
have been killed in the war, like Leonard. Simpler....Leonard
would not have to collect these hideous, fascinating little
stories that made of every Jew a stranger in any town, on any
field, on the face of the earth."
The nearly overwhelming alienation, fear, and despair
that Seeger feels at this point parallels that felt by Miss
Lonelyhearts faced with his letters. Both experience their
existential moment—the vision of a chaotic, ruthless and
indifferent universe—through these encounters with epistolary
texts. And both, in response, make an act of faith; that is,
in the face of all rational evidence that would suggest the
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futility of human action, they choose an authentic existence
based on reflection and vision which carries them beyond
themselves toward recognition of and commitment to others.
Seeger responds with ridicule and shame to his suicidal
thoughts: "At the age of twenty-one, death was not an answer"
(210)39. Standing in an open field, Seeger is approached by his
two comrades, who, sensing his despondency, have come to offer
their support of whatever Seeger's decision regarding the
lugar might be. The three walk "aimlessly" further away from
the camp/cave as Seeger silently recalls incidents in which
Olson and Welch had saved him from imminent death in combat.
Spontaneously, he asks what they "think of the Jews." Their
ironic response—"What are Jews?"—is partly based on their
intuitive sense of the contents of the letter Seeger still
holds in his hand, but it also, in the context of visionary
literature, asks a larger question about identity and purpose.
Plato's allegory posits a distinction between what the
mind perceives and the true nature of the universe. As
Socrates argues the case, true knowledge of the order of
things is possible only for those who escape the cave. If that
cave is a metaphor for the human mind, his question asks how
it is possible to know anything beyond our minds. How do we
transcend the borders of our own subjectivity? As with other
fields of inquiry which posit "second worlds" (supernatural
religious hierarchies and the study of particle physics come
39

Cf. Jim's identical response in chapter five.
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immediately to mind), Plato is suggesting the limitations to
and of the "truths" available to the quotidian or pragmatic
mind.
But for the existential or visionary mind, the only
knowledge
condition,

of value
by

is the understanding

which

is

meant

the

of the human
contigency

and

meaninglessness of human existence: we do not know why we are
nor

can we hope to

attain that knowledge. While the

limitations the pragmatic mind chooses to place upon itself
define Kierkegaard's despair that does not know it is despair
and a flight from freedom, the visionary is immersed in the
anguish and passion of freedom and the imperative of choosing
how to be, which an understanding of the human condition
entails. The individual can only become himself and transcend
the nothingness of his predicament by perceiving and embracing
the essential emptiness of his state.
In "Act of Faith" the tension between these competing
visions of reality is presented in the form of narratives
about Jews and their respective quotidian and visionary
analyses. On the one hand is the pragmatic equation of the Jew
with chaos and evil. Utilized as a scapegoat figure, the Jew
ironically supplies a causal, "rational" relationship to the
malevolence of the human landscape. Thus does Seeger recall
blatant acts of anti-Semitism occurring in moments of the
direst physical danger ("In the fogs and the cold, swelling
Arctic seas off the Aleutians, on a small boat, subject to
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sudden, mortal attack at any moment....") or in complete
contradistinction to facts (On the day of FDR's death, someone
yelling, "Finally, they got the Jew out of the White House.")
On the other hand, Jews themselves collect these same
narratives "Like a special, lunatic kind of miser," (209) as
if, instinctively, they perceive the very facticity of the
confusion, ignorance, and irrationality the stories represent
to be essential components of reality, of the human condition.
In effect, they make the destructive element those narratives
represent hold them up.
Always the key is how one chooses to be in the face of
the existential vision. Seeger confronts a choice between
violence toward and faith in other human beings. Originally
the lugar had represented a "vague, half-understood sign to
himself that justice had once been done and that he had been
its instrument" (208). Existentialist thinkers often speak of
such a precognitive state in which the individual already
intuitively knows what is not fully revealed until one is
deeply involved in the experience of anguish. Where Seeger had
originally intended to return to

America with the weapon's

barrel plugged, now in the light of his father's narrative, in
the full passion of his anguish and vision, he perceives the
necessity of returning with it loaded. His sole option, the
one he chooses, is to rely on his comrades40 in the crucible
40

The various states from which Olson, Welch, and Seeger
hail are mentioned, implying, I think, their universality. As
with Miss Lonelyhearts' spiritual faith, the wisdom and
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of everyday life as he had in warfare. In the totality of his
vision of the malevolence of humankind, this is profoundly an
act of faith.
Like existentialism itself, faith projects an attitude,
a way of being, which is constitutive of the entire person. In
Abbagnano's analysis, faith reflects not just an intellectual
act or a sentiment or a practical activity because it is all
these activities, "a fundamental mode of being in which all
man's expressions can take root and from which all can deduce
their own specific significance" (61). As the figure is
inseparable from the ground from which it projects, faith can
only be realized in connection with doubt: "The possibility of
doubt is...the possibility of faith itself" (62). Doubt along
with its constituents disorder, dissonance, and confusion is
the destructive element within which the visionary mind must
learn to swim. Conversely and paradoxically, to not doubt is
to be incapable of escaping confusion. Such an individual
"mistakes the fleeting moments of his daily life, the false
comforts, complacence and ignorance for a secure possession
and he fools himself into believing that he is docked in a
port toward which he never set out" (64). This is certainly

authenticity of Seeger's choice here may be questioned; that
is, is his disavowal of a militant stance in response to the
perceived malevolence surrounding him an instance of bad
faith? Seeger's experience in the war attests to his will to
confront physical brutality and chaos. Based on this we must
assume, I think, that Seeger's daily life will be conducted in
full visionary knowledge of and existential readiness toward
other manifestations of brutality and chaos he will encounter.
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Seeger's ("People of all kinds had seemed to like him all his
life") and Miss Lonelyhearts' (He hopes his advice column
might lead to a gossip column) ontological state prior to
receiving their respective letters.
For both Miss Lonelyhearts and Seeger the letters are
documents which create faith, a religious faith in the former
case; a secular one in the latter. Miss Lonelyhearts fervid
and deadly embrace of Doyle is a microcosm of his attitude
toward the world, a Christ-like stance taken in the face of
overpowering evidence of, at best, God's disinterest in the
human enterprise; at worst, his total abdication of his divine
responsibilities. Similarly, Seeger's embracing of life is
undertaken in the face of the historical facticity of the
holocaust and of his father's (accurate) assessment of how
widespread the "poison" of anti-Semitism had become.
These acts are paradigms of courage and faith. As
readers, we, too, must make our individual acts of faith in
the belief that, much evidence to the contrary, literature can
help us to make meaning of our condition. I believe that these
two visionary fictions, divergent as they are in their
intrinsic literary merits, help us toward that faith.
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CHAPTER IV
READING IN THE CAVE:
VIRGINIA WOOLF AND THE DRAMA OF BECOMING VISIONARY
"Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being—like a worm."
Sartre
"Nothing is more real than nothing." Samuel Beckett
"When one gave up seeing the beauty that clothed things, this
was the skeleton underneath." The Voyage Out
"Books...I wonder what you find in them." The Voyage Out

The belief in the value of a dynamic and vital connection
between the reading of literature and the living of life lies
at the core of this study. Nowhere has that value been more
cogently articulated

and embraced than in the feminist

literary enterprise of the past twenty-five years. The essays
of feminist scholars who were in the vanguard of the movement
are peppered with

references both to this value and its

antithesis, the Anglo-American formalist criticism, which
denied this connection1. "Without stories," writes Carol
Christ, "a woman is lost when she comes to make the important
decisions of her life... .Without stories she cannot understand

1

Fraya Katz-Stoker refers to formalism as "that great
block of aesthetic ice" (315). Certainly I am aware here of
the reductive (and therefore inadequate) nature of my own
comment about New Critical theory. It is, however, a revealing
irony—and one seemingly often forgotten—that the New Critics
"aesthetic iciness" was an attempt to discover in the "verbal
icon" a source of order and meaning that had disappeared in
the chaos and breakdown of modern society and the Yeatsian
"fury and mire of human veins." As Iser makes the point, the
New Critics had "called off the search for meaning" and
focused instead on "the elements of the work and their
interaction... .The value of the work is measured by the
harmony of its elements" (15). The critic's task became the
clarification of the text's ambiguities. Therein did critics'
essential skill become ingeniousness rather than insight. In
effect, then, New Criticism offers another example of the
figure-ground paradigm that informs visionary experience: it
was an attempt to objectify and isolate the literary work/form
through denying or ignoring the surrounding chaos from which
it emerged. Feminist theory, conversely, seeks to utilize
stories to "give shape to lives"; that is, its object is to
plunge into the "ground" of lived experience—the destructive
element—and create meaning there. Where the patriarchal
enterprise is characterized by isolation, feminist thought is
defined by connection. Schweikart argues that a "principle
tenet of feminist criticism (is that) a literary work cannot
be understood apart from the social, historical, and cultural
context within which it was written" (46).
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herself....Stories give shape to lives" (1). Florence Howe
believes that "the classroom should function in response to
real needs and questions of students and teachers; and on the
other hand that out of the classroom should flow some lively
literary and aesthetic debate rooted

in the lives and

understanding of women" (260). Nancy Burr Evans recalls being
"betrayed" by the "tight-fisted influence of my traditional
English major upbringing; I was self-conscious about doing
what I thought should be most basic and natural: relating
literature to life" (309). Indeed, the image of a "tight fist"
is taken to its political extreme by Fraya Katz-Stoker who
sees as "suspicious" that the rise of the New Criticism
coincided with "American and English businessmen...arming
Hitler as 'a bulwark against communism'", and that the New
Critics replaced "an extraordinarily vigorous sociological
approach which...dominated the middle 30's" (322).
The immediacy and vigor of feminist critical concerns
have run unabated through the present day, and their stress
continues on ways in which the experience of literature can
affect

lives

and

effect

change. Patrocinio

Schweickart

emphasizes feminist criticism as a "mode of praxis. The point
is not merely to interpret literature in various ways; the
point is to change the world" (39). Sharon O'Brien reflects
eloquently on her experience of writing a biography of Willa
Cather, of how it "shaped" her own life, allowing her to
reconcile her personal experiences of other powerful women
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(not men) "who tried to erase me without ever seeing who I
was." O'Brien recognizes, too, her indebtedness to the
feminist scholars who preceded her: "For the questions we can
ask of and about our subjects are shaped...by the critical
conversations available to us at the time" (24) . I would
suggest that the questions being asked by feminist critics are
marked by an authenticity, vitality and passion transcending
the arguments of other literary schools because the feminists'
goals are finally ontological rather than the "simply"
professional and intellectual

stakes traditional to the

academy; feminism is a mode of thought "alive" in Heinemann's
sense of that which might elucidate our position or offer
solutions to our problems; in existential terms, it is a
criticism conducted in Sartrean "good faith," and as such
offers a powerful venue for the playing out of visionary
fictions2.
Christ's analysis, in particular, speaks to some of the
core issues of visionary experience. She cites the "sacred
dimension" present in the ability of some stories to orient
the reader to what Stephen Crites' elsewhere calls "the great
powers that establish the reality of (the reader's) world."
These writers are not speaking "merely" of deities here, but

2

In speaking of the evolution of reader-response
criticism, for example, Schweickart cites "the relative
tranquility of tone" of various strands of that school which
"overlook issues of race, class, and sex, and give no hint of
the conflicts, sufferings, and passions that attend these
sufferings" (35).
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more of the existential forces against which a person must
contend and upon which she must grow in the battle for
selfhood: "They may ground a person in powers of being that
enable her to challenge conventional values or expected roles"
(3).
But the core of the feminist critique is the reaction
against unauthentic stories a patriarchal culture supplies (or
imposes upon) a woman, stories which "do not validate what she
thinks or feels" (5). Denied authentic stories, Christ argues,
there is a sense in which a woman is "not alive. Continually
trying to fit her possibilities into stories where her reality
is not acknowledged, a woman experiences nothingness, and
perhaps even contemplates suicide..." (6-7).
Clearly, a major aspect of an individual's realizing her
authentic self is in the existential choice of a story to
fulfill. Schweikart observes that what the feminist reader
reads is of equal consequence with the how of any theoretical
stance she might assume. Indeed, the forces that would
pressure a woman toward traditional and therefore crippling
ways

of

being

"institutional

were

omnipresent

narratives" supplied

in
by

the

pre-feminist

family, culture,

education, religion, and art—not to mention the myriad
permutations within these categories3. Moreover, each of these
3

For example, in The Voyage Out Helen Ambrose offers
Rachel Vinrace "Defoe, Maupassant, or some spacious chronicle
of family life" as an inducement "to think" and as a way of
lessening Rachel's immersion in music. As my analysis of the
novel will demonstrate, Rachel is defined by her propensity
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institutions often works against the "stories" offered by the
others. For men, the experiences of formal education and thus
of literature have traditionally (perhaps ideally) functioned
as critiques of the narrative patterns imposed by culture,
family and religion. For women, the struggle to canonize texts
which would critique and shape their experiences beyond the
academy has formed the feminist drama of the past quarter
century. For Michael Novak, any individual—man or woman—who
lives devoid of a structuring story experiences, as Christ
says of women, "nothingness: the primal formlessness of human
life below the threshold of narrative structuring. Why become
anything at all? Does anything make any difference? Why not
simply die?...Or drift: which is a death-in-life" (Ascent.
52). These are, of course, reiterations of the ineffable and
dangerous core questions underlying this study—"how to be"
and "whether to be"—questions Novak labels "religious" in
nature. Such questions, I have tried to show, are at the heart
of all visionary fictions; most importantly, I contend that
these

stories—in

an

age

of

cultural

fragmentation,

for question and analysis; Helen, however, is responding to a
different paradigm regarding what constitutes "thought."
Woolf, who was meticulous in her choice of literary allusions,
would seem to be here alluding to three historic paths imposed
on women: the use of wit and feminine charm as a means of
survival, an idealized romanticism, or absorption into "family
life." Annette Kolodny reminds us that "Insofar as we are
taught to read, what we engage are not texts, but
paradigms..." (10). Significantly, then, Rachel declines
Helen's selections and chooses instead "modern books" (124).
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intellectual confusion and spiritual malaise—provide the
structuring narratives for us all4.
In Christ's feminist analysis of the role of stories, the
most powerful are those which delineate the spiritual quest of
women: "Her awakening to the depths of her soul and her
position in the universe:
A woman's spiritual quest includes moments of
solitary contemplation, but it is strengthened by
being shared. It involves asking basic questions:
Who am I? Why am I here? What is my place in the
universe? (8)
Again, these

ur-questions

challenge

the

foundations of

accepted reality; that is, the stories of
culture and family, and

(patriarchal)

(organized) religion that have

heretofore defined reality and the woman's place within it.
The stories by women which oppose these traditional narratives
possess, for Christ, "both a spiritual and a social dimension"
wherein the process of women's spiritual quest moves from the
experience of nothingness, to awakening, to renaming, and
culminates in a reemergence in the world.
It begins in an experience of nothingness. Women
experience emptiness in their own lives—in selfhatred, in self-negation, and in being a victim; in
relationships with men; and in the values that have
shaped their lives. Experiencing nothingness, women
reject conventional solutions and question the
meaning of their lives, thus opening themselves to
the revelation of deeper sources of power and
value. The experience of nothingness often precedes
an awakening, similar to a conversion experience,
in which the powers of being are revealed. A
woman's awakening to new powers grounds her in a
*Cf. my
Darkness."

comments on the ending
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of

"The Brink of

new sense of self and a new orientation in the
world. (13) (emphases mine)
Certainly

the

experience

of

nothingness—of

the

recognition that the self is a culturally imposed entity—is
not gender specific. Men are perhaps even more susceptible to
culturally imposed roles and perceptions of reality and
morality than are women. The distinction, of course, has
always been in the relative breadth of men's choices within a
particular culture and

in the power

inherent

in those

possibilities. But the experience of the female visionary
extends this commonplace, reminding us that prior to the
feminist movement of the last quarter of this century, it was
only men who could discover solace and some level of meaning
in the rhythms and structures of daily life—regardless of how
tenuousness or illusory that order might be. And while
historically the legal status of women had begun to change
substantially by the time Virginia Woolf began writing her
first novel in 1908, Woolf could still have a male character
ask of a female:
"I've often walked along the streets where people
live in a row, and one house is exactly like
another house, and wondered what on earth the women
were doing inside... .Doesn't it make your blood
boil?...I'm sure if I were a 5 woman I'd blow
someone's brains out." (VO, 215)
5

It is perhaps illuminating that when Woolf has a male
project himself into a woman's position, his frustration will
result in his shooting someone else; however, in A Room Of
One"s Own she notes that "any woman born with a great gift in
the sixteenth century would certainly have gone crazed, shot
herself, or ended her days in a lonely cottage outside the
village... feared and mocked at" (51).
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For the enlightened woman, then, there really existed little
choice for creating a self—except perhaps through literature,
a point Woolf makes eloquently in A Room of One/s Own. Indeed,
despite Woolfs reservations in that book that women had not
yet developed

a truly

feminist art, the narratives of

Victorian female characters must surely have offered women
readers the first ontological maps for selfhood.
Christ sees patriarchal hegemony as the lie from which
women must continue to awaken and the root of their spiritual
quest. Novak, as noted above, perceives the experience much
more radically as one of "primal formlessness of human life
below the threshold of narrative structuring" (emphasis mine) .
But in addition to their focus upon the primacy of the
experience of nothingness, Novak and Christ also share the
discovery of the roots of that experience in the "deepest
recesses of human consciousness, in its irrepressible tendency
to ask questions" (Experience, 14). In visionary experience
the concepts of questioning and nothingness are inextricably
linked because the visionary's ultimate questions are met with
a universal silence:
When I perceive the drive to question in its
purity, apart from the products to which it leads
me, I perceive the ambiguity of my own conscious
life.
I
recognize
the
formlessness,
the
aimlessness, and the disunity implicit in my own
insignificance,
my
mortality,
my
ultimate
dissolution. I peer into madness, chaos, and death.
These insights are true insights. Not to experience
them is to evade the character of one's own
consciousness. It is to live a lie. The experience
of nothingness bears the taste of honesty. (Novak,
Experience. 15)
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As I have suggested, an interrogative posture is indicative of
the visionary consciousness. Implicitly or explicitly, the
visionary is an unrelenting, even ruthless questioner of all
the values—including the very nature of reality itself—which
form the foundations of quotidian life. Because those values
and bases have remained unremittingly patriarchal, women offer
some of the most cogent critiques of the culture which
produced them.
It is not surprising, then, that Rachel Vinrace, the
protagonist of The Voyage Out, is defined by her propensity
for radical questioning, a drive which frees her from her
perception of her life as a "creeping, hedged-in thing,"
confronts her with the experience of nothingness, and plunges
her into existential awareness. The outline of Woolf's first
novel is straightforward enough: At the age of twenty-four,
Rachel, who has been more isolated than raised by maiden aunts
in England6, accompanies her father, Willoughby, aboard his
ship, the Euphrosvne, bound for South America. Joining them
are Rachel's deceased mother's sister, Helen, and her husband,
'Woolf acutely traces Rachel's epistemological isolation:
"Her mind was in the state of an intelligent man's in the
beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth; she would believe
practically anything she was told, invent reasons for anything
she said....She was of course brought up with excessive care,
which as a child was for her health; as a girl and a young
woman for what it seems almost crude to call her morals. Until
quite lately she had been completely ignorant that for women
such things existed. She groped for knowledge in old books,
and found it in repulsive chunks...." (34-5). Woolf's interest
in how individuals learn and manifest knowledge is most richly
realized in To the Lighthouse in the characters of Mr. and
Mrs. Ramsay.
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Ridley.

Simultaneously

appalled

and

fascinated

by

the

narrowness of Rachel's experience, Helen suggests that Rachel
remain with them among the

(largely eccentric) English

community on the small island of Santa Marina while Willoughby
journeys down the Amazon. During her stay, Rachel falls in
love with a young Englishman and aspiring novelist, Terence
Hewet, who has travelled out with his effete friend, St. John
Hirst. The pair plans marriage, but during a river excursion
of their own, Rachel contracts a fever and dies. The novel
concludes in images which frame the response of the community
to Rachel's passing.
Not surprisingly, the critical heritage of The Voyage Out
has evolved much more slowly than those of the novels of
Woolf's artistic maturity, but I would suggest that the lack
of unity many critics cite as a weakness of The Voyage Out to
be one of its strengths. The book's numerous thematic concerns
and its utilization of an array of imperfectly realized
characters in fact reflect the realities that life is unified
by

nothing

but

its

fragmentation,

and

the

apparent

impossibility of knowing anyone—even ourselves—with anything
approaching
efforts,

is

certitude. Life, despite
most

assuredly

not

a

humankind's devout
row

of

gig

lamps

symmetrically arranged.
The roots of Rachel's radical questioning transcend her
naivete and ignorance, the fruits of her cloistered youth in
England, and lie instead in her visionary consciousness, which
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in effect compels her to see and question what others choose
to

ignore

or

passively

interrogative—not

simply

accept.

Rachel's

inquisitive

or

nature

is

precocious—but

radically interrogative. Novak reminds us that the drive to
question is innate and preverbal; that is, it is a way of
being, which, on the one hand, allows the individual to "keep
altering his views of world and self... (and) to direct his own
evolution" while, on the other, raising the uniquely human
specter

of

anxiety

and

its

attendant

realizations

of

loneliness and mortality:
For by his endless drive to question a man sooner
or later may perceive that all his supports offered
by his culture, his social position, and his
achievements do not remove the fundamental law of
consciousness: he stands alone in a darkness and
must die. (Nothingness, 48).
Richard Dalloway's kissing of Rachel during the outward
voyage is often cited as the symbolic awakening of her
consciousness, one which is fraught with nightmare images7. As
Novak suggests, the emotional and psychic crisis that Rachel
experiences here occurs within a wholly indifferent universe
("Far out between the waves little black and white sea birds
were riding. Rising and falling with smooth and graceful
movements in the hallows of the waves they seemed singularly
detached and unconcerned") and anticipates her credo that life
"seemed to hold infinite possibilities she had never guessed

7

The nightmare precipitated by Dalloway's advance
contains a narrative coherence and specificity that suggests
its basis in Woolf's own experience.
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at," possibilities which carry with them the harrowing price
of seeing "beneath the beauty that clothed things"8. Hence,
when she next sees Dalloway, Rachel feels "uncomfortable, as
if she and Richard had seen something together which is hidden
in ordinary life, so that they did not like to look at each
other" (76-7).
Rachel's unblinking questioning of the ideologies of the
people and ideas she encounters allows her to experience both
ends of Novak's ontological spectrum: she assumes control and
responsibility for her own growth, an evolution which leads
ineluctably to her perception of her isolation and her
confrontation with death. With these thematic bases in mind,
Rachel's customary discourse—"What I want to know is this:
What is the truth? What is the truth of it all" or "And life,
what was that?" (123, 125) becomes integral, not pretentious.
This is evident in Rachel's memory of her childhood and
adolescence in England, a period in which the poverty of her
formal education ironically left her "abundant time for
thinking" (35) . Much of that reflection, not surprisingly, was
bestowed upon the aunts who essentially defined reality for
Rachel: "Why did they do the things they did, and what did
they feel, and what was it all about?" She finds "unspeakably

8

Cf. Dalloway following a violent storm at sea. As the
storm subsides, "the ordinary world slipped into his mind, and
by the time he was dressed he was an English gentleman again"
(73) . The same dichotomy between the appearance of civility
and institutions, and the reality of mendacity and chaos is
present in Dalloway's assault upon Rachel. See below, p. 142.
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odd" the "whole system in which they lived" and questions
Helen (in the present) as to whether she is "fond" of the
aunts. "My dear child, what questions you do ask!" Helen
responds9.
This same pattern is repeated in Rachel's first shipboard
encounter

with

Richard

Dalloway,

a

former

Member

of

Parliament, who, with his wife Clarissa, shares a portion of
the outward journey. The fairly lengthy scene (pp.63-9) is
fueled by Rachel's numerous questions and by her tenacious
insistence on lucid answers. Rachel feels a genuine warmth and
attraction for Dalloway, and he in turn is flattered by even
a socially naive young girl's obvious interest in his tepid
accomplishments and shopworn ideas. But what is fascinating in
the exchange is the manner in which Rachel's honest and
incisive questions lay bare Dalloway's insidious nature; more
than through his respectable misogyny (women do not possess
the "political instinct.. .It's far better that you should know

9
In her ability to be struck by a kind of wonder or awe
by the life choices of others, Rachel's vision possesses a
distinctly Romantic flavor. The isolation of her upbringing
and her interrogative habits of mind join to make strange and
fresh to her the world and its inhabitants. As with her
reaction to her aunts'lives, we see Rachel emerging from her
Uncle Ridley's study, "lost in wonder at her uncle, and his
books, and his neglect of dances, and his queer, utterly
inexplicable, but apparently satisfactory view of life" (172).
Later, on a solitary walk, she encounters a tree: "It was an
ordinary tree, but to her it appeared so strange that it might
have been the only tree in the world.. .Having seen a sight
that would last her for a lifetime, and for a lifetime would
preserve that second, the tree once more sank into the
ordinary ranks of trees..." (174).
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nothing")10

Dalloway

defines himself

as a member of the

political establishment: "I can conceive of no more exalted
aim," he asserts, "(than) to be the citizen of the Empire."
Yet

the

brutality

and

violence

that

lie

beneath

the

institutionalized order of empire remain unacknowledged save
for Dalloway's ironic metaphor of the state as "a complicated
machine" whose efficiency is imperilled "if the meanest screw
fails its task" and in

Woolf's trenchant conclusion of the

interview through the appearance on the horizon of English
warships11. Subtlely, he is exposed as akin to Rachel's father:
a component of the insidious male machine that seeks to keep
her life "a creeping, hedged-in thing."
Rachel's innocence of the codes of social intercourse
offers other (non-visionary) characters a convenient way to
deflect the implications of her queries. She becomes, in
effect,

benignly

objectified

as

"child,"

"puppy"

or

"eccentric"—and thereby marginalized. Helen, for example,
describes Rachel's propensity for questioning as "brave and
foolish"12 and compares her to "a puppy that brings one's
10
Cf. Woolf's letter in response to a Desmond MacCarthy
review of Arnold Bennett's Our Women in the New Statesman. The
intellectual inferiority of women to men, wrote MacCarthy,
"stares him in the face" (Barrett, M. 55).
11

It was Conrad who would document the underbelly of
colonialism.
12

The attribution of this phrase to Helen is not entirely
accurate. The passage actually reads "Again Helen laughed at
her, benignantly strewing her with handfuls of the long
tasseled grass, for she was so brave and so foolish." This is
characteristic of what might be termed the luminous quality of
150

underclothes down into the hall" (145). It is particularly
important to understand that those who inhabit the quotidian
consciousness are equally aware of the insistent presence of
questions. Christ speaks of her preference for the term
"awakening" to "conversion" because the former "suggests that
the self needs only to notice what is already there.. .that the
ability to see or to know is within the self, once the
sleeping draft is refused" (18)13. The essential distinction,
then, between the visionary and quotidian ways of being lies
precisely

in characters' existential

stance before the

facticity of questions which confront the nature and meaning
of both our daily lives and spiritual condition. The visionary
chooses immersion in the potentially destructive element of
full consciousness of a world defined by its absence of
answers

and

establishes

his

or her being

within that

void/ground; the quotidian mind rejects or ignores that
emptiness, establishing being against the void by creating
institutions and systems which supply a sham teleology and
Woolf's narrative voice, a presence that hovers around and
often intermingles with the characters' direct thoughts. The
resulting ambiguity is, in light of Woolf's later fiction,
clearly intentional and not a case of a young writer
struggling to find her voice. While clearly this type of
indirect quotation has a long literary precedence, it is
nonetheless exceedingly appropriate here given that the
central problem of The Voyage Out and of Woolf's fiction as a
whole is the bridging of the ontological gap between
individuals. For a lucid discussion of this issue see
Naremore, especially pages 32-42.
13

Recall that the ancient Greek root for "truth" is
"unhiddenness." Socrates, too, taught that truth resided
within each individual.
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tenuous harmony to our daily lives. Both ways of being, of
course, occupy the same psychic and ontological space. We are
within the realm of Plato's Cave here, an allusion which I
will illustrate to be the controlling image of Woolf's first
novel.
A scene in which members of the English party ride to
the top of a scenic summit will serve as a microcosm of this
dichotomy of being. This is the setting of the first true
conversation among the novel's four central characters. As a
way of beginning to know one another—always the central issue
in Woolf's fiction14—Hirst proposes that each offer an
autobiographical sketch. Rachel begins, adumbrating her life
in

terms

of

male

facticity15:

age,

parentage,

living

arrangements:

u

During Rachel's encounter with the Dalloways on the
voyage out, Richard observes, "D'you know, Miss Vinrace,
you've made me think? How little, after all, one can tell
anybody about one's life! Here I sit; there you sit; both, I
doubt not, chock-full of the most interesting experiences,
ideas, emotions; yet how communicate? I've told you what every
second person you meet might tell you" (68).
15

The perhaps now too familiar gender distinction between
male preoccupation with facts and female orientation toward
emotion is present throughout Woolf's novel. When Hewet strays
from facticity in his autobiographical sketch and begins to
offer an impressionistic account of his father's death, Hirst
scolds him to "keep to the facts" (144) . Later Hewet himself,
in defense of Hirst, chides Rachel: "But you'll never see
it...because with all your virtues you don't, and you never
will, care with every fibre of your being for the pursuit of
truth! You've no respect for facts, Rachel; you're essentially
feminine" (295). And Helen muses that Hirst "took her outside
this little world of love and emotion. He had a grasp of
facts" (304).
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Rachel stated that she was twenty-four years of
age, the daughter of a ship-owner, that she had
never been properly educated; played the piano, had
no brothers or sisters, and lived at Richmond with
her aunts, her mother being dead. (143)
For all its reticence and brevity, Rachel's self-portrait
reveals an existence of abject isolation. She lacks both
mother and siblings, the very relationships by which she
defines herself; moreover, we know her father to be physically
and emotionally absent16 and her maiden aunts to be the vehicle
of her relative ignorance. She is, it would seem, without a
female model upon whom she might shape her life.
Rachel's stark self-portrait cogently illustrates—
partly

through

its

very

starkness—the

"experience

of

nothingness" which Christ cites as the prelude to female
awakening. While Rachel identifies herself in terms of the
dead and the distant, it is Helen who cites the inadequacy of
their autobiographical sketches17—"But of course we've left
16

This characterization is to give Willoughby the benefit
of the doubt. The following passage in which he acquiesces to
Rachel's remaining with Helen in Santa Rosa intimates an
oblivious selfishness bordering on the insidious: "I want to
bring her up as her mother would have wished. I don't hold
with these modern views—any more than you do, eh? She's a
nice quiet girl, devoted to her music—a little less of that
would do no harm. Still, it's kept her happy, and we lead a
very quiet life at Richmond. .. .I'm beginning to realize. . .that
all this is tending to Parliament....1 should want Rachel to
be able to take more part in things. A certain amount of
entertaining would be necessary—dinners, an occasional
evening party....In all these ways Rachel could be of great
help to me" (85-6).
17

Cf. Later in the novel, when Helen comes to write
Rachel's father of his daughter's betrothal to Hewet, it is
observed that Helen "had dwelt so often upon Mr. Hewet's
prospects, his profession, his birth, appearance, and
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out the only questions that matter"—before deflecting the
intuitive insight of her remark with what I read as an
insincere, sophisticate's question: "For instance, are we
Christians?" Precocious rationalists, Hewet and Hirst fall
over themselves denying faith, while Rachel affirms hers.
Typically, Hirst tasks her response, and Rachel, in what might
serve as the visionary's credo, reaffirms her belief with
something akin to a Kierkegaardian leap of faith:
"I believe—I believe," Rachel stammered, "I
believe there are things we don't know about, and
the world might change in a minute and anything
appear."
Again Woolf utilizes Rachel's social naivete—her stuttering
and statement of an exceedingly vague, apparently jejune
intuition18—to mask what is in fact the philosophical center
of her novel: a belief

in the inadequacy

of everyday

experience and "common wisdom" (rationality) as a guide to
reality and, ultimately, meaning. Where rational philosophers
hold the emotions suspect, the existentialists view them as a

temperament, that she had almost forgotten what he was really
like" (304).
18

Leaska observes that each of Woolf s novels poses a
question "which may appear embarrassingly naive" (4). Indeed,
one of my strongest original impressions of Woolfs work was
of the felicity with which she could have characters ask
questions revolving around "the meaning of life." Furthermore,
in a review
titled, appropriately enough, "Moments of
Vision," Woolf speaks of a particular author's need to capture
moments "almost menacing with meaning. Such moments of vision
are of an unaccountable, ineffable nature; leave them alone
and they persist for years; try to explain them and they
disappear; write them down and they die beneath the pen"
(Essays, v. 2, p. 251).
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reliable

guide to the

individual's

involvement

in and

reflection upon his or her existential situation. As in the
emotion evident in her "credo" above, Rachel is continually
reflected through emotion. Moreover, I would characterize
Rachel's

statement

as

instinctively

existential

in its

suggestion of humankind's need to transcend through perception
and action its present limits; to, in effect, "uncover" the
truth hidden by what might be termed a "conspiracy of reason."
Rachel's integrity—her authenticity—is

inherent in her

stuttering: she is groping after the ineffable. Conversely,
Helen, Hewet, and Hirst are engaged in an insincere discourse,
in effect a kind of idle chatter, which, because of its very
pervasiveness, has abrogated the right to name reality19. The
distinction here is between the use of language as language
(or as a way of filling or buffering the existential void) and
the use of language as a tool to apprehend and confront the
void's reality. Macquarrie notes:
...language has been diverted from its true
function—the words are passed along, but they are
heard as words. The disclosure does not take place;
we are not allowed to see or appropriate for
ourselves the reality that the words are about. So
the existentialist favors a return to the sources,
an exposure to the way things are rather than the
way they are said to be. (148)
It is worth noting here that in her own life in
Bloomsbury, Woolf was surrounded by those whose faith upheld
the absolute primacy of reason; their bible was G.E. Moore's
19

Cf. the uses of language of Susan Warrington and Miss
Allan cited below.
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Principia Ethica, whose epigraph is the antithesis of Rachel's
credo: "Everything is what it is, and not another thing."20
Clearly, nothing in Woolf's fiction would validate this
philosophy. Her most insightful—which is to say visionary—
characters may

be defined

by

their perception

of the

complexity and manifold nature of objects and people and, most
importantly, of how this understanding leads to one's ultimate
connection with them. Indeed, just this idea forms the
conclusion of Woolf's two finest novels: the "connection" of
Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Smith in Mrs. Dalloway, and the
"reformation" of Mr. Ramsay in the eyes of his estranged
children in To The Lighthouse. It is in the latter novel, too,
that Mrs. Ramsay, prompted by the stroke of the lighthouse
beam, experiences union: "It was odd, she thought, how if one
was alone, one leant to inanimate things; trees, streams,
flowers; felt they expressed one, in a sense were one" (97).
This is particularly interesting given an experience Rachel
has while walking alone in Santa Marina:
So she might have walked until she lost all
knowledge of her way, had it not been for the
interruption of a tree....It was an ordinary tree,
but to her it appeared so strange that it might
have been the only tree in the world. Dark was the
trunk in the middle, and the branches sprang here
and there, leaving jagged intervals of light
between them as distinctly as if it had but that
second sprang from the ground. Having seen a sight
that would last her a lifetime, and for a lifetime
20
Indeed, it is surely Moore's work which is identified
as Helen's "black volume of philosophy" from which she reads
"a sentence about the Reality of Matter, or the Nature of the
Good" as she embroiders on the deck of the Euphrosyne (32-3).
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would preserve that second, the tree once more sank
into the ordinary ranks of trees.
Rachel continues her walk now conscious that the "flowers and
even pebbles in the earth had their own life and disposition,
and brought back the feelings of a child to whom they were
companions" (174).
Given this sharp divergence about the nature of reality,
it is revealing to note that Moore and his work were imbued by
Leonard Woolf and most of the other (male) Bloomsbury denizens
with a talismanic power:
The tremendous influence of Moore and his book upon
us came from the fact that they suddenly removed
from our eyes an obscuring accumulation of scales,
cobwebs, and curtains, revealing for the first time
to us, so it seemed, the nature of truth and
reality, of good and evil and character and
conduct, substituting for the religious and
philosophical
nightmares,
delusions,
hallucinations in which Jehovah, Christ, and St.
Paul, Plato, Kant, and Hegel had entangled us, the
fresh air and pure light of plain common sense.
(93)
Quentin Bell speaks of "the mute circle of seekers after truth
who sat puffing their pipes around the discreet shrine of G.E.
Moore" and who, having "received the Gospel of Principia
Ethica regarded themselves as the elect" (105 and 184).
These reminiscences paint a daunting ideological tableau
even for the rarified air of Bloomsbury and therein serve to
fix both Virginia's courage in 1909—when she was in the midst
of composing The Voyage Out—in directly opposing Moore's
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thought to her friends21 and, later, the integrity of her art,
which never wavered from the principle annunciated in Rachel's
"credo." Mark Hussey suggests that Woolf "seems always to be
seeking to express a perception of the numinous" (59); to
discover "the things in the world we don't know about." Like
her contemporary Conrad, Woolf offered no formal aesthetic
theory, but her most influential essays22 clearly delineate her
engagement with capturing a reality lying not beyond the grasp
of mundane experience but imbedded, even hidden within i t —
most famously, perhaps, in her image of life as "a luminous
halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the
beginning of consciousness to the end23."
When Helen laughs at Rachel's profession of faith and
accuses her of having led an unexamined life—"You're not a
Christian. You've never thought what you are"—she is badly
misreading her niece's comment. To be sure, Rachel is not a
"Christian"

in

Helen's

sense

of

a

member

of

the

21

Bell writes, "In August, when she was at Manorbier, she
had attacked that work which her Cambridge friends regarded
practically as the gospel of their time: G.E. Moore's
Principia Ethica. She had read it with some difficulty and
great admiration. It is a little surprising that she should
have so long postponed what was, one imagines, almost
compulsory reading in Bloomsbury..." (145).
22

I am speaking primarily of "Modern Fiction" and "Mr.
Bennett and Mrs. Brown" here.
23

Cf. The description in "Heart of Darkness" of the
meaning of Marlow's tales emerging as "a glow brings out a
haze, in the likeness of one of those misty haloes that
sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of
moonshine."
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institutionalized Church; more importantly, however, Rachel is
shown to think of little else but what she and those about her
are. There is an important distinction implicit here between
the natures of religion and philosophy. In common usage,
"religion" implies belief

(faith) in and worship of an

omnipotent but unmanifested universal power. It is, of course,
the

existentialist

contention

of

this

study

that that

controlling force is absent; that we as individual men and
women bear sole responsibility for our own conduct and fate.
Rachel's thrice stated credo, then, is in the nature of a
philosophy, which is defined by the need for understanding
(the goal of questioning). Understanding is not innately an
aspect

of

religion, hence

"mystery"

serves

as

one of

religion's cognates. When Rachel's declaration provokes in her
aunt a sense of the profound interrogative tenor of human
experience—"And there are lots of other questions"—Helen
backs away: "though perhaps we can't ask them yet." And Hewet,
too, recognizes his essential impotence before the question:
"The important questions, the really interesting ones. I doubt
that one ever does ask them." What makes the visionary in turn
distinctive from the philosopher is the manifestation of will:
the insistence on structuring her existence upon the answers
she perceives.
Rachel's visionary nature, then, reveals itself in
contradistinction to others' reticence: "Slow to accept the
fact that only a very few things can be said even by people
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who know each other well, (Rachel) insisted on knowing what
(Hewet) meant." Like a neophyte Oedipus, Rachel will have out
the truth whether it leads her into social awkwardness or into
the grasp of an implacable fate. Woolf, in writing of Plato's
dialogues, had acknowledged the sheer intellectual stamina
required of the truth seeker:
It is an exhausting process; to concentrate
painfully upon the exact meaning of words; to judge
what each admission involves; to follow intently,
yet critically, the dwindling and changing of
opinion as it hardens and intensifies into truth.
(McNellie, 32)
The scene, however, concludes with the intrusion of other
members of the party

(Rachel's question

of Hewet thus

remaining unanswered), an entrance which might recall images
of Plato's "Allegory of the Cave": "But again the sunny earth
in front of them was crossed by fantastic wavering figures,
the shadows of men and women."
Woolf's novel

is rich with Platonic allusions and

images24, suggesting, I feel, the tension between the two ways
24

While several of the book's key Platonic allusions will
be incorporated into the main body of my argument, I will cite
here a few others which illustrate my contention that even in
her first novel Woolf was concerned with apprehending a
reality transcending the "plain common sense" most immediately
personified by Moore and his acolytes. In these passages,
characters are seen watching a stream of people and objects
pass before their eyes in a manner reminiscent of the
prisoners of Plato's metaphorical cave. For example, early in
the novel, as Helen and Ridley Ambrose are walking toward the
Euphrosvne. Helen is overcome with emotion at the prospect of
leaving her children behind. Wiping her eyes, she focuses upon
the human parade of the opposite bank: "She saw also the
arches of Waterloo Bridge and the carts moving across them,
like the line of animals in a shooting gallery. They were seen
blankly, but to see anything was of course to end her weeping
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of being which form the conflict of visionary fictions: the
life of the Cave, centered in an essentially passive and
unexamined everyday experience; and that of the visionary
realm of light, which is conducted, however, neither in the
glow of an abstract "Form of the Good" nor in an Augustinian
"Mind of God" but rather in the existential silence and shadow
of a chaotic and indifferent universe.

and begin to walk." However, Helen's reverie has in fact
prepared her "to read" her fellow Londoners and perceive the
void underlying the institutional patterns of civilization:
the rich, the "bigoted workers," the poor, and tattered old
men and women: "When one gave up seeing the beauty that
clothed things, this was the skeleton beneath" (11-2). Again,
during Rachel's illness, which approximates the experiencing
of a metaphysical plane, Rachel is said to be "oblivious of
the world outside, because it needed all her attention to
follow the hot, red, quick sights which passed incessantly
before her eyes" (340) . That the onset of her fever is
associated with a reading of Comus and that the visions
themselves are of trees, savages, the sea and high towers
suggests the psychosexual roots of Rachel's illness. Earlier,
in another scene with strong undertones of sexual frustration,
Rachel finds "intolerable" the partially deaf Mrs. Paley's
inability to understand others and flees into a hotel cul-desac where she is confronted with more objects; set among
Woolfs customary reference to a table and chair are a rusty
inkstand, an ash-tray, an old French newspaper, and a pen with
a broken nib, essentially objects of failed communication. For
Rachel these objects represent "human lives. We're all asleep
and dreaming," she concludes (257-58). Each of these Platonic
allusions reveals the ordering structures of everyday life to
be hiding the existential "beast" below. Helen's leaving of
her children—no doubt with the best care available—is
nonetheless associated with society's abandonment of the poor;
Rachel's illness seems an attempt to elude marriage, perhaps
civilization's key institution, yet one whose potential
insidiousness is signaled by the "closet drama" Comus, a work
whose sophistication "masks" a plot based on sexual bondage.
Finally, the condition and isolation of the objects
encountered in the hotel cul-de-sac belie both their
ostensible purpose and the order and efficiency that a hotel
should represent. "Things fall apart; the center cannot hold."
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The

most

powerful

evocation

of

the

Platonic

underpinnings of The Voyage Out is to be discovered in the
visionary's signature experience of an existential moment.
Lying at the thematic heart of the novel, Woolf's treatment of
Rachel's awakening possesses the ring of autobiographical
revelation and is a graphic treatment of the visionary
consciousness' rejection of the passivity of the quotidian. It
occurs at a Santa Marina church where the members of the
English colony have gathered for their traditional services.
Their voices, lifted in prayer, are described as "childlike
babble":
They felt themselves pathetically united and welldisposed towards each other. As if the prayer were
a torch applied to fuel, a smoke seemed to rise
automatically and fill the place with the ghosts of
innumerable services on innumerable Sunday mornings
at home. Susan Warrington in particular was
conscious of the sweetest sense of sisterhood, as
she covered her face with her hands and saw slips
of bent backs through the chinks between her
fingers. Her emotions rose calmly and evenly,
approving of herself and of life at the same time.
Here Woolf images religion as a source of self-affirmation,
not self-awareness; passivity, not integration. The emphasis
is upon the service as a source of tradition, which is to say
as an institution whose raison d'etre is the imposition of an
(ersatz) order and teleology on that which is formless and
without meaning. Thus the diction of "smoke" and "ghosts"
suggests death, not renewed life. Susan's self-impaired vision
and the parishioners' bent backs further imply the blindness
and submissiveness of their ontological state. This is the
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realm of Sartre's "Les Saluds," the stinkers, those who wallow
in their self-satisfaction, devoid of even the possibility of
action or complaint25. And it is the realm, too, of the
nineteenth century Copenhagen bourgeoisie, whom Kierkegaard
reviled

for their

complacency

and

self-satisfaction, a

critique which rendered him a virtual outcast and object of
ridicule for much of his adult life.
The accuracy of this harsh appraisal is evident when this
spirit of self-approbation is shattered by the reading of the
psalm, the actual words of the spiritual text:
But having created this peaceful atmosphere Mr. Bax
suddenly turned the page and read a psalm. Though
he read it with no change of voice the mood was
broken.
"Be merciful unto me, 0 God," he read, "for
man goeth about to devour me: he is daily fighting
and troubling me....They daily mistake my words:
all that they imagine is to do me evil. They hold
all together and hold themselves close....Break
their teeth, 0 God, in their mouths; smite the jawbones of the lions, 0 Lord; let them fall away like
water that runneth apace; and when they shoot their
arrows let them be rooted out."
The word of God here is the antithesis of the order and
harmony

fabricated

by

the parishioners. It presents a

Darwinian nightmare predicated, as Derrida might have it, upon
the failure of the "postal principle": "they daily mistake my
words." As if to ironically emphasize his confusion, the
biblical

speaker paradoxically

25

calls upon the Lord for

Sartre conceived this category in response to what he
perceived as the moral decay and ineffectualness of the French
bourgeoisie in general and the Popular Front government in
particular in responding to the threatening tide of the 30's.
163

retribution upon his enemies at the same time he invokes
divine mercy, all in predatory oral images—"devour," "teeth,"
"jaw-bones"—which reduce humankind's distinctive gift for
language to a predatory rumble.
Susan Warrington's response to the reading of the
biblical passage is an acute rendering of the quotidian mind
confronted with an uncongenial view of reality:
Nothing in Susan's experience at all corresponded
with this, and as she had no love of language she
had ceased to attend to such remarks, although she
followed them with the same kind of mechanical
respect with which she heard many of Lear's
speeches read aloud. Her mind was still serene and
really occupied with praise of her own nature and
praise of God—that is of the solemn and
satisfactory order of the world.
It is an essentially Augustan view of life: one which praises
and promotes a self-serving and self-preserving conception of
order (Cf. Heller's conception of "particularity) and meaning
that neatly ignores life's encroaching shadows. Indeed, I did
not use the adjective "Darwinian" above lightly. It will be
recalled

that

Darwin's

special

contribution

to

our

understanding of our species and its place in the cosmic
scheme was not strictly speaking in the realm of evolution, a
concept that had already gained considerable currency by the
publication of Origin of the Species, but rather in his
attribution of that process to the twin forces of "natural
selection from accidental variations." It was the randomness
implicit in "accidental variations" that posited the absence
of teleology, meaning and order. Thus while the biblical
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passage is sanctioned by the institution of the Church and
passively if not indifferently accepted by its members as a
part of God's word, its analysis in fact renders the universe
as a cosmic crap shoot played out by the bewildered and
perplexed who in effect seek in their God not a principle of
universal purpose but instead a bigger gun with which to smash
the Other—survival of the fittest.
The repression that Susan Warrington practices is only
one strategy for escaping the implications of vision. The rest
of the congregation feels an "inconvenience (at) the sudden
intrusion of this old savage. They looked more secular and
critical as they listened to the ravings of the old black man
with a cloth round his loins cursing with vehement gesture by
a camp fire in the desert." The strategy here is suppression;
the visceral faith of a Job or an Abraham is demeaned, reduced
to caricature through rendering the desert prophet a "savage";
his teachings "ravings." He becomes outsider, Other, madman.
Even the idea of Christ is eviscerated, his passion and
vehemence rendered vapid:
Then they returned to the New Testament and the sad
and beautiful figure of Christ. While Christ spoke
they made another effort to fit his interpretation
of life upon the lives they lived, but as they were
all different, some practical, some ambitious, some
stupid, some wild and experimental, some in love,
and some long past any feeling except a feeling of
comfort, they did very different things with the
words of Christ.
What is represented here is nothing so positive as a readerresponse spirituality. Rather than uniting human beings
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through their common essence, religion ironically reinforces
their isolated existence. Nor is this a militant, contemptuous
individuality but rather one marked by intellectual, moral,
and spiritual torpor and passivity:
From their faces it seemed that for the most part
they made no effort at all, and, recumbent as it
were, accepted the ideas that the words gave as
representing goodness, in the same way, no doubt,
as one of those industrious needlewoman had
accepted the bright ugly pattern on her mat as
representing beauty.
Thus are "goodness" and "beauty"—religion and art—also
effectively eviscerated by the quotidian mind.
This meaning is evident in Susan's "mechanical" response
to the reading just as her disinterest in language reflects
the speaker's own verbal ineffectuality. Religion, art,
philosophy, anything that might move one toward unfamiliar
ontological "ground" must be attended to "mechanically," its
implications for being ignored. Michael Novak associates this
way of life with the symbol-making capacity of human beings,
the "poor tools" by which they "break down the flood of
experience, selecting and distorting even as they make it
manageable." The world of symbols—among which are numbered
institutions like the church—represent humankind's "nostalgia
for order and clarity" (49-50). But nostalgia, while offering
a pleasant emotional interlude, is incapable of sustaining us
in the present.
Opposed to and preceding the need to create symbols,
which is essentially the realm of the quotidian, is the
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visionary impulse to question, which, in Novak's analysis,
disrupts the ordering capacity of symbols in two ways: "It
directs attention to new experience, in unknown and often
threatening areas, and it directs attention to distortions,
contradictions, and limitations in our perceptions and our
theories" (50). The question, Novak suggests, represents the
"fertile source of the experience of nothingness" (115) and
therefore of humankind's ontological anxiety as well:
The source of the experience of nothingness lies in
the deepest recesses of human consciousness, in its
irrepressible tendency to ask questions. The
necessary
condition
for
the
experience
of
nothingness is that everything can be questioned.
Whatever the presuppositions of a culture or a way
of life, questions can be addressed against them
and other alternatives can be imagined. Whatever
the massive solidity of institutions, cultural
forms, or basic
symbols, accurately
placed
questions can shatter their claims upon us. The
drive to ask questions is the most persistent and
basic drive of human consciousness. It is the
principle of the experience of nothingness. By
exercising that drive, we come to doubt the
definitions of the real, the true, and the good
that our culture presents to us. Without this
drive, cultural change would not be possible. What
was sacred once would for all time be locked in
unchanging sacredness. (14)
With this in mind, I wish to now examine the thematic
core of The Voyage Out. Rachel's existential moment, which
culminates her innate drive to question, offers a signature
example

of

Platonic

enlightenment,

and

functions

as

a

paradoxical experience of alienation and inclusion. As with
the visionaries we have already considered, Rachel's epiphany
seems spontaneous, almost a gift of grace:
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Whatever the reason might be, for the first time in
her life, instead of slipping at once into some
curious pleasant cloud of emotion, too familiar to
be considered, Rachel listened critically to what
was being said. By the time they had swung in an
irregular way from prayer to psalm, from psalm to
history, from history to poetry, and Mr. Bax was
giving out his text, she was in a state of acute
discomfort. Such was the discomfort she felt when
she was forced to sit through an unsatisfactory
piece of music badly played. Tantalized, enraged by
the clumsy insensitiveness of the conductor, who
put the stress on the wrong places, and annoyed by
the vast flock of the audience tamely praising and
acquiescing without knowing or caring, so she was
now tantalized and enraged, only here, with eyes
half shut and lips pursed together, the atmosphere
of forced solemnity increased her anger.
The onset of Rachel's awakening manifests itself in terms of
critical attention, which

is to say "questioning," and

questioning's end product: discomfort. This, then, is a mirror
image of the quotidian state of "tame acquiescence" and
comfort observed among her fellow worshipers. The "story," she
clearly senses, is not being properly told; the prayers,
psalms, history and poetry which are paraded before these
prisoners are perceived by Rachel as mere shadows, shabby
mock-ups of a profounder truth. Rachel is preparing to leave
the cave:
All round her were people pretending to feel what
they did not feel, while somewhere above her
floated the idea which they could none of them
grasp, which they pretended to grasp, always
escaping out of reach, a beautiful idea, an idea
like a butterfly. One after another, vast and hard
and cold, appeared to her the churches all over the
world
where
this
blundering
effort
and
misunderstanding were perpetually going on, great
buildings, filled with innumerable men and women,
not seeing clearly, who finally gave up the effort
to see, and relapsed tamely into praise and
acquiescence, half-shutting their eyes and pursing
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their lips. The thought had the same kind of
physical discomfort that is caused by a film always
coming between the eyes and the printed page. She
did her best to brush away the film and to conceive
something to be worshipped as the service went on,
but failed, always misled by the voice of Mr. Bax
saying things which misrepresented the idea, and by
the patter of having inexpressive human voices
falling round her like damp leaves. The effort was
tiring and dispiriting.
A simple transposition in this passage of "cave" for "church"
reveals Woolf's philosophical lineage here. These are the
Platonic

"prisoners"

united

by

a

Jamesian

"healthy-

mindedness"; having surrendered their conscious vigilance,
they have embraced "passivity, not activity; relaxation, not
intentness"; and "resign(ed) the care of (their) destiny to
higher powers" (James, 110).
The awakening which Rachel experiences is, of course,
anything but spontaneous. The interrogative habit of mind
which I have suggested as Rachel's defining characteristic
renders her epiphany a culmination, but in its disparity
between cause and effect and in the manifestly spiritual
affects of the experience, surely it adheres to Baja's
definition of epiphany26. But, as always, where the epiphany
offers spiritual sustenance and enlightenment, the existential
moment reveals the destructive element of nothingness.

26

Beja defines epiphany as
"a sudden spiritual
manifestation whether from some object, scene, event, or
memorable phase of the mind—the manifestation being out of
proportion to the significance or strictly logical relevance
of whatever produces it" (18).
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But I feel that what is most significant about the
passage is Woolf's metaphorical use of reading as a way of
distinguishing between vision and blindness; that is, Rachel's
vision of a universe of Platonic "caves" housing their
multitudes of passive prisoners is equated with the "physical
discomfort that is caused by a film always coming between the
eyes and the printed page." Similarly, the passion and the
Platonic allusion that distinguish Rachel's "reading" of her
fellow parishioners/prisoners is present in her encounter with
literary texts. For example, ensconced in her room in Santa
Marina, Rachel engages books with precisely the intensity that
Woolf had noted in the argumentation of Platonic dialogues:
"Her whole body was constrained by the working of her mind,"
and she reads with "the curious literalness of one to whom
written sentences are unfamiliar, and handling words as though
they were made of wood, separately of great importance, and
possessed of shapes like tables or chairs" (123-4). Rachel,
that is, is presented as both naive and ideal reader. She
approaches/sees the text as she approaches/lives her life:
with an honesty and integrity that grants the actions (ideas,
utterances, intentions) of others an inherent seriousness
worthy of both her intellectual and ontological engagement. By
imaging her way of reading in terms of Platonic ideal forms,
Woolf simultaneously implies ways of reading, seeing, and,
especially, being. Rachel shuts her book with "a deep breath,
expressive of the wonder which always marks the transition
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from the imaginary world to the real world." But for Rachel
this obvious line of demarcation is less than impenetrable.
Her reading matter here, Ibsen, always has the effect of
rendering Rachel the most vivid thing in her mental landscape;
moreover, "she acted (his plays) for days at a time, greatly
to Helen's amusement27. It is Helen who seeks to supply Rachel
with books as, ironically, a stimulus to thought and a balance
to her niece's immersion in music. But where Helen "would have
suggested Defoe, Maupassant, or some spacious chronicle of
family life, Rachel chose modern books...which were tokens in
her aunts' eyes of harsh wrangling and disputes about facts
which had no such importance as the moderns claimed for them"
(124).
Clearly, I feel, Woolf is intimating and validating a
direct link here between how and what we read, and how we

27

While the particular work is unidentified here, an
earlier draft had, not surprisingly, Rachel reading A Doll's
House. Rachel's affinity for Ibsen becomes even clearer
through remarks the playwright made as he was beginning the
play:
"...there are two kinds of spiritual law, two kinds
of conscience, one in man, and another, altogether
different, in woman. They do not understand each
other; but in practical life the woman is judged by
man's law as though she were not a woman but a man.
The wife in the play ends by having no idea of what
is right or wrong; natural feeling on the one hand,
belief in authority on the other, have altogether
bewildered her. A woman cannot be herself in the
society of the present day, which is exclusively
masculine society, with laws framed by men and with
a judicial system that judges feminine conduct from
a masculine point of view" (Marden, 8, emphasis
mine).
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live. While Helen reacts with "great amusement" to Rachel's
assuming "for days at a time" the attitudes and views of
literary heroines, the meticulousness and passion that Rachel
brings to her interaction with texts carries over to her
everyday life, allowing her "to come to conclusions, which had
to

be

remodelled

according

to

the

adventures

of

the

day...leaving always a small grain of belief behind them."
Like Leda ravaged by Zeus, Rachel is able to put on the
knowledge of every book she wrestles with. She is, as Carol
Christ observed, seeking out those stories by which she may
understand and give shape to her life.
This interaction between reading and being is illustrated
in the scene following Rachel's closing of the text. "The
exercise of reading

(has) left her mind

expanding and

contracting like the mainspring of a clock." As with her
reaction to her aunts quoted above and to her reading, the
commonplace rhythms of everyday life are made strange to
Rachel:
...she began to raise her first finger and to let
it fall on the arm of her chair so as to bring back
to herself some consciousness of her own existence.
She was next overcome by the unspeakable queerness
of the fact that she should be sitting in an armchair, in the morning, in the middle of the world.
Who were the people moving in the house—moving
things from one place to another? And life, what
was that? It was only a light passing over the
surface and vanishing, as in time she would vanish,
though the furniture in the room would remain. Her
dissolution became so complete that she could not
raise her finger any more, and sat perfectly still,
listening and looking at the same spot. It became
stranger and stranger. She was overcome with awe
that things should exist at all....She forgot that
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she had any fingers to raise.. .The things that
existed were so immense and so desolate...She
continued to be conscious of these vast masses of
substance for a long stretch of time, the clock
still ticking in the midst of the universal
silence.
In its melding of dread and awe; its anticipation of
Heideggar's

"Why

is there something; why

is there not

nothing?"; and its emphasis upon time, space and silence, this
passage offers a classic example of existential anguish of
being, whose catalyst is Rachel's reading of the experience,
awakening and revolution of Nora Helmer28.
Indeed, I believe that The Voyage Out is a novel about
books and reading; Woolf's references to various literary
works are at once legion and integral to her artistic aims.
Beverly Ann Schlack contends that Woolf's use of literary
allusion

is

"an

organic

part

of

the

growth

of

her

characterizations and of the development of the novel's
thematic structure..."; moreover, it was a strategy which
"came naturally" and was "a sheer habit of mind" to Woolf

28

There is at least one other important allusion working
here. In Varieties of Religious Experience James notes, "I
have no doubt whatever that most people live, whether
physically, intellectually, or morally, in a very restricted
circle of their potential being. They make use of a very small
portion of their possible consciousness, and of their soul's
resources in general, much like a man who, out of whole bodily
organism, should get a habit of using and moving only his
little finger. Great emergencies and crises show us how much
greater our vital resources are than we had supposed"
(emphasis mine). While Woolf met (and was alternately amused
and terrified by) Henry, I have been unable to ascertain
whether she was familiar with William James's work. In any
event, the thematic correspondences of the two remain
striking.
173

("The Novelist's Voyage..." 317-18) . More significant than the
role it plays in revealing character to the reader, I feel, is
the underlying assumption of Woolf's art of allusion: that the
self is in no small part created by reading—both by what one
reads and by how one reads29.
As if living without reading were inconceivable to
Woolf, virtually all her characters are readers. Indeed, it is
through her minor characters that Woolf seeks to reflect some
uses to which literature is put. This is clear in the
juxtaposition of the literary habits of Miss Allan, an English
teacher, and Susan Warrington, who functions as a virtual
quotidian antithesis of Rachel. The former is seen reading
Wordsworth's Prelude because "she always read The Prelude
abroad, and partly because she was engaged in writing a short
Primer of English Literature—Beowulf to Swinburne—which
would have a paragraph on Wordsworth" (103). Woolf's focus
then melds into Susan's adjoining room where, realizing she
has neglected her diary, Susan leaps from bed and proceeds "to
write in the square ugly hand of a mature child, as she wrote
daily year after year, keeping the diaries, though she seldom
looked at them." Her entries chronicle the rhythms of
quotidian life: people met, weather, appointments kept, and
concludes with "Mem. ask about damp sheets" (104-05).
Both women utilize their reading and writing as a device
to create a schematic life: to impose a desperate order and
29

Cf. Carol Christ's comment on p. 2.
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teleology upon lives which are formless and adrift. Like the
passive parishioners who trigger Rachel's existential moment,
Susan's diary, nominally a device for reflection, and Miss
Allan's pursuit of a spiritual autobiography, have devolved
into habitual, mechanical exercises characterized by reductive
summary

and ordering of experience rather than dynamic

engagement with

it. Theirs is indeed

a precarious and

desperate game: as long as they can sustain the illusion of
order and meaning both women can retire "contentedly" and
"comfortably"; yet, we are later told, "the mere glimpse of a
world where dinner could be disregarded, or the table moved
one inch from its accustomed place, filled (Miss Allan) with
fears for her own stability" (129).
The pervasiveness of what I might dare to call the "wrong
way" to read—that is the failure to link literature and
living—is further reflected in the character of Ridley
Ambrose, a classics scholar. Engaged in editing Pindar's odes,
Ambrose is imaged as "an idol... deeply encircled by books," a
device by which he effectively separates himself from being in
the world while simultaneously imposing an ordering rhythm
upon the microcosm of his home: "...every one was conscious
that by observing certain rules, such as punctuality and
quiet, by cooking well, and performing other small duties, one
ode after another was satisfactorily restored, and they
themselves shared the continuity of the scholar's life." But
Woolf accentuates that the salvaging of the odes produces
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neither communication nor revelation: "Unfortunately, as age
puts one barrier between human beings, and learning another,
and sex a third, Mr. Ambrose in his study was some thousand
miles distant from the nearest human being, who in this
household was inevitably a woman." On cue, Rachel enters his
study, seeking Gibbon's History, which had been recommended by
Hirst. Once she breaks through her uncle's absorption, Rachel
is literally led by the arm about the study as Ambrose
outlines

an

exclusively

patriarchal

course

of

study:

"Plato...and Jorrocks...Sophocles, Swift...You should read
Balzac. Then we come to Wordsworth and Coleridge. Pope,
Johnson, Addison, Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats. One thing leads
to another."
Thus, for all his apparent benevolence and intellect,
Ambrose denies or fails to recognize the efficacy of texts
which would name and speak to Rachel's condition. He would
deny her her story. Indeed, for Ambrose the ultimate value of
literature is restricted to the Greeks: "But what's the use of
reading

if

you

don't

read

Greek30?" Woolf

shared

his

admiration; it is among the heroes and heroines of Greek
literature, Woolf observes, that we discover the "original
human being"

(McNeillie, 27). But she knows, too, how

30

Classical Greek culture, of course, was no more
inclusive of women than most others in the West, largely
banning them, for example, from attending—much less
appearing in—the drama competitions at the public
amphitheaters, which played such a central role in Greek civic
and cultural life.
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precarious are our attempts to ascertain the rhythms and
pronunciation

of

the

language,

to

grasp

its

inherent

ambiguities. But for all that, Woolf sees truth as Rachel had
stated

it

in

her

"credo"—as

"various,"

capable

of

apprehending us in various guises: "it is not with the
intellect alone that we perceive (truth)" (32). Such literary
truth "is just on the far side of language. It is the meaning
which in moments of astonishing excitement and stress we
perceive in our minds without words" (31). And, as if she were
commenting directly upon Ambrose, Woolf reminds us that truth
will not be realized apart from others: "It is not to the
cloistered disciplinarian mortifying himself in solitude that
we are to turn, but to the well-sunned nature, the man who
practices the art of living to the best advantage, so that
nothing is stunted but some things are permanently more
valuable than others" (33).
The balance that Woolf suggests above is perverted
through the quotidian mind's counsel of proportion and reason,
which are code words for blindness and withdrawal. Helen sees
her

fostering

of Rachel's

quotidian

growth

as

one of

facilitating her becoming "a reasonable person" (83) and
disabusing her of her

"absurd...ideas about life" (97,

emphasis mine). Faced with Rachel's terror and confusion over
being kissed by Richard Dalloway during the voyage, Helen
advises that Rachel not think about the incident, that it is
"a pity...to get things out of proportion," that one must
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"take things as they are." Rachel, however, typically insists
that she will "think about it all day and all night until I
find out exactly what it does mean." Her insistent questioning
reveals to her the predatory existence imaged in Mr. Bax's
sermon: "...she saw her life for the first time as a creeping
hedged-in thing, driven cautiously between two walls, here
turned aside, there plunged in darkness, made dull and
crippled for ever—her life that was the only chance she had—
the short season between two silences" (80-2). Similarly,
Terence seeks to persuade her that "there was an order, a
pattern which made life reasonable...for sometimes it seemed
possible to understand why things happened as they did." In
turn,

Rachel

brings

to

her

relationship

with

Terence

"curiosity and sensitiveness of perception"—question and
vision—gifts against which, Terence realizes, the experience
which she lacks would only lend a "ridiculous formal balance,
like that of a drilled dog in the street" (300).
Indeed, the expression "keeping one's balance," as a
metaphor for sanity reminds us of how much a learned response
conventional conceptions of reality and reason are31. Such
balance is anathema to the visionary. The "common wisdom"
which characters like Helen and Terence seek to impart to
Rachel is a form of indoctrination or absorption, a way of
31

Indeed, at the time of the publication of The Voyage
Out, T.S. Eliot was arguing just this point in his doctoral
dissertation. His thesis concluded with the observation that
"reality is a convention," the culmination of a successful
"theory."
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preparing her to become like them, which

can only be

accomplished through stripping Rachel of her unique vision.
That attack comes almost necessarily through the body, the
instrument of perception. Therefore Richard's kiss, which in
Adamic

fashion he neatly attributes to Rachel's having

"tempted" him, is a prelude to Terence's desire to possess her
in marriage in the same manner as the nightmares engendered by
Dalloway's

assault

foreshadow

recurrent

subterranean

the

fever—and

nightmare32—which

the

same

paradoxically

destroys and preserves Rachel's body. In essence, her death
signifies her refusal to become objectified as the repository
of male passion.
Similar to its preoccupation with proportion and balance,
the quotidian mind, as perhaps best exemplified by Miss Allan
and Susan Warrington, is concerned with the passage of events,
their chronology, not their significance or kairos33. "One
thing follows another" becomes their refrain. We have seen
this pattern present in the church service which moves
mechanically from "prayer to psalm, from psalm to history,
from history to poetry..." as well as in Ambrose's recitation
of

patriarchal

authors:

"One

thing

follows

another."

Similarly, Richard Dalloway's conception of English history is

3Z

Cf. pp. 77 and 331.

33

The terms "chronos/kairos" are from the Greek and serve
to delineate the two principal ways of viewing time in the
Judeo-Christian tradition. In so doing, we are again
reminded of the identic link between visionaries and Jews.
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characterized by its "continuity": King following King, Prime
Minister Prime Minister, and Law..." (51)34. Willoughby Vinrace
whines at the prospect of losing control of his daughter: "We
go

on

year

after

year

without

talking

about

these

things.... But it's better so" (85). The phrase's prominence
leaves little doubt of the juxtaposition Woolf sought to
create. Indeed, Rachel herself takes up this same refrain in
naming the source of her inability to achieve a genuine
intimacy with others: "The lives of these people...the
aimlessness, the way they live. One goes from one to another,
and it's all the same. One never gets what one wants out of
any of them" (263) . When Arthur Venning declares his affection
for Susan, he couches his speech in dialectical terms of
blindness and vision, emptiness and meaning, concluding in a
Platonic image:

3A

Dalloway's "vision of English history"—a kind of
quotidian epiphany—comes upon him during a conversation with
Clarissa. He images the line of governmental conservative
policy as a "lasso that opened and caught things, enormous
chunks of the habitable world." The predatory image recalls
the scene discussed earlier between him and Rachel. Clarissa
responds admiringly to his conception, "You see round, where
I only see there," but, of course, her awakening to the
experience of nothingness and subsequent vision will occur in
a later novel. Her distinction is nonetheless enlightening.
Where Richard views humanity from afar, abstractly ("That's my
business"), Clarissa connects with individuals as she does
tentatively in The Voyage Out with Rachel and more profoundly
in Mrs. Dalloway with Septimus Smith. The scene concludes
when, again recalling his kissing of Rachel, Dalloway
passionately kisses Clarissa, causing her to drop a letter she
was writing. Dalloway then takes her pen and appropriates her
text, adding a postscript. The juxtaposition of passion and
(appropriated) pen offers an intriguing illustration of the
query which opens The Madwoman in the Attic.
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"Odd things happen to one," said Arthur. One goes
along smoothly enough, one thing following another,
and it's all very jolly and plain sailing, and you
think you know all about it, and suddenly one
doesn't know where one is a bit, and everything
seems different from what it used to seem. Now today, coming up that path, riding behind you, I
seemed to see everything as if...as if it had a
kind of meaning....It's because I love you."
After the couple embraces passionately Arthur "looks as if he
were trying to put things seen in a dream beside real things"
(138-39). Indeed, his declaration that "everything seems
different from what it used to seem" is a cogent illustration
of Rachel's credo. Yet the meaning with which love has
presumably imbued Arthur's existence is ironically deflated
later in the novel during a narrative disquisition upon the
state of long-term marriages:
When two people have been married for years, they
seem to become unconscious of each other's bodily
presence so that they move as if alone, speak aloud
things which they do not expect to be answered, and
in general seem to experience all the comforts of
solitude without its loneliness.
Commentators often view this passage positively as reflecting
the attainment of a certain level of balance and harmony
between the self and another. However, that Woolf viewed such
a relationship as a sham is illustrated through a later scene
between Helen and Ridley. She overhears her husband's solitary
exclamations in the next room—"'So it goes on year after
year; I wish, I wish, I wish I could make an end of it,' to
which she paid no attention" (195). While Venning's epiphany
reminds us that vision is natural to our nature, the later
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citations demonstrate the ease with which we discard its grace
and assume a quotidian posture.
It

is

further

indicative

of

this

quotidian

perspective that despite the relative isolation and exotic
nature of Santa Marina, most of its English community have
mentally and spiritually transformed their hotel into an
ersatz London and thus a veritable psychic barrier against the
uncharted possibilities of the South American continent,
which—like Conrad's jungle in Heart of Darkness—functions as
the locus of the visionary and necessarily dark territories of
the human mind. Therefore, even on the infrequent occasions
when they venture outside their hotel, the English are
assiduous in distancing themselves from the potentially
unsettling effects of the experience. For example, when the
expedition up Monte Rosa takes the travellers "higher and
higher.. .separating them) from the world," each rider keeps
"his eyes fixed on the hobbling curved form of the rider and
donkey in front of him." Once at the summit, they are
"overcome with wonder at "the immense space...and infinite
distances of South America... .They felt themselves very small,
and for some time no one said anything." Faced with tangible
evidence of the contingency and insignificance of their
existence, the quotidian pilgrims respond characteristically,
one with a commonplace "Splendid," and Miss Allan through
naming the points of the compass, thus exerting a tenuous
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control over the implacability of nature (129-32) . After
luncheon, the travellers disperse into groups:
One of these parties was dominated by Hughling
Elliot and Mrs. Thornbury, who, having both read
the same books and considered the same questions,
were now anxious to name the places beneath them
and to hang upon them stores of information about
navies and armies, political parties, natives and
mineral products... (136).
One is reminded of the passengers' reaction to the subsiding
of the storm encountered by the Euphrosyne: "...the mind of
men, which had been unmoored...once more attached itself to
the old beliefs....After their view of the strange underworld, inhabited by phantoms, people began to live among teapots and loaves of bread with greater zest than ever" (72) . In
the

later

passage,

the

complementary

homogeneity

and

xenophobia of the quotidian scheme of life serves to reaffirm
its adherents sense of reality while evading the darker,
unnerving elements of vision. They, too, have their stories
(of empire and exploitation), a closed canon which tolerates
no heresies.
That assurance and hegemony is shattered, however, when
Rachel and Terence, Hirst and Helen agree to a second "voyage
out," accompanying the Flushings on a river expedition to a
native village. When the party stops enroute along the river,
only Rachel and Terence penetrate the forest. Helen chides
them: "There's everything here—everything. What will you gain
by walking?" And Hirst bids them to "beware of snakes" (270).
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It is instructive to recall Helen's indifferent attitude
when the journey was proposed, an ennui that had drawn
Rachel's wrath. Helen, however, had been reacting to her own
existential vision, which resonates with Hirst's warning:
Aimless, trivial, meaningless, oh no—what she had
seen at tea made it impossible for her to believe
that. The little jokes, the chatter, the inanities
of the afternoon had shrivelled up before her eyes.
Underneath the likings and spites, the coming
togethers and partings, great things were
happening—terrible things, because they were so
great. Her sense of safety was shaken, as if
beneath twigs and dead leaves she had seen the
movement of a snake. It seemed to her that a
moment's respite was allowed, a moment's makebelieve, and then again the profound and reasonless
law asserted itself, moulding them all to its
liking, making and destroying. (263)
Helen, too, has seen but has made an existential choice to
draw back from the abyss. She will instead watch with a
mounting horror as Rachel attempts to traverse its rim.
Clearly, those who remain on the shore represent the
schematic consciousness. They are defined by their refusal to
cross boundaries35, and by their fervor to maintain the
illusory safety of proportion and reason. Naremore sees The
Voyage Out as a "wavering between two kinds of experience: the
rational, orderly, mannered world of regular proportions and
social relationships, and the deeper world of intense feeling
where individuals lose their sense of separateness and blend
with nature." He labels this latter world "feminine" and

35

Ironically, Hirst observes of the hotel's guests: "You
could draw circles round the whole lot of them, and they'd
never stray outside" (107).
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suggests, correctly, that, because it is "more real and
intense than ordinary life," because, moreover, it is "what
ordinary life is all about" that this is the world which
attracts Woolf.
This

intensity

and

reality

are not, to be sure,

reassuring. The forest is a setting, Hirst complains, that
"makes one awfully queer....These trees get on one's nerves—
it's all so crazy. God's undoubtedly mad. What sane person
could have conceived a wilderness like this, and peopled it
with apes and alligators? I should go mad if I lived here—
raving mad" (275). Hirst's response is far removed from the
order and purpose posited in Aquinas's argument from design
but Hirst's understanding is founded in experience, not
reason.
As Rachel and Terence move into the forest, the sounds of
"the ordinary world" are replaced by those suggesting that
they are walking "at the bottom of the sea." The primordial
image prepares us for the visionary's return to the elemental,
which will culminate in the their arrival at the village and
Rachel's subsequent death36. As part of that experience, the
36

The numerous manifestations in visionary texts of this
confrontation with the elemental were outlined in my first
chapter. Their function is to serve as objective correlatives
of the futility of humankind's attempts to at once imbue our
existence with meaning and to separate ourselves from our
primal—and
necessarily
destructive—instincts.
This
particular sea image foreshadows Rachel's fatal fever:
She saw nothing and heard nothing but a faint
booming sound, which was the sound of the sea
rolling over her head. While all her tormentors
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couple must

negotiate

a

critical

confrontation

between

emotions and words. Because they live in a world where words
often function to block emotion, they need to virtually
recreate the process of truthful communication in order to
give shape to the reality of their incipient emotion37:
"Does this frighten you?" Terence asked when
the sound of fruit falling had completely died
away.
"No," she answered. "I like it."
She repeated "I like it." ...There was another
pause.
"You like being with me?" Terence asked.
"Yes, with you," she replied.
He was silent for a moment. Silence seemed to
have fallen upon the world.
"That is what I have felt ever since I knew
you," he replied. "We are happy together." He did
not seem to be speaking, or she to be hearing.
"Very happy," she answered.
They continued to walk for some time in
silence. Their steps unconsciously quickened.
"We love each other," Terence said.
"We love each other," she repeated.
The silence was then broken by their voices
which joined in tones of strange unfamiliar sound
which formed no words. (271)
Naremore suggests that the rhythms of this unusual passage are
an attempt by Woolf to capture "the tentative conversation of
lovers as they experience the sexual act," just as its
"dimness

and

depth"

signal

Woolfs

"more

intense

and

thought that she was dead, she was not dead, but
curled up at the bottom of the sea. There she lay,
sometimes seeing darkness, sometimes light, while
every now and then someone turned her over at the
bottom of the sea" (341).
37

Naremore observes that in Woolf's treatment of
experience, "words seem at times superfluous, sometimes even
false to the experience of something that is nonverbal" (37).
That "something that is nonverbal," I would suggest, might
often be labeled as visionary experience.
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meaningful states of feeling" (48-9). That the couple has, in
fact, consummated their relationship would be consistent with
the book's increasing emphasis on the crossing of borders.
However, Rachel's apparently spontaneous "Terrible—terrible"
reflects her recognition of the elemental terror of the human
condition and of the fragility—perhaps the futility—of our
attempts at sexual or verbal communion with one another38, of
the price one pays for transgressing those borders39.
When the couple returns to the main party, their
dialectical

sincerity

is

contrasted

with

the

"little

meaningless words" spoken by Mr. Flushing, who is "flowing on,
now about his wife, now about art, now about the future of the
country...," which is to say, speaking of one thing after
another (276). Hearing again the cadences of the quotidian

38

Cf. Helen's vision cited above. It is also worth noting
that Rachel's comment here had been prepared for in chapter
thirteen where her contemplation of an ur-question—"What is
it to be in love?"—leaves her "awed by the discovery of a
terrible possibility in life." The result of her visionary
reflection upon the implications of love (the quotidian mind
would trivialize the emotion or eviscerate its darker
meanings) has "each word (of her question) seem(ing) to shove
itself out into an unknown sea." Language, as ever, is
rendered impotent before such questions.
39

0ne of the most powerful examples of the wages of such
"transgression" is accomplished through the juxtaposition of
two apparently unrelated scenes. The first is Hewet's
observation that a chicken can be killed by drawing a circle
around it; the implication, of course, being that the bird is
too passive to break through the line. Later, Rachel
experiences "the other side of hotel life" when she
unexpectedly observes a chicken being chased down in order to
be killed and prepared for the guests' dinner. (Cf. the
coyotes in "The Brink of Darkness.")
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world, Rachel asks of her experience with Terence, "Is it
true, or is it a dream?"
The Platonic allusion is carried forward as the boat
approaches the native village. They pass a clearing that had
once been the location of the hut of the explorer Mackenzie,
"the man who went farther inland than anyone's been yet." As
if in response to his stimulus, Rachel slips into a state of
pure being, separated not only from the everyday world but
also, Woolf suggests syntactically, from her own physical
senses:
The eyes of Rachel saw nothing. Yellow and green
shapes did, it is true, pass before them, but she
only knew that one was large and another small; she
did not know that they were trees. These directions
to look here and there irritated her, as
interruptions irritate a person absorbed in
thought, although she was not thinking of anything.
(277)
Rachel's
Europeans'

trance-like

arrival

at

state

the

is mirrored

Indian

village

during the
whose

"soft

instinctive people" make the visitors feel like "tight-coated
soldiers." The native women watch with the "motionless
inexpressive gaze of those removed from each other far, far
beyond the plunge of speech." The primal quality of the scene
fills Rachel and Hewet with a sense of insignificance: "'So it
would go on for ever and ever,' she said, 'those women sitting
under the trees, the trees and the river'" (285). The trees
and

river

function

both

as

symbols

of

fertility

and

permanence, linking the primordial stream to Rachel's vision
of the eternal nature of the native women:
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Since the time of Elizabeth very few people had
seen the river, and nothing had been done to change
its appearance from what it was in the eyes of the
Elizabethan voyagers. The time of Elizabeth was
distant from the present time by a moment of space
compared with the ages which had passed since the
water had run between those banks, and the green
thickets swarmed there, and the small trees grown
to huge wrinkled trees in solitude. Changing only
with the change of the sun and the clouds, the
waving green mass had stood there for century after
century, and the water had run between its banks
ceaselessly, sometimes washing away earth and
sometimes the branches of trees, while in other
parts of the world one town had risen upon the
ruins of another town, and the men in the towns had
become more and more articulate and unlike each
other. (264)
Woolf's comment upon the talk that flies among the Europeans
in the microcosm of Santa Marina ("Words crossed the darkness
but, not knowing where they fell, seemed to lack energy and
substance" 286) perceives language's very sophistication as
ironically

delineating

our

separateness,

isolation, and

impotence: knowledge reveals nothingness; civilization is
built upon civilization, thought upon thought, one thing
follows another, culminating in, most infamously, the most
civilized nation in history fostering the Nazi holocaust.
In contrast to this linguistic enervation, Rachel and, to
a lesser extent, Hewet, are aligned with a transcendent nature
"beyond the plunge of speech" where they are essentially
relearning communication; their tentative happiness is tied
specifically to their willingness to cross into nature's
domain and generally to their willingness to question the
tenets of quotidian consciousness. Yet such boldness exacts a
piercing cost. It is this awareness that prompts Helen's
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foreboding regarding the river journey. While her companions
characteristically debate signs of European influence in the
native jewelry, she chastises them for having come on the
expedition at all, "for having ventured too far and exposed
themselves" (286). It is perhaps inevitable that Rachel,
having "advanced so far in the pursuit of wisdom," must
undertake a final, all-consuming voyage of fire.
Daiches has written of the connection between death and
the revelation of character in Woolf's work: "Death for
(Woolf) was always the illuminator of and commentator on life,
so that an adequate insight into any character is only given
if he is shown not only living but also in some connection
with death" (12). Therefore, the fatal fever that Rachel
contracts as

(presumably) a result of her river voyage

functions, like language, as a device to delineate our
separateness: "...at intervals she made an effort to cross
over into the ordinary world, but she found that her heat and
discomfort had put a gulf between her world and the ordinary
world which she could not bridge" (329) . Woolf's emphasis on
the impotence of language to ameliorate our condition prepares
us for the death, the ultimate separation, which Rachel's
fever anticipates. Moreover, her death functions not as
culmination to experience but rather as an emblem of the
arbitrary and pernicious nature of existence.
This is realized both individually and communally. First,
Woolf employs the psychic awakening of Terence and Evelyn
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Murgatroyd to validate Rachel's own visionary experience. That
is, as Kurtz taught Marlow and Marlow Heart of Darkness's
primary narrator, so, too, does Rachel effect ontological
change in those around her and, presumably, in us as readers
as well. Indeed, Hewet functions as something of a Shelleyan
epipsyche to Rachel. Confronted by her deepening illness, he
has revealed to him the malignant underside of life:
He could not get used to his pain, it was a
revelation to him. He had never realized before
that underneath every action, underneath the life
of every day, pain lies, quiescent, but ready to
devour; he seemed to be able to see suffering, as
if it were a fire, curling up over the edges of all
action, eating away the lives of men and women.
(344-45)
Like Rachel, he begins to analyze the meaning and
implications of words: "He thought for the first time with
understanding of words which before had seemed to him empty:
the struggle of life; the hardness of life. Now he knew for
himself that life is hard and

full of suffering." He

excoriates the blindness of his quotidian existence: "How had
he dared to live as he had lived, rapidly and carelessly,
passing from one thing to another, loving Rachel as he had
loved her? Never again would he feel secure; he would never
believe in the stability of life, or forget what depths of
pain lie beneath small happiness and feelings of content and
safety (emphasis mine)." And finally he immerses himself in an
elemental, existential vision:
The light on his candle flickered over the boughs
of a tree outside his window, and as the branch
swayed in the darkness there came before his mind a
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picture of all the world that lay outside his
window; he thought of the immense river and the
immense forest, the vast stretches of dry earth and
the plains of the sea that encircled the earth;
from the sea the sky rose steep and enormous, and
the air washed profoundly between the sky and the
sea. How vast and dark it must be tonight, lying
exposed to the wind; and in all this great space it
was curious to think how few the towns were, and
how like little rings of light they were, scattered
here and there among the swelling uncultivated
folds of the world. And in those towns were little
men and women, tiny men and women. Oh, it was
absurd when one thought of it, to sit here in this
little room suffering and caring. What did anything
matter? The nearness of their bodies in this vast
universe, and the minuteness of their bodies,
seemed to him absurd and laughable. Nothing
mattered, he repeated; they had no power, no hope.
(344-45)
One might discern in Terence's reaction to the encroaching,
palpable presence of death traces of the privileged and the
pampered, a want of fortitude, an agony of the moment which
will be assuaged by the passage of time and the pleasures of
everyday life. Such a reading, Woolf makes clear in the next
chapter's opening emphasis upon the "empty air...profound
silence...the little inarticulate cries of children or of the
very poor, of people who were very weak or in pain," would
indicate the reader's own failure of vision. For the primary
intent of visionary fictions—as is reflected through their
concern with the interrelations of existential awakenings, the
experience of reading, and metaphysical insight—is always on
the evolution of and response to our own vision of our
existential condition.
These concerns are carried forward in the responses of
Mrs. Thornbury and Evelyn Murgatroyd to Rachel's death. Mrs.
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Thornbury, the de facto matriarch of the English colony and,
as such, a personification of tradition and good sense, learns
of the news upon entering the hotel's lobby where the other
guests have gathered. Like those who had experienced the storm
aboard the Euphrosyne, and like Helen and Hewet before her,
she,

too, experiences

an

existential

awakening

to the

implacable powers of her universe, one which is dressed in
Platonic allusions. She watches her countrymen "standing
beside the solid arm-chairs and tables," but the human beings
look "unreal, or as people look who remain unconscious that
some great explosion is about to take place beside them."
However, the commonplace of death provokes "no explosion, and
they went on standing by the chairs and tables." Now her
vision penetrates through them "as though they were without
substance," and sees instead "the figure of the dead lying
still in the dark beneath the sheets." It is there that
reality resides in a world that now appears to her "strangely
empty."
Confronted

with

this

vision

of

nothingness, Mrs.

Thornbury totters on the brink of the abyss fabricating a
desperate teleology: "And yet the older one grows...the more
certain one becomes that there is a reason. How could one go
on if there was no reason?...There must be a reason. It can't
only be an accident. For it was an accident—it need never
have happened... .But we must not let ourselves think of that."
She wanders from room to room, guest to guest seeking meaning,
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but the essential question remains: "There must be some reason
why such things happen... .Only at first it was not easy to
understand what it was." Ultimately, Mrs. Thornbury finds
solace in an ethical utilitarianism, perhaps the epitome of
rationalism:
She thought very quickly and very clearly, and,
looking back over all her experiences, tried to fit
them into a kind of order. There was undoubtedly
much suffering, much struggling, but, on the whole,
surely there was a balance of happiness—surely
order did prevail.
The futility and speciousness of her attempts to recognize a
cosmic balance of order and good is emphasized by her own
recognition, as she seeks haven in the quotidian through a
political discussion with her husband, that "every now and
then what she was saying seemed to her oddly empty of
meaning40."
Woolf weighs Mrs. Thornbury's escape into the illusion of
an ordered and benevolent universe against the emergence of an
incipient vision in Evelyn Murgatroyd, who throughout the
novel has sought a person or philosophy upon which she can
shape her life. The others "keep up an elaborate conversation"
as a way of deflecting Evelyn's obvious distress over Rachel's
death. Evelyn will have none of it: "Why would people never
talk about the things that mattered?" Indeed, in true
40

Cf. Richard Dalloway, a true politician, who, as he
speaks with Rachel "lost consciousness of what he was saying"
(68). Such passages imply Woolf's view of the essential
unreality of practices and institutions like politics, which
nominally are accorded the distinction of manifesting what is
"real."
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visionary fashion, her questions make the other guests "feel
uncomfortable":
"It seems so inexplicable," Evelyn continued.
"Death, I mean. Why should she be dead, and not you
or I? It was only a fortnight ago that she was with
the rest of us. What d'you believe...D'you believe
that things go on, that she's still somewhere—or
d'you think it's simply a game—we crumble up to
nothing when we die? I'm positive Rachel's not
dead." (362)
As if in support of her premonition, Rachel's spirit enters
Evelyn's consciousness as she packs to return to England:
"Suddenly the keen feeling of some one's personality, which
things that they have owned or handled sometimes preserves,
overcame her; she felt Rachel in the room with her." As the
presence

fades, Evelyn

is

left

feeling

"depressed

and

fatigued" beneath the burden of a distinctly interrogative
consciousness:
What had she done with her life? What future was
there before her? What was make-believe, and what
was real? Were these proposals and intimacies and
adventures real, or was the contentment which she
had seen on the faces of Susan and Rachel more real
than anything she had ever felt?
Faced with her own imminent proposal of marriage, Evelyn—like
Rachel—is unsure of "exactly what I feel." When her suitor
tells her that her presence has awakened for him "so many
possibilities that I had never dreamed of," we might recall
that it was just those possibilities which Rachel had labeled
"terrible." And we sense that it is upon this knowledge that
Evelyn backs away from the proposal which, prior to Rachel's
"visitation", she had been resigned to accepting. Her body
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left inviolable, her spirit infused with Rachel's example,
Evelyn is left alone pondering her ur-questions: "What did
matter then? What was the meaning of it all?"
Like its penultimate chapter, The Voyage Out's final
chapter sets forth a tone of cosmic foreboding. A silence and
a feeling of "pressure and restraint" permeate the atmosphere
of the hotel's dining room as a wind drives "waves of darkness
across the earth," prelude to a "great confused ocean of air"
which will deposit a brief but powerful storm. We are now
clearly among the prisoners of Plato's cave as the guests
huddle

together

in

the

great

hall

"far

from

the

windows...(where) they could not see anything." With the
storm's passing, a collective "comfortable sense of relief" is
experienced; the guests, having faced manifestations of the
fragility and contingency of their existences, react by naming
the beast, "tell(ing) each other stories about great storms,"
and thereby distancing themselves from the destructive element
of truth.
Now comfortable in their familiar quotidian rhythms, the
guests produce pastimes: chess, knitting, and cards—each an
emblem of human fate. Their activities and sense of well-being
fill the room with an "indescribable stir of life"; their
conversation lulls the mind as "the words came gently one
after another." It is at this point that St. John Hirst, the
novel's personification of reason, returns from Rachel's
deathwatch. His cheeks "pale, unshorn and cavernous" from his
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glimpse into the abyss, he is in effect returning to the cave
to tell the other prisoners of his vision. However, the change
in ontological altitude befuddles Hirst, and he "dr(aws) his
hand across his eyes as if some dream came between him and the
others and prevented him from seeing where he was."
While Hirst
exhausted, his

is clearly

confusion

physically

here

signals

and

emotionally

something beyond

fatigue. Unlike Plato's wrathful prisoners whom Socrates
speculates would fall upon and murder any of their fellows
attempting to disabuse them of their delusion, the movements
and voices of these prisoners converge from about the hall to
weave a seductive and subtle pattern of order and harmony:
Hirst is "content to sit silently watching the pattern build
itself up, looking at what he hardly saw." As if to confirm
the illusory quality of the pattern, a flash of lightning is
revealed to be "only the reflection of the storm which was
over," and references to rain, air, earth, and flashing light
further emphasize the universal and elemental stakes of the
drama being played out in microcosm. The novel closes with
Hirst "half-asleep, and vividly conscious of everything around
him:
Across his eyes passed a procession of objects,
black and indistinct, the figures of people picking
up their books, their cards, their balls of wool,
their work-baskets, and passing him one after
another on their way to bed.
Hirst here faces an ontological decision—a choice of how
to be—between embracing the implications of his glimpse into
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the abyss occasioned by Rachel's apparently arbitrary passing
or seeking haven from that vision in the comforting human
procession provided by the shadows of his fellow inmates. Much
earlier in the novel, after he and Rachel had come from a
dance, Hirst observed with characteristic insouciance, "I see
through everything—absolutely everything. Life has no more
mysteries for me." But the narrative voice undercuts his
hubris. observing that "near though they sat, and familiar
though they felt, they seemed mere shadows to each other"
(169) . Now the example of Rachel's life—essentially a leaving
of the cave of quotidian being—has transformed her shadowy
status into vivid if alarming existential being through the
revelation of life's true mystery: the nothingness at its
core. Hirst now tentatively reenacts her example; we leave him
at the moment of choice and commitment.
Like Hirst's position here, the experience of reading The
Voyage Out approximates a kind of test, one which we cannot
pass while under the illusion that this is a novel concerned
with the vagaries of love. It is indeed a bildunqsroman. but
the education is ours. If Rachel sees the world differently
than do her countrymen, they all inhabit the same world: as
Rachel is dead so, too, are they "on their way to bed." Death
is our insoluble problem, the ultimate textual puzzle. We live
as we read.
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CHAPTER V
BECOMING LORD JIM
"...the question is not how to get cured, but how to live."
(Lord Jim)
"My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the
written word to make you hear, to make you feel—it is before
all, to make you see."
(Conrad's Preface to The Nigger of the Narcissus)
"He who with eagle's talons graspeth the abyss: he hath
courage."
(Nietzsche)

When I perceive Conrad's Jim to be a visionary hero, I
recognize his experience to be neither a lust for heroism nor
a flight from shame but rather an increasingly profound
commitment to what Sartre calls authentic being. Indeed,
Olson's gloss of Sartrean "authenticity" as the experience of
an individual who "undergoes a radical conversion through
anguish and who assumes his freedom; (who) recognizes himself,
not as a shepherd of being, but as the cause of there being a
world and as the unique source of the world's value and
intelligibility1" (139) describes the arc of Jim's career as
1

In relation to Jim's experience in Patusan, the wording
of Olson's gloss might unintentionally raise the specter of
imperialism and racism—charges which are hardly unprecedented
in Conrad criticism. Humphries, for example, argues that the
"real reason (for Jim's going to the East) is to be part of a
particular economic system, if not to actually take an active
part in its concrete manifestations: the imperialist pillage
associated with colonialism." Moreover, Humphries sees, as do
I, the genesis of Jim's journey in the "light holiday
literature to which he is addicted" (64). While fashionable,
this position is untenable. There certainly is no evidence of
Jim's "addiction" to romance literature; he, for example,
totes a complete Shakespeare with him to Patusan—"Best thing
to cheer up a fellow"—along with two unidentified smaller
volumes. He does, to be sure, upon Marlow's first visit to
Patusan, observe that the Patusanians are "like people in a
book" (260). However, Jim's arrival in Patusan is an act of
desperation, not one of malignity. It is clear that, following
his cowardice upon the Patna, he would have remained in
oblivion at any of the posts to which he retreated had not the
infamy of his experience ineluctably rooted him out. Indeed,
his very entrance into the merchant service in the East is a
case of Heideggerian "throwness": "The majority (of those in
the eastern service) were men..., like (Jim), thrown there by
some accident" (13). No, the meaning of Jim's Patusan
experience yields itself to existential, not Marxist analysis.
While Jim's original existential choice to join the eastern
service may well have racial undertones in the "distinction of
being white," his overriding motive was to "lounge safely
through existence" in the grasp of a "safe universe." It is
Jim's awakening to the true nature of his world and to his
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he evolves through Sartre's fundamental—if nearly opaque—
distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself2. In
sum, Jim, as was his creator, is best defined by his tenacious
and—given its seeming futility—courageous pursuit of the
question of "how to be." Most importantly, I discover value in
my reading of Jim's own crucible of becoming for my own; I
realize my self to be among the "us" of Marlow's relentless
refrain in Lord Jim3. Throughout his fiction, Conrad, who
almost certainly never heard the term "existentialism" nor
read the writings of Kierkegaard or Nietzsche4, reveals an
instinctive and cogent existential posture, and, in characters

responsibilities to himself and to others, not their
exploitation, that constitutes the novel's greatness. As
Sartre observes, "Total responsibility in total solitude—is
not this the very definition of liberty?" For an excellent
series of discussions of Conrad in relation to colonialism,
see Hamner.
2

As defined by Hazel Barnes, these are, first, "being-initself: non-conscious Being. It is the being of the phenomenon
and overflows the knowledge which we have of it. It is a
plenitude, and strictly speaking we can say of it only that it
is"; and second, "Being-for-itself: The nihilation of Beingin-itself; consciousness conceived as a lack of Being, a
desire for being, a relation to being. By bringing Nothingness
into the world the For-itself can stand out from being and
judge other beings by knowing what it is not. Each For-itself
is the nihilation of a particular being" (Nothingness. 800)
The key to the distinction is one of consciousness and
freedom. Being-in-itself" is the thing—whether man or object-itself; "Being-for-itself" is an evolution or separation from
the latter in which the existent chooses a self and
experiences the process of becoming that self.
3

Marlow employs the phrase "one of us" on 10 separate
occasions in the novel.
4

Conrad was deeply read in and
Scohpenhauer. See chapter four of Johnson.
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influenced

by

like Leggatt; Martin Decoud; Razumov; Kurtz; Marlow and Jim,
offers

an

impressive

array

of

specifically

visionary

experience. In my final example of the visionary hero, I will
focus upon Lord Jim and demonstrate the descent of meaning
from what I will outline of Conrad's life, to its thematic
reflection in Lord Jim and ultimately the capacity of that
representation to affect awareness and change in any reader
willing to mentally "audition" the roles offered by this
novel, to expose his or her vulnerability to the power of
visionary literature.
The

inherent

difficulty

of Sartre's

language in

attempting to apprehend those modes of being mentioned above
might suggest Conrad's own characteristically hazy, often
ambiguous—if more felicitous—phraseology5. In particular,
Conrad's fiction is rife with references to various narrators'
inability to see—and consequently to name—events clearly and
accurately, and the Marlow of Lord Jim repeatedly laments his
inability to see—which is to say, to understand—Jim's
character in a definitive way6, an ambiguity which persists
to—indeed constitutes—the novel's conclusion. But as Bruce
Johnson reminds us "it is too easy to smile at either Sartre
or Conrad when they have, often for good reason, nearly

5

See Adam Gillon's article for an enlightening comparison
and contrast between Conrad's and Sartre's thought.
6

Sartre would see nothing unusual in this, noting that
one "cannot pass beyond human subjectivity" ("Existentialism
and Humanism," 29).
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exhausted the resources of language. There is nothing funny
about the ideas involved, and...it appears that at rare
moments Conrad is incredibly close to seeing consciousness as
this fountain or gland of nothingness" (90) . This sentiment is
amply borne out in Conrad's letter (translated from the
original French) to Ted Sanderson:
There are no converts to ideas of honor, justice,
pity, freedom. There are only people who, without
knowledge, understanding, or feeling, drive
themselves into a frenzy with words, repeat them,
shout them out, imagine they believe in them—
without believing in anything but profit, personal
advantage, satisfied vanity. And words fly away;
and nothing remains, do you understand? Absolutely
nothing, oh man of faith! Nothing. A moment, a
twinkling of an eye, and nothing remains—but a
clot of mud, of cold mud, of dead mud cast into
black space, rolling around an extinguished sun.
Nothing. Neither thought, nor sound, nor soul.
Nothing. (Letters, vol.2, p.70)
One of the many instances in Lord Jim where this
struggle with the interrelated problems of language and
vision7 is played out occurs at Jim's trial for abandoning the
Patna: "...the sound of

(Jim's) own truthful statements

confirmed his deliberate opinion that speech was of no use to
him any longer," and, perceiving Marlow's fixed stare upon
him, Jim realizes that Marlow, too, "seemed to be aware of
(Jim's) hopeless difficulty" (33) . Standing in the witness

7

0f course, it could be argued that the entire
relationship between Marlow and Jim originates from the
fallacy of the "postal principal": that every message finds
its recipient. The "yellow cur" incident is the first of a
series of occasions in which language proves at best
incidental, at worst a hindrance to the growing rapport
between the two seamen.
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box, Jim understands instinctively that the facts ("Facts!
They demanded facts from him, as if facts could explain
anything8") with which the court so assiduously seeks to
explain and thereby bury the implications of the Patna affair9
will prove inadequate to the task.
An understanding of visionary literature teaches us that
Jim's frustration here is the result of a way of seeing
distinct from that of those who are trying him. Indeed, the
Patna inquiry reflects the existence of types or levels of
judgment which are endemic to the moral systems which produce
them. Jim's solitary stand before the naval inquiry is based
upon a systemic ethical view of the world, or what might be
termed the fallacy of the morally symmetrical universe. In
this instance "right" is defined as conformity to the tacit
code of the sea, a "few simple notions" of self-sacrifice,
valor, competence and devotion to duty. Any action extraneous
to the code is "wrong." Hence Jim's frustration at the

8

This same distinction between what I would label the
quotidian consciousness's focus on "facts" and the visionary's
on instinct and emotion was noted in The Voyage Out. We also
see precisely the same concern voiced by Leggatt in "The
Secret Sharer":
You don't suppose I am afraid of what can be done
to me? Prison or gallows or whatever they may
please. But you don't see me coming back to explain
such things to an old fellow in a wig and twelve
respectable tradesman, do you? What can they know
whether I am guilty or not—or what I am guilty of,
either?" (51)
9

For a graphic illustration of this sentiment, see
Marlow's quote on page 214.
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inadequacy of facts to explain the subjective and complex
reality

of

his

experience.

What

is

lacking

in

these

proceedings is interrogativity, a willingness to question the
center or, obversely, to peer into the chaos and ambiguity of
life

on

the

margin.

It

is

just

Jim's

clenched-teeth

willingness to view the mess, to persevere through the most
grievous doubts that is a prime motivation behind Marlow's
unflagging devotion to Jim's ordeal of becoming. And Marlow of
all men, having witnessed Kurtz's evisceration of the ideal,
knows the danger and cost of ideas: "Hang ideas! They are
tramps, vagabonds knocking at the back door of your mind, each
taking a little of your substance, each carrying away some
crumb of that belief in a few simple notions you must cling to
if you want to live decently and would like to die easy!"
(75).
Jim,

then, has perceived—at

least

instinctively—

something essential about the nature of reality that others
(witness Brierly) have heretofore suppressed or refused to
acknowledge: "These were issues," Marlow later says of Jim's
struggle, "beyond the competency of a court of inquiry: it was
a subtle and momentous quarrel as to the true essence of life,
and did not want a judge" (93). In a phrase that essence is
the malevolent soul which lurks at the heart of things, the
darkness that underlies the endeavors and fate of humankind,
whereas "the facts those men were so eager to know had been
visible, tangible, open to the senses, occupying their place
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in space and time..." (30). It is as if Jim, enlightened
through his plunge into the destructive element, were speaking
a language different from that of his inquisitors. Again,
Conrad addresses the point in a letter to Cunningham Graham,
which reads like a primer on existentialist thought:
The mysteries of the universe made of drops of fire
and clods of mud do not concern us in the least.
The fate of humanity condemned ultimately to perish
from cold is not worth troubling about. If you take
it to heart, it becomes an unendurable tragedy. If
you believe in improvement, you must weep, for the
attained perfection must end in cold, darkness and
silence. In a dispassionate view the ardour for
reform, improvement, for virtue, for knowledge, and
even for beauty is only a vain sticking up for
appearances as though one were anxious about the
cut of one's clothes in a community of blind men.
Life knows us not and we know not life—we don't
even know our own thoughts. Half the words we use
have no meaning whatever and of the other half each
man understands each word after the fashion of his
own folly and conceit. Faith is a myth and beliefs
shift like mists on the shore; thoughts vanish;
words once pronounced, die; and the memory of
yesterday is as shadowy as the hope of to-morrow—
only the string of my platitudes seems to have no
end. As our peasants say: "Pray, brother, forgive
me for the love of God." And we don't know what
forgiveness is, nor what is love, nor what God is.
Assez. (Letters, vol.2, pp. 16-7)
This perception of shifting beliefs, the absence of faith, and
the ephemeral nature of human thought begins to explain for us
the mystical vagueness characteristic of Conrad's prose. As
one critic has observed, Conrad labored under "a withering
paradox...that the artist must be engaged in making shapes to
prove that shapes cannot be made, in giving form to the
formless" (Cox, 11).
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At his trial, Jim quells his feelings of "revolt" at the
absurdity of trying to capture the meaning of his experience
through language, and attempts "through a meticulous precision
of statement

(to) bring out the true horror behind the

appalling face of things" (30). This I would suggest to be a
key statement of visionary being, and one, given Conrad's
propensity for the portentous phrase, that might be easily
overlooked.

It suggests a kind

of double vision that

acknowledges the quotidian horror of events—in this case, the
"appalling" dishonoring of the "fellowship of the craft" by
the

Patna's

European

horror," which

crew—while

is exemplified

by

insinuating
the

the

"true

recognition that

institutionalized ideals like the "brotherhood of the sea" or
white

European

cultural

and

racial

dominance

are

but

psychological fragments shoring up the ruins of futile claims
to a teleological universe based upon clearly articulated
conceptions of good and evil.
I am not suggesting that Jim is fully conscious of the
complexity of such a response here, but Marlow, his personal
anthropologist, is. When Marlow fixes his courtroom gaze upon
Jim—"an act of intelligent volition" unlike the "fascinated
stares" of the others—Jim senses that he "looks at me as
though he could see somebody or something past my shoulder"
(32-3). I would submit that what Marlow perceives (or, as I
will argue later, "reads"), is not the image of himself which
the novel's refrain might suggest but rather Nothingness—his
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own existential moment—the revelation as illusion of his
ideals concerning his craft, his world, his self. As Royal
Roussel makes the point, Marlow perceives "the formlessness
behind all form, the meaninglessness behind all meaning" (85) .
Indeed, Marlow says as much in one of his projections of
ontological value upon Jim's person:
He was a youngster of the sort you like to see
about you; of the sort you like to imagine yourself
to have been; of the sort whose appearance claims
the fellowship of these illusions you had thought
gone out, extinct, cold, and which, as if rekindled
at the approach of another flame, give a flutter
deep, deep down somewhere, give a flutter of
light...of heat!(128)
To be sure, Marlow's use of "illusions" here possesses a
partially

ironic

cast; one does

not

normally

seek to

resuscitate an illusion. But Marlow's prevalent irony is, of
course, a defense mechanism against what he sees in the course
of his fictional encounters, and the larger point Conrad the
artist is making, I think, is that while Marlow's (and Jim's)
pursuit of a life sustaining and invigorating ideal of conduct
is understandable, it is also futile. That standard can only
be discovered individually and through considerable psychic
cost; it can never be imposed or adopted from without—however
willing the individual might be to accept it—for such an
imposed code would lack both value and authenticity.
To know anything of Conrad the man is to understand the
profound value he placed on codes of discipline and right
conduct. To know anything of existential thought is to know
the emptiness of such ideals. "Nowhere is it written," Sartre
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observes, "that the Good exists, that we must be honest, that
we must not lie; because the fact is that we are on a plane
where there are only men... .Therefore, he thinks that man,
with no support and no aid, is condemned every moment to
invent man" (282) . This was a view with which Conrad, for all
his longing for a "fixed standard of conduct," did not
disagree:
Everyone must walk in the light of his own heart's
gospel...No man's light is good to any of his
fellows. That's my creed from beginning to end.
That's my view of life,—a view that rejects all
formulas, dogmas and principles of other people's
making. These are a web of illusions. We are too
varied. Another man's truth is only a dismal lie to
me" (Jean-Aubry, v.l, 184).
Herein we may better understand Marlow's indelible horror
upon discovering the emptiness inhabiting his cherished
concepts of the nautical brotherhood. It seems to unleash in
him a sense of the apocalyptic. He observes of Jim's
experience in the lifeboat: "It is as if the souls of men
floating on an abyss and in touch with immensity had been set
free for any excess of heroism, absurdity, or abomination," a
judgment Jim confirms when he reveals that there was "no
concern with anything on earth. Nobody to pass an opinion.
Nothing mattered10" (120-1). Marlow's shock of recognition is

10

Cf. Dostoyevsky in The Brothers Karamazov: "If God is
dead, then all is permitted." Conrad, by the way, claimed to
loathe the Russian author, in part, undoubtedly, because of
his family's exile following Russia's usurpation of Poland.
But more pointedly, I think, is that Dostoyevsky so powerfully
mirrored—and thus anticipated—many of Conrad's own views and
themes.
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shared with Brierly; together they personify the two frame
questions of this study. Jim's actions, Brierly observes,
"destroy one's confidence," and no longer able to exist within
the cocoon of his illusion11, he chooses suicide. Marlow,
however, chooses existence, and "takes up" Jim not primarily
from altruism but rather from self-preservation: he must
discover a new way to be in the awareness of his condemnation
to freedom, with Jim ironically as his guide.

What neither

Brierly nor Marlow understand, however, is that Jim at this
point has made no choice; like Martin Decoud, "the dilettante
of life," he has simply casually accepted the imposition of a
code of conduct to which he has made no commitment beyond
throwing in his lot with those identified by "the soft spot,
the place of decay, the determination to lounge safely through
existence" (12); which is to say he exists within a state of
bad

faith.

In

contradistinction,

Brierly

had

believed

passionately and without question in the ideal of the craft:
"We are trusted," he appeals to Marlow at one point, "Do you
understand?—trusted!....We aren't an organized body of men,
and the only thing that holds us together is just the name for
that kind of decency" (68). The desperation implicit in
Brierly's words reflects his perception of the personal
consequences of calling his ideal into question. Jim, however,
learns to exist in the destructive element of freedom. The
11

The entomological metaphor here has particular relevance
for Stein's butterflies and thus for the entire evolutionary
drama of becoming.
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text of Lord Jim is the map of his evolving commitment to an
individual code of fidelity to all men and women—his becoming
authentic.
But we must go further. It is a critical commonplace that
Marlow serves as Conrad's alter ego. We have already seen
Conrad, who moved throughout his life among the three
languages he spoke fluently, to be grimly aware of the flux
and slipperiness of language or with what post-structuralists
would label its lack of "referentiality." C.B. Cox reminds us
that Conrad's fiction was dug "out of a foreign quarry. This
made him doubtful about the mimetic function of words, and in
this he is characteristically modern" (8) . What was the
experience which Conrad's language sought to capture and from
which it evolved? Essentially Conrad, living the life of the
exile which similarly would come to define twentieth century
experience, spent his life staring into a void: first,
following the exile of his aristocratic family from Poland,
came the bitter years of wandering in the Russian steppes, a
time which, in effect, prepared him for the sea years of
peering into the fathomless horizon and the bottomless abyss;
and finally the writing career, perhaps the most trying of his
three lives, with his agonizing slowness of production, the
gnawing doubts about recognition, indeed about basic economic
survival; always he was tied to his writing desk, pen and
paper—his Sisyphean rock—staring into the blankness of the
paper, dredging through the years of exile on land, of
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isolation

at

sea,

fermenting

that

loneliness

in

his

imagination to produce the dark vision of his fiction. Peter
Glassman speaks of Conrad's character as "framed by virtually
no external sanctions" and Frederick Karl speculates that
Conrad deliberately—in effect existentially—
...chose directions or careers that would force him
to relive a teetering, near-disastrous experience.
Comparable to his actual suicide attempt in
Marseilles was his use of suicidal situations in
which he could confront the worse and could wobble
existentially while peering into the abyss. Then,
and only then, could he apply himself at his
highest level of achievement, whether at mate,
captain, or novelist. (18)
Stavrou observes that, like Camus, pessimism and/or
nihilism is the bedrock of Conrad's thought. In 1897 Conrad
offered the following Kafkaesque cosmology in a letter to
Cunningham Graham:
There is a—let us say—a machine. It evolved
itself (I am severely scientific) out of a chaos of
scraps of iron and behold!—it knits. I am
horrified at the horrible work and stand appalled.
I feel it ought to embroider—but it goes on
knitting. You come and say: "this is all right;
it's only a question of the right kind of oil. Let
us use this—for instance—celestial oil and the
machine shall embroider a most beautiful design in
purple and gold." Will it? Alas no. You cannot by
any special lubrication make embroidery with a
knitting machine. And the most withering thought is
that the infamous thing has made itself; made
itself without thought, without conscience, without
foresight, without eyes, without heart. It is a
tragic accident—and it has happened. You can't
interfere with it. The last drop of bitterness is
in the suspicion that you can't even smash it. In
virtue of that truth one and immortal which lurks
in the force that made it spring into existence it
is what it is—and it is indestructible!
It knits us in and it knits us out. It has
knitted time, space, pain, death, corruption,
despair and all the illusions—and nothing matters.
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I'll admit however that to look at the remorseless
process is sometimes amusing12. (Letters, v.l,
p.425)
Art, then, would become for Conrad a hedge against this
relentless indifference, a way of imbuing his experience with
significant form, of utilizing the nihilistic demons that
throughout his life nibbled at the edges of his consciousness.
If life's meaning could not be apprehended, its impressions
and vicissitudes might nonetheless be recorded. Art became,
most powerfully, an exercise in self-definition, for "Joseph
Conrad," a name that was the result of nearly twenty
permutations, was a self-invention, a persona created out of
an

urgent

ontological

need

by

Josepf

Teodor

Konrad

Korzeniowski as surely as Jay Gatsby was by James Gatz. Karl
compares Conrad to Proteus, "always...in a state of defining
and redefining himself. A final shape was not his destiny"
(22).
With this background, it is perhaps not surprising that
Conrad not only portrayed Camus' philosophical imperative in
his art, which contains at least 15 suicides13, he also acted
upon it. Prior to the start of his literary career, distraught
at the drift of his life, despairing at ever resolving a

12

Cf. the interrogativity implicit in this passage with
that of the passage from Kierkegaard's Repetition quoted in
chapter one.
13

For a listing of Conrad's fictional use of suicide, see
Cox, page 6. His opening chapter also offers a lucid
meditation on the issues surrounding Conrad's own attempted
suicide.
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fragmented sense of self, and panic-stricken with guilt and
shame over an unpayable gambling debt, the twenty-four-yearold Conrad placed a revolver against his chest and pulled the
trigger. Miraculously, the bullet passed through his body
without striking a vital organ14.
In many ways the act seems an anomaly in the life of a
man who was personally circumspect and conservative. However,
Karl speculates that Conrad's decision to turn to writing—
which, given its own inherent uncertainty and doubtful chances
for success, seems itself an act of desperation—was very much
a form of gambling and "the endless sheets of white paper he
faced each day...a quotidian equivalent of suicide" (175).
What emerges here is a portrait of Conrad as a marginal
man. Even late in his life, having achieved mastery in the two
quintessential professions of his adopted country—the sea and
letters—he continued to not only harbor but be actively
tormented by doubts regarding his identity and self-worth,
traits—like

so much else about Conrad—which mark his

prescience for modern experience. It is within this nexus of
marginality that Conrad, like Camus, transformed through an

1A

While there is no minimizing the seriousness of Conrad's
action here, all three of his most recent biographers concur
that it was more a cry for help than a desire to end his life.
For example, the setting of the shooting coincided with an
appointment Conrad made with his chief creditor, reflecting,
observes Bernard Meyer, "an inner state of indecision,
preparing the way for rescue by his tea-time guest in the
event his intended self-injury should not prove immediately
fatal" (38).
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act of consciousness (his writing) an invitation to death into
a rule of life.
Lord Jim mirrors that struggle to be, the striving for
identity and personal meaning. Even Jim's lack of a surname
anticipates the spate of nameless protagonists in twentieth
century fiction, many of whom I would label "visionary." That
struggle speaks directly, of course, to

existentialist

thinkers' emphasis upon "becoming." Kierkegaard had argued in
Concluding Unscientific Postscript that man is constantly "in
a process of becoming" (84), and again in The Sickness Unto
Death that "a self, every moment it exists, is in a process of
becoming; for the self is not present actually, it is merely
what is to come into existence" (60) ; and Sartre's basic
distinction between "existence and "essence" posits that "man
first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the
world—and

defines

himself

afterwards.

If

man

as

the

existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to
begin with he is nothing.. .man simply is" ("Existentialism and
Humanism," 28). In sum, Kierkegaard and Sartre are arguing
that human beings lack a defined, stable self, a view with
profound implications for any reading of Lord Jim in that
Marlow's narration is fueled by his faith in Jim's intrinsic
worth and essential moral fitness15.
15

Conrad himself echoed similar sentiments in a letter to
Edward Garnett:
When once the truth is grasped that one's own
personality is only a ridiculous and aimless
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If Marlow's view is correct, then indeed Jim needs but
"another chance," an opportunity that will allow his true
nature to emerge; however, our understanding of visionary
literature suggests a situation quite distinct from this.
Early in the novel, Marlow categorizes the nautical denizens
of the East into two distinct groups:
Some, very few and seen there but seldom, led
mysterious lives, had preserved an underfaced
energy with the temper of buccaneers and the eyes
of dreamers. They appeared to live in a crazy maze
of plans, hopes, dangers, enterprises, ahead of
civilization, in the dark places of the sea, and
their death was the only event of their fantastic
existence that seemed to have a reasonable
certitude of achievement.
The majority were men who, like (Jim) , thrown there
by some accident, had remained as officers of
country ships. They had now a horror of the home
service, with its harder conditions, severer view
of duty, and the hazard of stormy oceans. They were
attuned to the eternal peace of Eastern sky and
sea.
They
loved
short
passages...and
the
distinction of being white. They shuddered at the
thought of hard work, and led precariously easy
lives, always on the verge of dismissal, always on
the verge of engagement, serving Chinamen, Arabs,
half-castes—would have served the devil himself
had he made it easy enough. They talked
everlastingly of turns of luck...and in all they
masquerade of something hopelessly unknown the
attainment of serenity is not very far off. Then
there remains nothing but the surrender to one's
impulses, the fidelity to passing emotions which is
perhaps a nearer approach to truth than any other
philosophy of life. And why not? If we are "ever
becoming—never being" than I would be a fool if I
tried to become this thing rather than that; for I
know well that I never will be anything. (Letters,
I, 267-68)
(I am thankful to Otto Bohlmann's work for alerting me to this
passage.)
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said—in all their actions, in their looks, in
their persons—could be detected the soft spot, the
place of decay, the determination to lounge safely
through existence. (11-2)
The first grouping—defined by an exclusivity based upon a
vision and energy which set its members beyond civilization,
dwelling in the destructive element of "mazes" and the sea's
"dark places," and sustained only by the promise of death—
suggests an approximation of how a quotidian mind might view
visionary

being. This

is buttressed

by

the distinctly

quotidian character of the second group, who, sharing a
Heideggarian "throwness," lack either the energy or vision to
surge up, leaving their nebulous identities to the vagaries of
race

and

fortune.

Most

tellingly,

their

"everlasting"

discussions of luck—"how So-and-so got charge of a boat on
the coast of China" and so forth—denotes their appalling
distance from existential responsibility. Faced with what
Kierkegaard terms the "either/or" inherent in any decision,
Jim chooses the values of decadence, a decision that leads to
his berth aboard the Patna.
It is equally clear, however, that Jim enters into his
choice irresponsibly, in a state of "bad faith," seeking, as
Marlow

puts

it, "to

lounge

safely

through existence."

Developing a "fascination in the sight of those men," he
chooses absorption into the quotidian16, refusing, in effect,
16

Again, "quotidian" indicates simply one's existential
attitude toward experience; in this case, the attitude toward
their craft of the men in the East as opposed to that of those
in the home service.
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to transcend himself or to "surge up" and define himself in
differentiation from those around him. Jim's service aboard
the Patna is undertaken in what can best be described as an
ontological trance17 or what Sartre would label "being-initself." Jim

is "penetrated by the great certitude of

unbounded safety and peace that could be read on the silent
aspect of nature.. .and, as if made audacious by the invincible
aspect of the peace, he felt he cared for nothing that could
happen to him to the end of his days" (17, 19-20). Jim's
blindness at this point gives rise to his characteristic
hubris: "At such times his thoughts would be full of valorous
deeds: he loved these dreams and the success of his imaginary
achievements. They were the best parts of life, its secret
truth, its hidden reality" (20).
At no time in the novel is Jim more blind or less
authentic, a fact which is signaled, as so often in visionary
literature, by the presence of a figure-ground dichotomy:
There was nothing he could not face. He was so
pleased with the idea that he smiled, keeping
perfunctorily his eyes ahead; and when he happened
to glance back he saw the white streak of the wake
drawn as straight by the ship's keel upon the sea
as the black line drawn by the pencil upon the
chart. (20)

"Conrad's imagery would support this metaphor. Just prior
to the collision with the submerged derelict, Jim is
repeatedly described as "sleepy" and his blood to have "turned
to warm milk." The odious captain arrives on the bridge
dressed "in pyjamas and with his sleeping-jacket flung wide
open" (21).
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Characteristically at this point in his moral evolution, Jim
is focused upon the "figure" of the white streak left in the
Patna's wake and its "negative," the black line denoting her
nautical route, neatly ignoring the implications of the
formless "ground" of sea and chart which gives each being.
Moreover, the teleology implicit in the straightness of these
lines suggests a geographical/ontological illusion based upon
the human inability to perceive/see our situation in its
totality. Indeed, the very concept of a "chart"—which is but
a way of seeing—emblematizes the tenuousness of humankind's
grasp of its ontological orientation, a fact soon brought
graphically home by the Patna's encounter with the partially
submerged and consummately uncharted derelict vessel. And it
is that encounter, of course, that will precipitate Jim's
literal and deliberate plunge into the destructive element of
the sea.
Furthermore, one might well consider the "extraordinary
power of defying the shortness of memories and the length of
time" of the Patna affair within the context of figure-ground
relationships. Marlow observes to his auditors:
It seems to live with a sort of uncanny vitality,
in the minds of men, on the tips of their tongues.
I've had the questionable pleasure of meeting it
often, years afterwards, thousands of miles away,
emerging from the remotest possible talk, coming to
the surface of the most distant allusions. Has it
not turned up to-night between us? And I am the
only seaman here. I am the only one to whom it is a
memory. And yet it has made its way out! (137-8,
emphases mine)
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Surely,

on

the

quotidian

level,

it

is

the

affair's

extraordinary circumstances, its seeming to play out a moral
drama with apparently clear delineations of right and wrong
which define its compulsive presence in the minds of men; but
I would contend the Patna episode's true power to be contained
in a mythic or visionary dimension, in what Marlow elsewhere
labels the "fascination of the abomination"; it allows the
darkness underlying our dreams and endeavors to protrude and
then escape from our carefully crafted psychic defenses. Jim's
growth toward authenticity, responsibility, and freedom, then,
is

intimately

and

inextricably

tied

to

his

evolving

willingness to see or acknowledge and endure that darkness or
"ground," the chaotic, shapeless forces that underlie both the
macrocosm

(the indifferent universe he inhabits) and the

microcosm (the primacy of emotion over reason in his own self)
of his being.
It is not an easy acknowledgement. Early in his career,
Jim, injured in a shipboard accident caused by a storm which
"force(d) it upon the mind and the heart of a man, that this
complication of accidents or these elemental furies are coming
at him with a purpose of malice" lies in his cabin "at the
bottom of an abyss of unrest." Shielded from the storm's fury,
Jim's awareness of and attitude toward its danger fades,
becomes "shadowy." He "saw nothing.. .and felt secretly glad he
had not to go on deck." The visionary works considered thus
far teach us that the greater threat Jim faces here is not the
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presence of a malevolent universe but rather his refusal to
acknowledge its presence. Thus is he alternately gripped by a
"rush of anguish" at his ontological lethargy and at the
"unintelligent brutality of an existence liable to the agony
of such sensations." This is clearly a manifestation of
Stein's destructive element ("I tell you, my friend, it is not
good for you to find you cannot make your dream come true, for
the reason that you not strong enough are, or not clever
enough."), a confrontation that fills Jim with "a despairing
desire to escape at any cost." When fine weather returns, "He
thought no more about it" (11).
The significance here is not simply that Jim's early
years are marked by a distaste for acknowledging or grappling
with his special demons but rather that that struggle takes
place, as it were, off stage, away from the dramatic center of
events. This pattern will occur again in the pantomime of the
abandonment of the Patna, as Jim stands on the margin of the
scene, watching the frantic efforts of his fellow officers to
launch a lifeboat, and yet again as Jim removes himself
geographically and systematically from Europe, the novel's
implicit center of value. The common elements in each of these
situations are isolation, loneliness and marginality during
which Jim must confront the anguish of his desire to be and
even—if we recall the experience of, say, Martin Decoud
floating alone in the darkness of the Placid Gulf—whether to
be. By contrast, in Marlow's famous interview with the French
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lieutenant, the latter observes that while "man is born a
coward," habit, necessity and the eyes of others allow one to
bear the fear. Jim, Marlow observes, "had none of those
inducements" aboard the Patna (147).
Yet is it not during such moments of isolation on the
margins of existence that we are capable of seeing ourselves
most clearly? And conversely is it not the persistent tug of
the quotidian that obviates that vision? Marlow images the
French lieutenant as a priest "into whose ears are poured the
sins, the suffering, the remorse of peasant generations, on
whose faces the placid and simple expression is like a veil
thrown over the mystery of pain and distress" (139). As that
seaman's heroic wounds testify, he has experienced and borne
up under that pain; he has done, as he says, "one's possible."
Surely his thirty-two hours aboard an apparently doomed ship
would seem to dwarf Jim's experience. And yet does not the
French sailor's bulk, lethargy, love of wine, and hint of
scandal suggest his own tropism for the center and the
emergence

of

his

own

desire

to

lounge

safely

through

existence?
It is on the margin, of course, that creativity thrives,
and

implicit

in

the

very

idea

of

marginal ity

is

interrogativity, a critique of the center. The margin is the
region—whether geographic, psychic or artistic—that is most
dynamic, most

dangerous; at

once potentially

the most

destructive and the most creative venues of human experience.
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A similar dichotomy presents itself in Marlow's use of
the leitmotif "one of us." As a reference to Jim, it most
immediately refers to his membership in the brotherhood of the
sea and its tacit rules of conduct, which Jim has abrogated.
But like all great literature, Conrad's best work possesses
the ability to transcend itself, accruing not just broader
dimensions of meaning and complexities of implication, but
more importantly a reflexive, mirror-like effect upon the
reader wherein he or she comes to recognize the mythic quality
of the tale and consequently the ontological share he or she
holds in its telling. As the reader's recognition of the
universality of Jim's odyssey of becoming matures, the weight
of the meaning of the phrase "one of us" falls increasingly on
Jim's marginal aspects as a human being caught in a cycle of
failure and despair rather than on formal traits such as his
appearance or breeding.
Marlow in his struggle to reconcile the promise of Jim's
appearance with the seeming perfidy of his actions feels the
persistent tug of the center:
...for a second I wished heartily that the only
course left open to me was to pay for his funeral.
Even the law had done with him. To bury him would
have been such an easy kindness! It would have been
so much in accordance with the wisdom of life,
which consists of putting out of sight all the
reminders of our folly, of our weakness, of out
mortality; all that makes against our efficiency—
the memory of our failures, the hints of our
undying fears, the bodies of our dead friends.
(170)
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The key word here is "efficiency," a habit of moral and
psychological convenience that allows the inhabitants of the
center to, in Ian Watt's phrase, "secure their survival
through various unacknowledged mechanisms for hiding and
falsifying whatever might disturb their complacent attitude18"
(316). Captain Brierly is their patron saint. It is precisely
Jim's inefficient, even sloppy way of being that shocks
Brierly into suicide and pulls Marlow, mesmerized by Jim's
resonance for Marlow's own ordeal of becoming that had been
played out in "Youth" and "Heart of Darkness," inexorably
toward the psychic and geographical margins of experience.
When Brierly rhetorically questions Jim's insistence on
facing the Patna inquiry—"Why eat all that dirt?"—he is
attempting to secure his own survival through avoiding the
interrogativity—the exploration of self—that comes to define
both Marlow and Jim. Marlow's refusal to deliver to Jim
Brierly's

inducement

to

flee

prompts

Brierly's

ironic

complaint, "You don't think enough of what you are supposed to
be" (91-2). It is, of course, precisely Marlow's fascination
with the question of "how to be" that is a key component of
his visionary status: "I wanted to know," he says, aligning
himself with Plato, "and to this day I don't know, I can only
guess" (101). It is in the persistence and sincerity of
Marlow's questioning that we are able to discern Howe's
18

Cf. William James and Marlow's own comment: "...it is
my belief that no man ever understands quite his own artful
dodges to escape from the grim shadow of self-knowledge" (80) .
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comment

observed

in

chapter

one

of

the

modernists'

redefinition of the idea of the question; its metamorphosis
from interrogation to "mode of axiomatic value."
The concepts of interrogativity and marginality are
inextricably interrelated. What is secure and unquestioned is
in the center; yet, as Yeats told us, it is the special burden
of the interrogative mode of being to understand the ephemeral
nature of that center and to comprehend and confront the
destructive element of the beast that the center's demise
heralds. This awareness is present in Marlow's growing doubts,
"gnawing like a worm," regarding the existence of a "sovereign
power enthroned in a fixed standard of conduct." In effect he
is asking whether the stability of the center is not an
illusion sustained by the very indifference of those who
inhabit it.
This is expressed spatially through the setting of Jim's
"confession" to Marlow at the latter's hotel. The meeting
occurs in the dining room among a group of world travellers,
"people with a-hundred-pounds-round-the-world tickets in their
pockets" (99). These are the people Conrad had caustically
labeled "idiots," those "just as intelligently receptive of
new impressions as their trunks upstairs." As with Marlow's
categorization of the sailors plying their craft in the East,
we are again meant to infer an ontological distinction between
those concerned with the foggy adumbrations of the "Jim
problem" (that is, Marlow and those "of us" both within and
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without Lord Jim caught up in Marlow's "text") and those
concerned with the extent to which they've been "done" at the
local bizarre. While such distinctions are facile and patently
unfair, Conrad is intent here on emphasizing the types of
questions we allow to torment us. When Jim in the naivete of
his solipsism blurts out "hell" in description of the ordeal
of the inquiry, the other diners look up in "alarm from their
iced pudding," and Marlow realizes the interview must be moved
to an adjoining gallery. It is here on the physical margin of
the setting, where "the night seemed to hang like a splendid
drapery," serving as backdrop to Jim's Patna past ("the riding
lights of ships winked afar like setting stars") and his
Patusan future ("the hills across the roadstead resembled
rounded black masses of arrested thunderclouds") that Jim
actually narrates his desertion, going "through it again while
he was telling (Marlow) these things he could not tell the
court" (86).
And again, following Jim's sentencing, Marlow, out of "a
sense of responsibility," takes Jim back to his room: "On all
the round earth...he had no place where he...could withdraw—
be alone with his loneliness." Here Marlow oversees Jim's
metaphysical struggle with the question of "whether to be."
However, even the isolation of Marlow's ascetic room proves
inadequate to Jim's torments of conscience as, his body racked
by convulsive shudders, he bursts through the glass doors that
lead to a veranda. Again Jim's growing marginality—and
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therein his growing sense of self—is emphasized through
Marlow's juxtaposition of the "feeble burst of many voices"
emanating from the community dining room below with the depth
of Jim's commitment to face the destructive element of his
emotional despair. It is in this posture—with Jim "on the
brink of a vast obscurity," and the light from Marlow's candle
falling faintly on Jim's back—that Marlow says he "(wi)ll
always remember" what I would term the iconic Jim, who stands
as

a

paradigm

of

the

individual's

evolution

toward

authenticity. While it may seem at the very least ironic that
the plot does not in fact turn on the Patna incident, an event
with the power of apparently universal fascination, but rather
here in the silences and shadows of Marlow's room, Conrad is
once again demonstrating both his prescience in anticipating
literature's

movement

inward,

its

ability

to

achieve

communication through "an interaction between the explicit and
the implicit, between revelation and concealment" (Iser, 169)
and his instinctively existential outlook. For when Jim
reemerges from the veranda and intones "That's done," he is
signaling his readiness to "take possession of himself...to
mould himself in his own image" (Macquarrie, 74) . Unamuno
tells us that "we live in memory, and our spiritual life is at
bottom simply the effort of our memory to persist, to
transform itself into hope, the effort of our past to
transform itself into our future" (9) . This transformation and
creation occur on Marlow's veranda, an event so "marginal"
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that even Marlow cannot actually witness it, and yet its
results form the kernel of Jim's growth toward authentic
being.
The ideas of marginality and interrogativity may be
profitably extended to the reader, too, through his or her
interaction with the literal margin of the book. The blank
areas of the printed page are, like the white areas of Jim's
Patna sea chart, the terra incognita of the intellectual map
and the locus of the reader's most personal and intuitively
critical engagement with the page's center, its words, which
denote a certain "course" that the reader may follow passively
or question actively19. Marginalia mark the merging of reader
and text, the interaction of which produces, in Iser's model
of the reader's interaction with the author's text, the
possibility of textual meaning; here, I would suggest, it
marks the possibility of meaning beyond the literary work.
When the reader inscribes the page's margin, its blankness,
she or he is acting in similar ways: first, as a palpable sign
of

commitment

to

and

engagement with

the problem

and

experience of the work—what Conrad would term "fidelity."
Where the first-time reader of Lord Jim might well exhibit
distress or frustration that 350 pages of narrative, opinion,
and rumination on the phenomenon of Jim concludes with "who
knows?", what images of Sisyphean labor are conjured up by
19

Iser argues that the author's text "represents a
pattern, a structured indicator to guide the imagination of
the reader" (9) .
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those of us, aware of this (non)conclusion, who nonetheless
return repeatedly to this or any book, our journey delineated
by the increasing density of our marginalia20? The very
decision to read literature as a way of living as opposed to
a way of making a living21 serves as a microcosm for the
profound existential implications of how we fulfill ourselves
as individuals. For it is only through its depth or intensity
rather than its breadth that the reading experience or any
other experience fulfills one. To engage oneself with a work
or author is to some extent to deny the possibility of
experiencing others, textually or personally. Again fidelity
is the operative term. "Every decision is a decision against
as well as a decision for; and every decision limits the range
of possibilities that will be open for future decisions"
(Macquarrie, 182).
Second, marginalia are a sign of the reader's questioning
struggle toward meaning and of a desire to counter the
resistance of the black marks at the center of the page by
Z0

Iser reminds us that eighteenth century authors frequently
utilized the metaphor of the journey to educate their readers
to the rigors of apprehending longer genres like the novel.
The reader—like the traveller—"combines all that he sees
within his memory and establishes a pattern of consistency,
the nature and reliability of which will depend partly on the
degree of attention he has paid during each phase of the
journey" (16). This recalls for us, of course, the necessity
of multiple readings in trying to divine the "pattern" of any
complex literary work.
21

While I am not suggesting these two ways of relating to
texts to be mutually exclusive, I do maintain, as stated in my
first chapter, that the former often becomes lost in the
professional shuffle of the latter.
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connecting the self with them through the literal and
intellectual touching of the reader's words with the author's.
In essence, the margin becomes, like Sisyphus' rock, the
reader's "thing" through which the possibility of meaning is
derived

through

repeated—if

never

wholly

successful—

readings. When that text is "visionary" in nature, the choice
reflects Marlow's commitment to the enigma of Jim: "There was
nothing but myself between him and the dark ocean. I had a
sense of responsibility" (170-71) ; that is, the choice of
visionary texts as objects of engagement signal the reader's
commitment to the existential process of becoming just as the
act of inscribing the book's margins reflects his or her
passion for, questioning of and possible identification with
the possible ethical roles offered by the work. Marginalia,
then, function in two opposite ways: simultaneously connecting
the

reader

with

the

page's

center

but

also,

more

significantly, nudging him or her "over the edge" of the page
and into a being-in-the-world renewed and intensified by the
paradigms offered by visionary heroes. The reader's experience
of writing and "being" in the margins of Lord Jim is consonant
with, as mentioned above, Conrad's lifelong struggle to
inscribe meaning upon a universe he viewed as "a mystery
play...with

an

obscure

beginning

and

an

unfathomable

denouement: (Karl, 651).
A book itself is a "figure," a human structure created to
encompass and give significant form and meaning to the chaotic
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"ground" of experience. Fiction orders that experience and
presents it for our inspection and, I believe, our judgment.
From its opening paragraph where Conrad employs the second
person in his narration, Lord Jim seeks to draw the reader
into a position of moral participant; it seeks to force
choices upon us. It was not until my third or fourth reading
of the novel that the familiar phrase "one of us" brought me
up short with the force of "You hypocrite lecteur, mon semble,
mon frere," transforming the rules of my engagement with the
book. It became no longer Jim's relationship with his craft
that was my concern, nor even Marlow's to Jim, but rather,
more affectively and dangerously, mine to Jim and Marlow and
Conrad; and, by extension, to the men and women I would
encounter beyond the margins of this book; suddenly I become
part of "us."
This conversion is underlined through Jim's repeated
question to Marlow: "What would you do?" (pp. 102, 111, 121,
130, 132, 138). The baldness of the phrase, like so much else
about Jim's character, smacks of an adolescent naivete22,
suggesting the manner in which a high school sophomore might
expeditiously conclude an essay. But again an awareness of the
nature of visionary literature reminds us that this is, in
fact, an ur question that, like the refrain "one of us,"
22

The child-like qualities of visionaries like Jim, Rachel
Vinrace, Bartleby, and Miss Lonelyhearts speak to their
separateness from quotidian cynicism. Their innocence is
simultaneously compelling and threatening to those around
them; their prototype is Dostoyevsky's Prince Myshkin.
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serves through its very repetition to confront us with the
novel's ethical and existential choices. And implicit in the
idea of choice is that of action. Like the visionary hero, do
something we must—even in the face of the probable futility
of those actions. Indeed, much of the world's greatest
literature seeks to subvert meaning; it beckons us, too, to
jump ship. A novel like Lord Jim with its complex narrative
scheme23, ambiguity of character, rudely bifurcated structure
and refusal to "pay off" with easy truths and neat denouements
continually encourages the "average pilgrim" (68) to abandon
the work, to turn to more passive pursuits, to tasks more
promising of immediate and tangible reward. In this way, too,
the reading experience mirrors life. Ford Madox Ford observed
that his artistic collaboration with Conrad was based upon the
aesthetic principle "that the general effect of a novel must
be the general effect that life makes on mankind" (Watt, 209).
Therefore we have effects like the subversion of linear
progression in the revelation of Jim's character (who among
our

acquaintances

have

revealed

their

stories

to

us

linearally?) and, more significantly, the presentation to the
reader of a series of moral choices.

"Beach offers a graphic rendering of the convolutions of
Lord Jim's narrative scheme. Assuming a linear chronology of
the novel's events as denoted by an A, B, C, D, etc.
progression, the book's actual chronology reads, by chapters:
KLMP, WA, E,B, E, E, H, GD, HJ, FE, E, E, F, F, F, FK, I, I,
R, I, KL, MN, N. Q. QPO, OP, P, QP, P, P, P, QP, P, P, Q, Q,
Q, R, ZV, YX, S, S, S, TY, U, U, U, WXY. (363)
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The most affecting of these, I believe, occurs at the
conclusion of chapter 11. Jim has revealed to Marlow his
confrontation with and rejection of suicide following his leap
from the Patna: While he felt "sick of life," he understands
that "that was not the way. I believe—I believe it would
have—it would have ended—nothing." Jim then abruptly and
characteristically turns on his auditor (among whom we have
been prepared to number ourselves), asking with violent
emotion: "What do you believe?" Again, the question Jim asks
is "whether to be," whether he should have committed suicide.
While the question forces the engaged reader into conscious
moral participation in the analysis of Camus' philosophical
question, even more instructive is Marlow's reaction to Jim's
decidedly unrhetorical query:
A pause ensued, and suddenly I felt myself overcome
by a profound and hopeless fatigue, as though his
voice had startled me out of a dream of wandering
through empty spaces whose immensity had harassed
my soul and exhausted my body.
The passage possesses the signature Conradian note: doomladen
and complex. Marlow's image of wandering heart and soul sick
amidst a vast immensity (Ford would employ similar imagery in
The Good Soldier) has implications existentially and for the
related themes of marginality and nothingness. Indeed the word
"nothing"

reverberates

passage,

in

the

throughout

process

this

accruing

and

the ensuing

something

of

its

transformational power in another visionary novel, A Passage
to India.
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The complexity of the present passage manifests itself in
several ways: first, the subtle transition into simile of
Marlow's "dream" here recalls both Jim's condition when the
Patna struck the submerged derelict ship and of the potential
condition of the Patna's pilgrims, who, if Jim had chosen to
rouse them to the ship's condition, would have "leap(t) out of
sleep into terror" (105) . In so doing, it reinforces the
novel's frequent distinctions between levels of consciousness
or being. Secondly, the weltschmerz Marlow expresses is
triggered grammatically by Jim's question, "What do you
believe?" By implication it establishes action as the antidote
to the angst of Marlow's image of wandering through an
immensity of empty spaces. While a cursory reading might
suggest that weariness to result from the enigma of Jim, it in
fact results from Marlow's heretofore avoidance of just the
questions Jim is forcing upon him; that is, Jim's question
"startle(d Marlow) out of dream" he had already inhabited. The
axis of this key passage, though, is the "pause," the interval
of silence which suggests both Marlow's reflection upon the
implications of Jim's question and the ontological gulf which
separates individuals. It is during this chronological/psychic
Iserian "gap," instigated by Jim's question, that Marlow
confronts his enervating passivity and consequently the
necessity of choice.
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In essence, Marlow is attempting to "read" Jim much as we
are. Marlow, who never answers Jim's question, observes at the
beginning of chapter twelve:
The mist of his feelings shifted between us, as if
disturbed by his struggles, and in the rifts of the
immaterial veil he would appear to my staring eyes
distinct of form and pregnant with
vague appeal
like a symbolic figure in a picture24.
While the "mist" emphasizes the inherent isolation of each
character, the attempt of Marlow's "staring eyes" to divine
the meaning of Jim as symbol reflects the reader's own
experience of the text. Marlow finally breaks the silence by
intoning "I see," but "more," he claims, "to prove to myself
that I could break my state of numbness than for any other
reason." The point I would wish to make here is that Marlow
can break his condition of "numbness" only through "seeing,"
which is to say, understanding Jim's odyssey of becoming. And
like the novel's emphasis upon the creative possibilities to
be realized in the margins of existence, that understanding
emerges in the silences between the words where empathy and
compassion reign.
The

passage

also

illustrates

Morson's

theory

of

"Prosaics" mentioned in chapter one, which "privileges" the
novel over poetry as offering a special way of thinking about
the world before our eyes and about the ethical problems we

Z4

Cf. the "film" that obscures Racel Vinrace's vision, p.

163.
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constantly face" (527) . It is only in novels that we can
discover:
...descriptions of situations rich enough to
educate our moral sense...that offer a rich sense
of the psychological and moral milieu of living
people....The entire impulse is to provide just
such information, as "thickly" as possible. Ethics
is a matter of prosaics, and great prose develops
our ethical sense....In novels we see moral
decisions made moment by moment by inexhaustibly
complex
characters
in
unrepeatable
social
situations at particular historical times; and we
see that the value of these decisions cannot be
abstracted from these specifics. (526)
When the naive reader (if such exists) chooses to read
Lord Jim, he or she is ostensibly opting for a romance, a tale
of high adventure, large deeds and exotic setting. Such is the
focus of the world. "Most philosophers and historians tend to
focus on big events...and individual people tend to tell
themselves the story of their lives in terms of exceptional
events and big decisions." One is reminded again of Beckett's
observation that "all life is figure and ground." And indeed,
Jim's existence seems swallowed up by the few hours the Patna
incident takes to play itself out, an absorption imaged by
"the shadow of a silent cloud (that) had fallen upon the ship
from the zenith, and seemed to have extinguished every sound
of her teeming life" (105).
Yet I am suggesting that visionary fictions subvert any
expectation of meaning being discovered in the events which
typically form the foreground of experience and find it
instead in the paradoxical isolation and interaction of
reading, often in the form of letters—the most personal of
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human documents and the genre which offered both form and
credibility to the earliest English novels: Miss Lonelyhearts
hunched over the train of human misery represented in his
correspondents' letters; Seeger's shock of recognition as he
reads his father's letter; Bartleby's despair generated almost
by osmosis in the Washington dead-letter office, perhaps the
most marginal of venues; and in the more traditional "texts"
pursued by Rachel Vinrace in her shipboard cabin, South
American room and even its wilderness; and finally Jim, the
genesis of whose entire odyssey lies in his pursuit of "a
course of light holiday literature" (5). In this light, Morson
asks a question rooted in the distinction between center and
margin, and rooted, too, in the power of questions to change
the way we think and consequently live: "But what if the
important events are not the great ones, but the infinitely
numerous and apparently inconsequential ordinary ones, which,
taken together, are far more effective and significant?"
(519) . The center of Lord Jim is not truly to be discovered in
the Patna incident nor in Jim's martial exploits in Patusan,
but rather in the awkward, intensely intimate moments Jim and
Marlow spend together sorting out Jim's experience or in the
equally mundane decisions Jim makes in presiding over the
quotidian affairs of the Malayans. This is where he "surges
up" in the world, where he takes his most significant steps
toward authenticity, and where the book truly lives. "Art,"
Tolstoy observed, "begins where the tiny bit begins." So in
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that brief pause as he sits on the physical and psychic
margin, having been confronted by Jim's raw question, Marlow
experiences a subtle readjustment, an interrogation of self.
There is moral movement.
Ultimately

it is Marlow more than Jim who is our

visionary model for it his task to read, perceive and
comprehend Jim's experience. And Marlow proves a cogent
reader. Drawing upon the work of R.D. Laing, Iser tells us
that "all men are invisible to each other. Experience is man's
invisibility

to man"

(165) . This

is an

insight Marlow

instinctively shares:
I at least had no illusions; but it was I, too, who
a moment ago had been so sure of the power of
words, and now was afraid to speak, in the same way
one dares not move for fear of losing a slippery
hold. It is when we try to grapple with another
man's intimate need that we perceive how
incomprehensible, wavering, and misty are the
beings that share with us the sight of the stars
and the warmth of the sun. It is as if loneliness
were a hard and absolute condition of existence;
the envelope of flesh and blood on which our eyes
are fixed melts before the outstretched hand, and
there remains only the capricious, unconsolable,
and elusive spirit that no eye can follow, no hand
can grasp. (180)
Communication between individuals and between readers and
texts, Iser argues, results from individuals' efforts to fill
in these existential "gaps" or "blanks" or "indeterminacies"
with others or with the silence of the text. And again, Marlow
shows himself a competent reader: "...but I would have been
little fitted for the reception of (Jim's) confidences had I
not been able at times to understand the pauses between words"
238

(105). Iser points out that because "we have no experience of
how other experience us" our understanding of one another
results from "interpretation." Thus does Marlow "read" Jim.
Marlow's (and the reader's) exegesis of Jim's character
is aided by a series of "reflectors" whom he encounters in the
pursuit of his "text." The character of Brierly represents an
obvious example, his suicide offering a radical example of the
individual's failure to attain being-for-itself. Arguably the
most central reflector is the French lieutenant, who evokes in
Marlow perhaps the book's most cogent existential moment with
the commonplace remark "how the time passes." Marlow labels
his experience "a moment of vision," but while its mundane
catalyst is similar to those generating Joycean epiphanies,
the visionary nature of Marlow's experience is evident in its
emphasis upon quotidian blindness, not insight:
It's extraordinary how we go through life with eyes
half shut, with dull ears, with dormant thoughts.
Perhaps it's just as well; and it may be that it is
this very dullness that makes life to the
incalculable majority so supportable and so
welcome. Nevertheless, there can be but few of us
who had never known one of these rare moments of
awakening when we see, hear, understand ever so
much—everything—in a flash—before we fall back
again into our agreeable somnolence. (143)
Marlow's existential moment allows him to perceive the
Frenchman as indeed "left...hopelessly behind with a few poor
gifts." Those gifts, it is made clear, are heroic in nature,
"the

raw

material

of

great

reputations,"

but

most

significantly, I feel, they hint at Jim's own experience:
following his youthful shipboard accident, he, too, had been
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"left behind," (11) his persistent lameness portending the
Frenchman's own heroic scars. Indeed, at one point in the
recitation of his part in the Patna affair, the lieutenant
turns to Marlow and sounds Jim's leitmotif, "What would you
(do)" (140)? Clearly, he is intended to reflect what Jim may
become through the passage of time.
Similarly, the vignette of Bob Stanton (pp. 149-51)
functions only to mirror Jim's experience. Jim's situation as
a water-clerk is, Marlow observes, surpassed in its aridity
only by the position of an "insurance canvasser" a career
which Stanton briefly endured. It is Stanton, of course, who
later dies because he will not abandon a passenger paralyzed
by fright at their ship's impending sinking. But we as readers
recall, too, that in Lord Jim's narrative scheme, we have just
been told by the French lieutenant of the role of "the eye(s)
of others" that allows individuals to bear the horror of
experience, and we know, also, that, unlike Jim, the eyes of
Stanton's shipmates were riveted upon him throughout his
ordeal.
While Marlow does not dwell upon the perhaps too obvious
parallels of these situations, the fact that he includes them
in his narrative at all attests to the importance of his
continuous process of ethical weighing and balancing, aided by
the parade of "reflectors" he encounters. Textually this is
continued in short order with the appearance of Chester
(pp.161-69), who ironically announces himself to Marlow with
240

"Man overboard!" Chester, whom Marlow later characterizes as
a "strange idealist" (172), asseverates the need to "see
things exactly as they are—if you don't, you may as well give
in at once. You will never do anything in this world."
Chester's vision, not accidently, is of a literal world of
shit, a guano island upon which he seeks to place Jim, who,
with two six-shooters, would be "supreme boss" over forty
"coolies." The scheme, of course, is meant to represent a
variant foreshadowing of Jim's Patusan period, another way he
can possibly become, and evokes in Marlow a complementary
existential, even Promethean, image:
I had a rapid vision of Jim perched on a shadowless
rock, up to his knees in guano, with the screams of
sea-birds in his ears, the incandescent ball of the
sun above his head; the empty sky and the empty
ocean all a-quiver, simmering together in the heat
as far the eye could reach.
Accompanying Chester is Captain Robinson, "an emaciated
patriarch in a suit of white drill." Jim, too, we recall, was
dressed in white in Marlow's initial description; moreover,
there exists the air of scandal and infamy around "HolyTerror"

Robinson.

Nonetheless,

charges

of

cannibalism

following a shipwreck leave Robinson undeterred:
Three weeks after (rescue) he was as well as ever.
He didn't allow any fuss that was made on shore to
upset him; he just shut his lips tight, and let
people screech. It was bad enough to have lost his
ship, and all he was worth besides, without paying
attention to the hard names they called him.
Robinson, then, would appear to balance in Marlow's and the
reader's minds Bob Stanton's "way of being"; one simply exists
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in a condition of moral solipsism refusing, in Brierly's
phrase, "to eat all that dirt." However, herein an essential
distinction lies. To be sure, as Marlow says of Jim's case, "a
little coarser nature would not have borne the strain; it
would have had to come to terms with itself—with a sigh, with
a grunt, or even with a guffaw; a still coarser one would have
remained invulnerably ignorant and completely uninteresting"
(177). While Robinson clearly falls into the latter category,
we are reminded that the existentialists argue repeatedly for
the importance of the individual's escaping the constraints of
the "they," the crowd, who would seek to drag the existent
back into the grasp of quotidian moral lethargy. "Existenz,"
Jaspers observes, "warns me to detach myself from the world
lest I become its prey" (2:5). The case of Robinson—and
Chester for that matter—is a quite different matter in that
their disdain for the world is rooted
appropriate others as objects

in a desire to

(in Robinson's case in a

particularly grisly manner) . Chester and Robinson's venture to
the guano island is a case of sordid manipulation and material
lust profoundly dissimilar to Jim's existential need to
discover a place "where he could have it out with himself
without being bothered by the rest of the universe" (171).
It is this defining habit of conscience and moral
introspection

which

sustains Jim's

quest

for authentic

selfhood. Patusan is the setting and realization of that quest
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and is framed by yet two other reflectors, Stein and Gentleman
Brown.
Gripped

by

political

anarchy

and

suffused

by the

ubiquitous threat of violence and death, Patusan possesses in
its sheer alienness to Jim's experience the potential to
become for him another world of shit, but as Sartre teaches us
in works like "The Wall" and No Exit, the coward may transform
himself into a hero; we are what we make of ourselves. It is
in Patusan, then, that Jim attains authenticity by a sheer act
of will.
It might be argued that Jim's Patusan experience is
another instance of Heideggerian "thrownness"; indeed, Stein
states that "a man that is born falls into a dream like a man
who falls into the sea" (214). In fact, however, Jim grasps
with avidity Patusan's potential for reinventing himself: "He
left his earthly failings behind him and that sort of
reputation he had, and there was a totally new set of
conditions for his imaginative faculty to work upon" (218).
Its very alienness and danger—Marlow observes that if Stein
"had arranged to send him to a star of the fifth magnitude
that

change

could

not

have

been

greater"—reify

the

"destructive element" posited by Stein as humankind's only
salvation in a world where they are "not wanted, where there
is no place for (them)" (208).
Stein's pronouncement of humankind's essential alienation
is curious for he suggests, I feel, a theistic pole opposed to
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Gentleman Brown's atheism. Stein's "intense, almost passionate
absorption"

with

butterflies25

is

conducted

with

a

concentration of vision which intimates a Paleyan argument
from design:
...he looked at a butterfly as though on the brown
sheen of those frail wings, in the white tracings,
in the gorgeous markings, he could see other
things, an image of something as perishable and
defying destruction as these delicate and lifeless
tissues displaying a splendour unmarred by death.
(207)
In addition, while his rapid and incisive "diagnosis" of Jim's
problem as romanticism further marks him as a master "reader,"
Stein's Camusian prescription of suicide as the sole remedy to
the human condition—"'One thing alone can us from being
ourselves cure!' The finger came down on the desk with a smart
rap"—and his summation of our condemnation to freedom by the
arch-ur question "how to be" mark him as the novel's prime
existential voice.
If Stein has discovered meaning in his existence, it has
emerged through a process of becoming abetted by reflection.
While Marlow characterizes him as "one of the most trustworthy
men I have ever known" (202), Stein understands fully the
price

of that

attainment:

"And

do

you

know how many

opportunities I let escape; how many dreams I had lost that
had come in my way" (217)? Thus, while Marlow imbues Stein's
character with a certain ontological inevitability—"I saw
25

The butterfly, of course, is an ancient symbol for the
human soul and, as mentioned above, also carries resonance for
Jim's metamorphic project of authenticity.
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only the reality of his destiny, which he had known how to
follow with unfaltering footsteps"—the committed reader's
repeated encounters with Jim's reflectors has taught him to
perceive Stein as another26 possible way for Jim to be.
Stein's own awareness of the precariousness of existence
is symbolized in his pursuit of entomology: he collects not
only butterflies but also beetles. From a human perspective
those species may be seen to reflect the authentic and
inauthentic, the evolutionary and the stagnant. Stein's
fascination with them functions as a kind of memento mori, a
reminder of the cost and implications of his finally being
able to pronounce, "I exist, too" (217). The "beetleness" of
humanity is personified in Jim's final reflector, Gentleman
Brown.
The

figures

of

Brown

and

Cornelius, who

dog and

ultimately destroy Jim, suggest a remanifestation of Chester
and Robinson

in the same way that their guano island

prefigured the destructive element of Patusan. It is as if in
his use of reflectors Conrad were offering a series of quizzes

Z6

Cf. Stein with Siegmund Yucker (pp. 198-99), in whose
employ Jim briefly pursues his existence as a water clerk.
Yucker may be seen to foreshadow Stein in that Yucker and
Marlow discuss the possibility of sending Jim into the
interior to tend the Yucker Brothers "concessions," a plan
obviated by Jim's "secret" Patna past again reemerging.
Nonetheless, Conrad's rhetorical strategy appears to be to
create positive and negative "reflections" of characters as if
to emphasize the centrality of the human struggle—and
frequent failure—to achieve authenticity.
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or problems27 on certain ontological principles, changing only
the problems' components. Indeed, when we see this—that is,
when we understand

Lord Jim as visionary

in genre—we

actualize Iser's comment that "as the reader passes through
the various perspectives offered by the text and relates the
different views and patterns to one another he sets the work
in motion, and so sets himself in motion, too" (21).
That Conrad's stated aim was not only to make us "see"
but also to depict the drama of authenticity is further
reflected

in

the

seeming

awkwardness

of

Lord

Jim's

Patna/Patusan structure. It will be recalled that the genesis
of Jim's pursuit of heroism lay in "a course of light holiday
literature" (5) . But as I hope has been demonstrated, that
quest was marked by "bad faith"; Jim never committed himself
to the ideals and roles offered by those texts but rather
merely assumed a casual pose that proved woefully inadequate
to the actual rigors of existence. His leap from the Patna is
an act of indecision, which remains for Jim unresolved even in
retrospect: "I jumped—it seems."
In Patusan, however, Jim discovers what Kierkegaard
called an "idea for which I can live and die" (Journals, 15).
Nor has his early reading been in vain for he observes that
the Patusanians "are like people in a book" (260). What has
changed is Jim's vision of his being-in-the-world and of his

Z7

The reader will recall mention in chapter two of
Ignatius' "Spiritual Exercises."
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being-wlth-others: "It seemed to come to me," he tells Marlow.
"All at once I saw what I had to do" (261) . Jim's vision is of
a way to relieve the internecine warfare that has dissipated
Patusan, a plan for which "he had made himself responsible for
success on his own head" (263) . Most significantly, Jim's
commitment and sense of personal responsibility imbue him with
"the gift of finding a special meaning in everything that
happened to him" (305).
Jim's ultimate manifestation of that responsibility
before the chieftain Doramin following Gentleman Brown's
savage ambush is the culmination of a process that began with
Jim's resolve to stand before his nautical tribunal; that is,
one's authenticity results not from an existential moment,
which can only reveal one's situation in the world, but rather
through a psychological, spiritual and, as we saw in "Act of
Faith" and again in Lord Jim, even physical odyssey. It
persists here through what Marlow terms Jim's "retreat"
through various Eastern ports of call, turns on Jim's "leap of
(good) faith" from the Rajah's compound and concludes with his
"proud and unflinching glance" in the face of his own death.
Beyond the love of his wife and the unquestioning devotion of
Tamb' Itam—not inconsiderable gifts—Jim, once again, is left
with nothing beyond his hard-earned sense of self, his
authenticity.
Jim serves the reader as a paradigm of becoming, not
necessarily as a way, specifically, to be. That is a decision
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we must each make alone, abetted, ideally, by a plethora of
"texts," both literary and human. As Booth says, "If I do not
practice courage frequently enough to make it habitual, how
can I ever become courageous?" (253). Jim's manifest failure
aboard the Patna is the sign of his humanity, marking his
common cause with Adam and Eve, who, like Jim, were "not good
enough" and were also subsequently dissuaded by the forces of
darkness from fidelity to a sacred code. As for them, the
question for Jim becomes how to live in a hostile world
outside the bounds of romance. This question becomes Jim's
rock, which he chooses to embrace and push toward the summit.
It is a task, undoubtedly, as arduous, harrowing and fraught
with the likelihood of failure as the dragging of the cannons
to the peak of Doramin's mountain. Yet like Camus's Sisyphus,
"this universe without a master (must have finally seemed) to
Jim neither sterile nor futile....The struggle toward the
heights is enough to fill a man's heart" (91). We must imagine
Jim happy.
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Coda
In his essay on the novel in Fiction and Repetition. J. Hillis
Miller does not view Lord Jim as a source of ontological
strategies but instead as a work that fails to provide its
reader with a definite answer to whatever question it raises.
Miller seems virtually obsessed with the idea of a literary
work's

offering

an

unequivocal,

"visible

thematic

or

structuring principle which will allow the reader to find out
its secret, explicate it once and for all, untie all its knots
and straighten all its threads" (25) . In reviewing the book's
numerous reflections and resonances, he complains that "no
episode serves as the point of origin, the arch-example of the
mythos of the novel" (33-4); nor does the literary sleuthing
of critics like Sherry and Watt "serve as a solid and
unequivocal point of origin by means of which the novel may be
viewed, measured, and understood" (37) ; nor do its image
patterns offer "a last place where an unambiguous meaning may
be found" (37) . From this Miller asseverates: "I claim, then,
that from whatever angle it is approached Lord Jim is a work
which raises questions rather than answers them" (39). We
have,

of

course, heard

this

before.

The

words

are—

essentially—those of Irving Howe quoted above, and the
principle is the interrogativity which defines modernity and
is endemic to visionary fictions.
As a deconstructionist, Miller documents on the one hand
the "undecidability" of Lord Jim's multiple viewpoints; on the
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other, he refuses to distinguish among them. Is Chester's
determination to "see things as they are" motivated by the
same ethical values as the equally unencumbered vision of the
French lieutenant? Is Gentleman Brown but another version of
Jim

stripped

of

Jim's

reassuring

physical

form?

Now

admittedly, Miller's point may be that there is nothing either
within or beyond the "text" upon which we can definitively
discern the answers to these questions, and he would be right.
The

supreme

irony

is

that—like

Jim's

guilt—Miller's

deconstructive objections and observations are manifest and
unquestionable—and finally quite beside the point.
During his final meeting with Jim, Marlow speaks alone to
Jim's wife, Jewel, who tells of her mother's death after a
lifetime of abuse and degradation at the hands of the
scrofulous Cornelius. The tale, Marlow relates,
...had the power to drive me out of my conception
of existence, out of the shelter each of us makes
for himself to creep under in moments of danger, as
a tortoise withdraws within its shell. For a moment
I had a view of a world that seemed to wear a vast
and dismal aspect of disorder, while, in truth,
thanks to our unwearied efforts, it is as sunny an
arrangement of small conveniences as the mind of
man can conceive. But still—it was only a moment:
I went back into my shell directly. One must—don't
you know?—though I seemed to have lost all my
words in the chaos of dark thoughts I had
contemplated for a second or two beyond the pale.
These came back, too, very soon, for words also
belong to the sheltering conception of light and
order which is our refuge. (313)
Marlow's existential moment harbors the answers to Miller's
contention of the "undecidability" of Lord Jim or of any other
text. Marlow's "second or two beyond the pale" in which he
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loses "all (his) words" is in essence and function another
Iserian "gap," the moment constitutive of meaning in which the
words (or text) that he has heard (Jewel's story) and the
consciousness with which he seeks to interpret those words
interact. In Iser's model it is the dynamic of these two
forces (the "artistic" or textual pole and the "aesthetic"
pole, the "realization accomplished by the reader" [21]) which
produces the synthesis of meaning. But always this process is
aided

by

the

reader's

filling

of textual

"gaps," the

information which the silent text does not nor can not yield.
This textual silence mimics the cosmic silence against which
the visionary hero seeks to define him or herself in the same
way that Iser's conception of the "implied reader" (clearly an
addendum to Booth's "implied author") relates to my own
suggestion of the committed reader who will not only perceive
textual patterns and structure but also act upon that vision
beyond the text.
Indeed, the figure-ground dichotomies which have appeared
so prominently in visionary fictions are equally important in
Iser's theory of reading. For Iser, a text can never be
grasped wholly but only as "a series of changing viewpoints,
each one restricted in itself and so necessitating further
perspectives. This is the process by which the reader realizes
an overall situation" (68). The relevancy of this conception
for the "reflectors" operating in Lord Jim would seem clear.
Moreover, these viewpoints are alternately thrust into what
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Iser calls the "foreground and background" or "theme and
horizon." It is through the reader's continual acts of
comparison and contrast among these views (always abetted by
gap-filling) that meaning is produced.
Readers exist in the silence of gaps more than we ever
can in our processing of a text's words. I am reminded of
Kierkegaard's observation in Fear and Trembling that Abraham's
true trial and his greatest courage were not manifested in the
beginning of the downward sweep of his dagger toward Issac's
throat but instead during the three day's journey to Mount
Moriah which preceded that aborted act when he lived in
silence with the imminence of his task permeating his mind,
all the while attending to the quotidian tasks that, absurdly,
sustained the life he was committed to end. Abraham, of
course, was himself sustained by his faith, which, in effect,
filled up the terrible silence and the emptiness of his fate
with a vision of God: "He believed the ridiculous" (54).
It is perhaps equally ridiculous to believe that anyone's
engagement with literature will effect a more moral, or
meaningful, or happy existence. Kierkegaard speculates that
had Abraham lacked faith, he would have done something else—
something equally great, but different—and pictures him
plunging his knife

into his own breast. In this way,

Kierkegaard writes, "he would have been admired in the world
and his name never forgotten; but it is one thing to be
admired, another to be a guiding
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star that saves the

anguished" (54). Visionary fictions are guides on our own
anguished journeys toward selfhood; they aid us in the hard
task of becoming by presenting us with codes toward which we
can act with fidelity or, if the journey should appear too
arduous or its destination doubtful, with cynicism. As
Kierkegaard unquestionably found in his contemplation of the
Abraham legend, the choice we make reminds us of why art and
its criticism are important.
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APPENDIX
The use of a figure-ground dichotomy is found at the very
center of Stephen Crane's "The Blue Hotel" (1899), a story
that anticipates later visionary fictions and whose structure
is designed, like theirs, to virtually ambush the reader into
self-awareness. The figure of the Palace Hotel, we are told in
the opening line, takes its distinctive color from "the legs
of a kind of heron, (which) causes the bird to declare its
position against any background" (104). Indeed, the immediate
background we are given is a singularly hostile one—a
blizzard described as "a turmoiling sea of snow"—against
whose fury the hotel's inner sanctum, described in religious
imagery, remains unaffected: "No island of the sea could be
exempt in the degree of this little room with its humming
stove" (106). That this blithe sanctuary of the story's five
main characters seems to ineluctably disintegrate into a
brutal fistfight, a cold-hearted ostracism, and a vicious
murder is perhaps not surprising. The assiduously observed
code of conduct which sustains the hotel's veneer of civility
is increasingly revealed as an ineffectual, even desperate
maneuver against the implacable and indifferent chaos inherent
in human and physical nature.
However, the rhetorical ante is raised in the denouement
of "The Blue Hotel" in a way it is not, say, in "The Lottery"
(1949), which also addresses the theme of human kind's
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atavistic nature. In Shirley Jackson's story, for all the
genuine outrage its first readers felt and expressed, there
remains a certain aesthetic buffer; our complicity in the
story's culminating stoning is theoretical; that is, "The
Lottery's" exposition and structure—while perhaps implicating
us in its unthinking savagery—do not maneuver us into
psychologically choosing to become one of the scapegoaters. We
perhaps react to the climax as we would to films of Nazi war
crimes: with a horror leavened by our presumed moral distance
from the monsters who perpetrated them.
Like that of "The Lottery," the ending of "The Blue
Hotel" harbors the shock of recognition for the reader. But
our collusion in the violence of Crane's story is actual.
Crane manipulates the Swede's alternating puling and bullying
to engender our visceral and therefore complicitous reaction.
I suspect the reader's pulse quickens during the brawl between
Johnny and the Swede over the latter's charge of cheating (the
Cowboy, an Everyman figure, is reduced to an atavistic
bloodlust). And I suspect that reader's ego deflates upon the
Swede's unexpected victory. Seemingly instinctively, we choose
to stand against this "outsider," the marginal man who, alone
among the tale's five primary characters, is denied a name
even to the point of being stripped of his proper ethnicity.
But the revelatory dollop of exposition placed in the
story's denouement collapses the margin between fiction and
reality. We learn that for all his repulsive behavior, the
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Swede is both the victim of human duplicity
cheated)

as

well

as

a

kind

of

amoral

(Johnny had

visionary

who

instinctively names the latent violence lurking at the edges
of the Blue Hotel. With that knowledge, the reader is left
stranded either in the camp of the Easterner's pusillanimity
in failing to name Johnny's cheating when he saw it (the
terror of vision) or in that of the Cowboy—inarticulate and
uncomprehending (the inertia of blindness)—who ends the story
with a plea copped in various guises from grammar school to
Nuremberg: "Well, I didn't do anythin', did I?" "Every sin,"
the

Easterner/Crane

teaches

us,

"is

the

result

of

a

collaboration."
"The Blue Hotel"'s denouement has generally not fared
well at the hands of the critics. It is, as several have
pointed out, a second ending, offering a "moralizing appendix"
(Stallman) to the story's first, more dramatically concise and
aesthetically satisfying conclusion in which the mortally
wounded Swede stares up into "a dreadful legend" resting atop
a cash register: "This registers the amount of your purchase."
Indeed, Stallman contends that the two endings "contradict
each other in their philosophical import. What traps the Swede
is his fixed idea of his environment, but according to the
second conclusion it is the environment itself that traps him.
The two endings thus confound each other and negate the
(story's) artistic unity" (488).
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However, it is only when we view this story within the
context of visionary literature that we see that these two
endings are not contradictory but rather complementary. The
Swede is indeed "trapped" by the chaos of his environment.
Physical nature in the form of a blizzard howls and screams;
the hotel's color is said to "howl and scream"; and the men
that hotel harbors will literally howl and scream as well.
Moreover, the Swede's movement from the hotel—where "a
guest. . .has sacred privileges"—to the infernal saloon—marked
by "an indomitable red light" where he meets his death—is no
movement at all. He moves across a blasted, existential
landscape—
He might have been in a deserted village. We
picture the world as thick with conquering and
elate humanity, but here, with the bugles of the
tempest pealing, it was hard to imagine a peopled
earth. One viewed the existence of man then as a
marvel, and conceded a glamour of wonder to these
lice which were caused to cling to a whirling,
fire-smitten, ice-locked, disease-stricken, spacelost bulb. The conceit of man was explained by this
storm to be the very engine of life. One was a
coxcomb not to die in it. (311)
—and arrives where he began in a setting marked, like that of
the hotel, by an outward calm but harboring a cold, sudden,
virtually indifferent leathalness.
The Swede—like Bartleby and Miss Lonelyhearts—is a good
reader. His conception of the West, garnered from "dime store
novels," may indeed be a monomania, but it is a true and
accurate rendering of the essential nature—the environment—
of his world. That Crane's literary text is about learning to
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competently read the text of the world is emphasized by the
Easterner (who is Crane's persona) who observes that the man
who killed the Swede "isn't even a noun. He is a kind of an
adverb."

The grammar

of the visionary

uncompromising.
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is harsh and

